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The health insurance density in the Neth-
erlands is among the highest in the world. 
This is shown by the fact that, in 2016, only 
12 per cent of the Dutch insured opted 
for a reduction of health insurance cover-
age in the form of a voluntary deductible, 
while, at the same time, 84 per cent of the 
Dutch insured opted for an extension of 
health insurance coverage in the form of 
a supplementary health insurance. On the 
cover of this dissertation, this is illustrated 
by two individuals in a grocery store with 
the same basket of goods. The young wom-
en, however, reduces her basket by putting 
a product back onto the shelf (illustrating 
the voluntary deductible), while the old man 
extends his basket by adding a product (il-
lustrating the supplementary insurance). This 
dissertation questions whether risk aver-
sion alone can explain the low uptake of 
voluntary deductibles and the high uptake 
of supplementary insurance, since the value 
in terms of reduction of financial uncer-
tainty regarding financial losses is limited in 
those cases. Therefore, this dissertation aims 
to identify potential explanations for the 
demand for high health insurance coverage. 
The insights provided within this disserta-
tion could be used to optimise the design 
of health insurance – and more specifically 
the design of voluntary deductibles and the 
supplementary insurance – and to better 
facilitate the individual’s decision-making 
process concerning the demand for health 
insurance coverage.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
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11.1 baCKgROundIn the Netherlands, insurance premiums are as large as 11 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, which makes the Netherlands the number one coun-
try in Europe when it comes to insurance penetration in 2014 (SwissRe, 2015). 
On average, each Dutch individual spends 5,689 US Dollars on insurance of 
which over 75 per cent is spent on non-life insurance. The Netherlands is the 
country with the highest per capita spending on non-life insurance in the world 
in 2014 (SwissRe, 2015). This high demand for insurance not only holds for 
insurance in general, but also for health insurance specifically. After all, Dutch 
insured are obliged to purchase basic health insurance but, nevertheless, also 
voluntarily demand high health insurance coverage. This is for instance shown 
by the fact that only 12 per cent of the Dutch individuals opted for a reduc-
tion of health insurance coverage in the form of a voluntary deductible and 
at the same time 84 per cent of the Dutch individuals chose an extension of 
health insurance coverage in the form of supplementary health insurance in 
2016 (Vektis, 2016). In the classical economic theory, an individual behaves 
in a rational way and aims to maximise utility. From this theory, a potential 
explanation for the demand for high health insurance coverage might be risk 
aversion (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; Nyman, 1999). Individuals might know 
something about their need for healthcare services in the upcoming period, but 
the exact amount they will need to spend on healthcare will to a large degree 
be uncertain. Risk averse individuals will want to protect themselves from the 
possibility of having to need a substantial amount of money to purchase the 
necessary treatments and consequently purchase health insurance. So, from a 
traditional economic point of view, the main reason to purchase health insur-
ance is the reduction of uncertainty regarding financial losses (Nyman, 1999). 
This implies that the value of health insurance increases with the unpredict-
ability of healthcare spending and with risk aversion (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 
2000). This dissertation questions whether risk aversion alone can explain the 
demand for high health insurance coverage as expressed by the low uptake of 
voluntary deductibles and the high uptake of supplementary health insurance. 
After all, the value in terms of reduction of uncertainty regarding financial 
losses is limited in those cases. For instance, Dutch individuals can opt for 
the highest voluntary deductible of €500 and get a premium rebate of €300 in 
return, which implies that little financial risk (i.e., €200) is left. This implies 
that Dutch insured are willing to pay €300 in order to commute a deductible of 
€500. Additionally, the Dutch supplementary health insurance mostly provides 
access to already affordable healthcare services such as dental check-ups and 
regular consultations with the physiotherapist, meaning that the risk reduc-
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tion from purchasing supplementary insurance is limited. Dutch insured are 
for instance willing to purchase supplementary health insurance covering 
dental expenses up to a maximum of €250 per individual per year for an annual 
premium of €180 per individual. These examples illustrate that other aspects 
than risk aversion are likely to affect the demand for health insurance coverage 
as well. Against this background, this dissertation studies the following central 
research question:
What are potential explanations for the low demand for voluntary deductibles 
in basic health insurance and the high demand for supplementary health 
insurance?
To answer this central research question, the traditional economic literature 
and the behavioural economic literature will be studied. Furthermore, several 
empirical analyses and empirical simulations will be performed using real world 
data from a large Dutch health insurer containing individual-level information 
on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics for six years. This dissertation 
could provide important insights into which aspects drive the demand for health 
insurance coverage. With these insights the design of health insurance – and 
more specifically the design of voluntary deductibles and the supplementary 
health insurance – could be optimised and the individual’s decision-making 
process concerning health insurance coverage could be better facilitated. The 
next section of the introduction will discuss the voluntary deductible and the 
corresponding three research questions. The third section will elaborate on the 
supplementary health insurance and provides the corresponding fourth and 
fifth research questions. Finally, the fifth section will provide the structure of 
this dissertation.
1.2 ThE vOLunTaRy dEduCTIbLE
By opting for a voluntary deductible, individuals voluntarily choose to lower 
their health insurance coverage in return for a premium rebate. In the Neth-
erlands, but also Germany, Switzerland and the USA individuals are being 
offered the possibility to opt for such a voluntary deductible. Voluntary deduct-
ibles are introduced in order to counteract moral hazard. Moral hazard refers 
to the change in health behaviour and health consumption resulting from the 
fact that the insurer reimburses (part of) the costs. In case of a deductible, indi-
viduals pay healthcare expenses up to the deductible amount out-of-pocket. In 
the Netherlands, individuals can opt for five predetermined deductible levels, 
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1i.e., €100, €200, €300, €400, €500. The voluntary deductible is preceded by a mandatory deductible (i.e., €385 in 2016), from which expenses for the GP, maternity care and for children are excluded. Each health insurer is free to determine the community-rated premium rebate individuals receive in return 
for their chosen deductible amount.
1.2.1 financial profitability
In the Dutch mandatory basic health insurance, 12 per cent of the insured 
opted for a voluntary deductible in 2016 (Vektis, 2016), which is relatively low 
compared to the 56 per cent of Swiss insured opting for a voluntary deductible 
in 2014 (Bundesamt für Gesundheit, 2014). Given this low percentage, it might 
be questioned whether the low uptake of the voluntary deductible in the Dutch 
basic health insurance might be explained by the fact that it is financially unat-
tractive for the Dutch consumer to opt for a voluntary deductible. The first 
research question of this dissertation focuses on the financial profitability of 
opting for a voluntary deductible as a potential explanation for the low demand 
for voluntary deductibles in health insurance. It is stated as follows:
Q1. How profitable is a voluntary deductible in health insurance for the 
consumer?
In order to answer this question, a large Dutch database with individual-level 
information on insurance claims and background characteristics for six years 
is used. With this data, we study the financial profitability in retrospect, both 
at the individual level and for different groups of insured based upon their 
background characteristics. Additionally, we relate the financial profitability to 
background characteristics in a multivariate binary logistic regression analysis.
1.2.2 Ex-ante and ex-post premium differentiation
As mentioned already, only 12 per cent of the Dutch individuals opted for a 
voluntary deductible in 2016 (Vektis, 2016). Therefore, the moral hazard reduc-
tion resulting from this deductible is quite limited. Economic theory predicts 
that rational consumer behaviour causes individuals to opt for a voluntary 
deductible only if their expected expenses under the deductible fall (far) be-
low the premium rebate. This phenomenon is referred to as adverse selection 
and implies that low-risk individuals are more inclined to opt for a voluntary 
deductible than high-risk individuals (within the same premium risk group) 
(Akerlof, 1970; Cummins et al., 1982; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998; Neudeck 
and Podczeck, 1996; Pauly, 1986). This kind of behaviour would also imply that 
insured do not opt for a voluntary deductible in a (incidental) year they expect 
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(high) healthcare expenses. In free markets, insurers can reduce adverse selec-
tion by risk-rating the premium or by denying insured to reduce the deductible 
level in later years. Additionally, insurers in either free or regulated markets 
– such as in the Netherlands – can reduce adverse selection by an ex-ante or ex-
post differentiation of the premium according to, respectively, the duration of 
the contract for which the voluntary deductible holds or the number of previous 
years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible. It is hypothesised that the 
longer the period for which the voluntary deductible holds or the more previous 
years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible, the lower the premium 
can be. Such a differentiated premium rebate could incentivise insured to opt 
for a voluntary deductible for a longer period or more consecutive years. Con-
sequently, this could imply a larger reduction in moral hazard since insured 
then also opt for a voluntary deductible in (incidental) years they expect (high) 
healthcare expenses. The second research question of this dissertation explores 
the premium patterns in case of either an ex-ante or ex-post differentiation of 
the premium and reads:
Q2. What would the premium look like when differentiated to either the duration 
of the contract for which the voluntary deductible holds or the number of 
previous consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible?
In order to answer this research question, we will simulate the distribution 
of insured across the deductible options and subsequently determine the cor-
responding premium patterns. To achieve this, data from a large Dutch health 
insurer with individual-level information on healthcare expenses and risk 
characteristics of 762,982 insured for six years are used.
1.2.3 behavioural economic determinants of deductible uptake
The previous research questions studied the financial profitability – of which 
the premium makes up a substantial part – of opting for a voluntary deduct-
ible as a potential explanation for the low demand for voluntary deductibles 
in health insurance. The results thereof show that opting for a voluntary de-
ductible would have been financially profitable for about one in two insured in 
retrospect (see chapter 2). Nevertheless, only 12 per cent of the Dutch insured 
opted for a voluntary deductible in 2016 (Vektis, 2016). This discrepancy sug-
gests that reasons other than the financial profitability might influence the 
decision to opt for a voluntary deductible. Subsequently, the third research 
question of this dissertation reads:
15
1Q3. Which determinants could affect deductible uptake in health insurance and which strategies could increase deductible uptake?In other words, this research question does not only identify potential determi-
nants of deductible uptake, but also aims to provide insights into what these 
determinants imply for the design of voluntary deductibles. After all, if more 
insured would opt for a voluntary deductible, moral hazard will, ceteris paribus, 
be further reduced. To answer this research question, an extensive literature 
study in the behavioural economic field is performed.
1.3 ThE SuPPLEMEnTaRy hEaLTh InSuRanCE
The Dutch health insurance system could, roughly, be classified into the Law 
on Long-term Care (Wet Langdurige Zorg (2015)), the Health Insurance Act 
(Zorgverzekeringswet (2006)) and the supplementary health insurance. The first 
covers healthcare services for individuals who need round-the-clock intensive 
healthcare or close supervision. The Health Insurance Act obliges individuals 
to purchase basic health insurance that covers – among others – expenses for 
the GP, the hospital and pharmaceuticals. Next to this mandatory basic health 
insurance, Dutch insured can voluntarily extend their health insurance coverage 
by purchasing supplementary health insurance. This supplementary insur-
ance provides coverage for healthcare services not (or partially) covered by the 
mandatory basic health insurance. In the Netherlands, these healthcare services 
include, among others, dental care for adults, physiotherapy, durable medical 
equipment, alternative medicines, pharmaceuticals, care consumed in a foreign 
country, orthodontics and maternity care, as far as these benefits are not covered 
by basic health insurance. Contrary to basic insurance, supplementary insurance 
in the Netherlands is offered at a free market, which means that insurers are 
free to determine the premiums, coverage and cost-sharing arrangements. Ad-
ditionally, instead of the requirements of community-rating and open enrolment 
such as at the basic health insurance market, insurers on the supplementary 
insurance market are free to apply risk-rating and selective underwriting.
1.3.1 non-optimal supplementary health insurance
Traditional economics states that the advantage of purchasing health insur-
ance can be found in the reduction of uncertainty regarding financial losses, 
while the disadvantage lies in moral hazard, the loading fee and transaction 
costs. Ultimately, health insurance design involves a trade-off between the 
gains from risk pooling and the losses from moral hazard, the loading fee and 
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transaction costs. In this respect, the literature shows that full insurance is 
far from optimal and that a mix of coverage and cost-sharing is preferred (e.g., 
Arrow, 1976; Manning and Marquis, 1996; Zeckhauser, 1970). Optimal designs 
of health insurance a) protect individuals against unpredictable high financial 
risks, b) provide access to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services, c) include 
first-dollar cost-sharing, and d) incorporate individual caps on out-of-pocket 
expenses (see table 1.1). The Dutch supplementary health insurance deviates 
from the optimal insurance design as described by the traditional economic 
literature in several aspects (see table 1.1). Firstly, the Dutch supplementary 
health insurance covers healthcare services that do not involve large losses 
and it applies coverage limits. Due to these coverage limits, the risk reduction 
resulting from the supplementary health insurance seems limited. Secondly, 
the Dutch supplementary health insurance mostly provides access to already 
affordable healthcare services such as dental check-ups and regular consulta-
tions with the physiotherapist. These two characteristics suggest that the con-
sumers’ welfare gain from purchasing supplementary health insurance may be 
limited. Thirdly, the loading fee (i.e., about 17 per cent of the premium (Vektis, 
2015c)), moral hazard and the transaction costs of the supplementary health 
insurance are substantial. Substantial moral hazard can be expected, because 
most healthcare services are subject to first-dollar coverage, while substantial 
transaction costs could arise since many insurers offer many different supple-
mentary insurance policies. Consequently, the consumers’ welfare loss from the 
Dutch supplementary health insurance may be substantial.
Table 1.1 Characteristics of health insurance design: “optimal” versus the Dutch supplemen-
tary health insurance.
Characteristic
Optimal insurance 
design
dutch supplementary insurance
1. What does the 
insurance provide 
protection against 
and what does it 
provide access to?
Unpredictable 
high financial risks 
and otherwise 
unaffordable 
healthcare services.
Mostly predictable low financial risks (e.g., 
dental check-ups and consultations at the 
physiotherapist). Some supplementary 
insurances provide protection against large 
expenses, but these are mostly maximised (e.g., 
dental expenses after an accident (up to about 
€10,000), care consumed in a foreign country)
2. Is cost sharing 
applied and if so, 
how?
Yes, in the form 
of first-dollar cost 
sharing.
In general no; only dental insurances apply 
coinsurance of 20-25 %.
3. Are caps on out-
of-pocket expenses 
applied and if so, 
how?
Yes, in the form of an 
individual cap.
No, after the coverage limits (e.g., nine 
treatments at a physiotherapist) are reached, 
insured pay the full expenses for healthcare 
services out-of-pocket.
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1In short, given this non-optimal design of the Dutch supplementary health insurance, it is all the more surprising to observe that so many Dutch insured purchase supplementary insurance. The fourth research question of this dis-sertation reads:
Q4. Why do so many Dutch insured take out non-optimal supplementary health 
insurance?
To answer this research question, we will systematically study 1) the tradi-
tional economic literature on optimal insurance design, 2) the behavioural 
economic literature to see whether aspects – other than those mentioned in the 
traditional economic literature – could provide a welfare gain to insured when 
taking out supplementary health insurance and 3) the behavioural economic 
literature to see whether certain aspects could indicate why insured make 
suboptimal choices.
1.3.2 adverse selection
The Dutch supplementary health insurance is offered at a free market. Nev-
ertheless, many insurers do still apply community-rating and open enrolment 
as a result of societal pressure. Theory predicts that the combination of a free 
market with community-rating should lead to adverse selection (Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, 1976). Adverse selection refers to the tendency that, within each 
premium risk group, high-risk individuals have a larger incentive to buy 
supplementary insurance or to extend their coverage compared to low-risk in-
dividuals. Historically, almost all Dutch individuals purchased supplementary 
health insurance. There are, however, four indications that adverse selection 
has started to occur in the Dutch supplementary health insurance. Firstly, the 
percentage of individuals with supplementary insurance decreased from 93 per 
cent in 2006 to 84 per cent in 2016 (Vektis, 2016). Secondly, individuals with 
supplementary health insurance take out insurance policies with less compre-
hensive coverage than before (Vektis, 2015c; Gezondheidsnet, 2012). Thirdly, 
insurers’ total technical result on supplementary insurance policies reduced 
substantially since 2008 (Vektis, 2015a). Fourthly, more and more insurers 
stop offering supplementary health insurance policies providing coverage for 
healthcare services mostly used by high-risk individuals, while the premium 
for policies that do offer this coverage increased considerably (Zorgwijzer, 
2015). To counteract adverse selection, insurers are allowed to apply premium 
differentiation, which means that the premium for each insurance policy is 
adjusted to the individual’s risk. Nevertheless, only very few Dutch insurers 
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apply premium differentiation due to a fear of loss of reputation. Against this 
background, the fifth research question reads:
Q5. How could adverse selection affect the premium for supplementary 
insurance over time and would premium differentiation be able to counteract 
adverse selection?
To answer this research question, the uptake and premium development of 
supplementary health insurance over time is simulated using data from a large 
Dutch health insurer with individual-level information on healthcare expenses 
and risk characteristics from 110,261 insured for six years.
1.4 STRuCTuRE Of ThIS dISSERTaTIOn
This dissertation is structured as follows. In part I (The voluntary deductible), 
chapter 2 studies the financial profitability of opting for a voluntary deductible 
as a potential explanation for the low demand for voluntary deductibles (i.e., 
research question 1). Thereafter, chapter 3 examines the premium patterns for 
health insurance in case they would be differentiated to either the duration 
of the contract for which a voluntary deductible holds or the number of previ-
ous years insured opted for a voluntary deductible (i.e., research question 2). 
Chapter 4 studies potential behavioural economic determinants that affect the 
decision to opt for a voluntary deductible to explain the low uptake of voluntary 
deductibles. This chapter additionally provides insights into the implications 
of these determinants for the design of the voluntary deductible by mentioning 
several strategies to increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary 
deductible (i.e., research question 3).
In part II (The supplementary health insurance), chapter 5 incorporates 
the traditional economic literature on optimal insurance design and the 
behavioural economic literature to explain why so many Dutch insured pur-
chase non-optimal supplementary health insurance (i.e., research question 4). 
Furthermore, chapter 6 studies the effect of adverse selection on the uptake 
and premium development of supplementary health insurance over time and 
the potential of premium differentiation to counteract adverse selection (i.e., 
research question 5). Subsequently, chapter 7 summarises the main findings 
of the preceding chapters and subsequently answers the central research ques-
tion of this dissertation. It additionally provides the policy implications of the 
findings of this dissertation and shows several directions for further research. 
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1Since chapters 2 through 6 are written as separate articles1, they can be read independently.
1 This dissertation is based upon five separate articles relating to chapters 2 through 6. 
The first author of all these articles has performed most of the work during all stage of the 
research, starting from searching and studying the relevant literature, to performing the em-
pirical analyses, to reporting the findings. The co-authors (i.e., respectively, the co-supervisor 
and the supervisor) were consulted on a frequent basis to share ideas, discuss the findings, 
and / or to provide feedback on the manuscript.

Part I The voluntary deductible

Chapter 2
How profitable is a voluntary deductible in health 
insurance for the consumer?
24
abSTRaCT
To counteract moral hazard in health insurance, insured can be offered a volun-
tary deductible in return for a premium rebate. In the Dutch mandatory basic 
health insurance however, only 11 per cent of the insured opted for a voluntary 
deductible in 2014. Several determinants could affect the decision to opt for 
a voluntary deductible. This paper examines one of these determinants: the 
financial profitability. A voluntary deductible is profitable for the consumer if 
the out-of-pocket expenses do not exceed the offered premium rebate. The em-
pirical analyses, based upon individual-level data on costs and characteristics 
of over 800,000 Dutch insured, show that a voluntary deductible of €500 on top 
of the mandatory deductible of €360 would have been financially profitable for 
48 per cent of the Dutch insured given the average premium rebate of €240 in 
2014. If the whole population had a voluntary deductible, most insured would 
obtain either the maximum loss (44 per cent) or the maximum gain (41 per 
cent). A voluntary deductible is profitable for males, young insured, healthy 
insured and insured with few healthcare expenses in the past. To further re-
duce moral hazard, the following strategies can be used to increase the number 
of insured opting for a voluntary deductible: provide insured with information 
regarding the voluntary deductible and introduce a shifted deductible.
25
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2.1 InTROduCTIOn
A well-known consequence of (comprehensive) health insurance is moral hazard, 
which refers to the change in health behaviour and consumption caused by the 
(partial) reimbursement of costs by the health insurer. One strategy for policy 
makers and health insurers to counteract moral hazard is offering insured 
a voluntary deductible in return for a premium rebate (Folland et al., 2010; 
Zweifel and Manning, 2000). Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
USA apply this strategy. In the Dutch mandatory basic health insurance, 11 
per cent of the insured opted for a voluntary deductible in 2014 (Vektis, 2014), 
which is relatively low compared to the 56 per cent of Swiss insured opting for 
a voluntary deductible in 2013 (Bundesamt für Gesundheit, 2013). Given this 
low percentage it can be questioned whether the voluntary deductible in the 
Dutch basic health insurance is attractive for the consumer.
An insured’s decision to opt for a voluntary deductible can be affected by 
several determinants, like risk aversion, loss aversion, status quo bias, limited 
knowledge regarding the voluntary deductible and the financial profitability 
of the voluntary deductible. Risk aversion could affect the decision to opt for a 
voluntary deductible since uncertainty exists about future healthcare expenses 
(Gorter and Schilp, 2012; Rice, 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2006). Loss aversion 
could affect this decision (Johnson et al., 1993) since a voluntary deductible im-
plies a potential loss and losses are overweighted relative to gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Status quo bias could have an effect since insured tend to 
prefer their current insurance policy – including the chosen deductible level – 
when they decide whether or not to renew their current policy (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988). Previous research has shown that insured know little about 
their health insurance (Hsu et al., 2004; Reed et al., 2009) and that individuals 
misunderstand complex price schedules including premiums and cost-sharing 
arrangements (Baicker et al., 2012; Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004; Marquis, 
1981). Limited knowledge regarding a voluntary deductible could therefore also 
affect the decision. Finally, the profitability of a voluntary deductible could 
affect the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible (Van Kleef et al., 2006).
This paper focuses on the last determinant: the financial profitability. Con-
sidering the low percentage of Dutch insured opting for a voluntary deductible, 
this paper raises the question whether a voluntary deductible is financially 
profitable for Dutch insured. The financial profitability of a voluntary deductible 
depends on the out-of-pocket expenses due to the voluntary deductible and on 
the offered premium rebate. As long as the out-of-pocket expenses do not exceed 
the premium rebate, a voluntary deductible is financially profitable. The aim 
of this paper is to empirically examine the financial profitability of a voluntary 
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deductible for groups of insured, using a large database with individual-level 
information on claims and background characteristics for six years. Section 
two discusses the data and section three describes the methods. Section four 
presents the results of the empirical analyses. The findings are concluded and 
discussed in section five and policy recommendations are provided in section 
six.
2.2 REguLaTORy fRaMEWORK
To examine the financial profitability of a voluntary deductible, we use data 
from a large Dutch health insurer. The insurer operates under the Health 
Insurance Act, of which the introduction in 2006 was an important further step 
towards regulated competition. This law obligates insured to take out basic 
health insurance from a private health insurer. In 2014, insured could choose 
among 70 basic insurance policies offered by 26 health insurers. Adults are 
required to pay a mandatory deductible of €360 (2014) per individual per year 
from which GP-care, obstetric and maternity care are exempted. On top of the 
mandatory deductible, individual adults can opt for a voluntary deductible of 
€100, €200, €300, €400 or €500 per individual per year. The law states that the 
offered premium rebate must be equal for each insured with the same deduct-
ible level within the same health insurance product. In 2014, the premium 
rebate for the highest deductible level varied between insurance policies from 
€180 to €300 per individual per year and the average premium rebate was €240 
per individual per year. Note that the law does not dictate insurers to exclude 
the same healthcare services (i.e., GP-care, obstetric and maternity care) from 
the voluntary deductible as from the mandatory deductible, but all insurers do 
this.
2.3 daTa
For the empirical analyses we use the Achmea Health Database that contains 
administrative data from a large Dutch health insurer who operates particular-
ly in the western and eastern parts of the Netherlands. It includes individual-
level information on insurance claims in the years 2006–2011 aggregated at 
and categorised into the following eleven types of healthcare services: GP-care, 
pharmacy, inpatient care, hospital admissions, outpatient care, dental care, 
maternity care, aids, physiotherapy, mental care and care consumed in a for-
eign country. Moreover, the database includes an encrypted ID-number and 
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(per year) information on the year of birth, sex, ethnicity, degree of urbanisa-
tion, the number of days of enrolment in the health insurance policy and in 
which Pharmacy-based Cost Group (PCG) and/or Diagnoses-based Cost Group 
(DCG) the insured is classified for the risk equalisation scheme. PCGs and 
DCGs are risk adjusters used as a proxy for health status, based upon prior use 
of pharmaceuticals and prior hospital inpatient diagnoses, respectively (Van 
Kleef et al., 2013). Table A1 in Appendix 1 provides the characteristics of the 
database for 2011 (i.e., the year upon which the analyses are performed). For 
simplicity reasons, two selection criteria are applied: individuals must be fully 
insured in all six years and individuals must be 18 years or older on January 
1, 2011 since in the Netherlands only adults can opt for a voluntary deductible.
2.4 METhOdS
Given the available data, this section describes the operationalisation of the 
two components of the financial profit: the out-of-pocket expenses and the 
premium rebate. A voluntary deductible is financially profitable if the out-of-
pocket expenses do not exceed the premium rebate. This section furthermore 
discusses the statistical analyses used to determine the financial profitability 
of a voluntary deductible.
2.4.1 Operationalisation
Out-of-pocket expenses
Given that we have data regarding individuals who are fully insured in the 
Dutch basic health insurance in 2011, we performed four steps to achieve the 
out-of-pocket expenses under the voluntary deductible. First, we deflated the 
mandatory and voluntary deductible levels and the premium rebates to the level 
of 2014 in order to estimate the profitability of a voluntary deductible in 2014 
(e.g., the average premium rebate of €240 in 2014 is deflated to €209 in 2011). 
Second, the sum of all aggregated annual healthcare expenses under basic in-
surance are determined. Third, it is determined which healthcare expenses are 
subject to the voluntary deductible. This means that expenses excluded from 
the mandatory and voluntary deductible (i.e., costs for GP-care, obstetric and 
maternity care) and the mandatory deductible itself are subtracted from the 
aggregated amount. Given a certain premium rebate, a larger mandatory de-
ductible decreases the out-of-pocket expenses due to the voluntary deductible, 
because higher healthcare expenses are (ceteris paribus) needed to reach the 
voluntary deductible. Since the mandatory deductible increased significantly 
in the Netherlands (i.e., from €170 in 2011 to €360 in 2014), the effect of the 
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mandatory deductible on the profitability of a voluntary deductible is studied 
by applying three mandatory deductible levels: no mandatory deductible and 
the mandatory deductible levels of 2011 and 2014. As a fourth and final step, 
only the healthcare expenses up to the voluntary deductible amount (i.e., €500) 
are taken into account to determine the profitability of a voluntary deductible.
In our primary analyses we do not correct the out-of-pocket expenses for a 
possible moral hazard reduction. Given a certain voluntary deductible amount, 
the out-of-pocket expenses are smaller as the moral hazard reduction is larger. 
To indicate the effect of moral hazard on our results, a sensitivity analysis is 
performed with a reduction of healthcare expenses due to reduced moral hazard. 
Based upon research by Keeler et al. (1988) (see also (Bakker, 1997; Bakker et 
al., 2000)), the total moral hazard reduction due to a voluntary deductible of 
€500 in 2014 is set at 4.7 per cent of the total individual healthcare expenses. 
The insurer ‘benefits’ more from the moral hazard reduction (i.e., reimburses 
less claims) compared to the insured (i.e., pays less out-of-pocket). Calculations 
by Keeler et al. (1988) (see also (Bakker, 1997; Bakker et al., 2000)), show that 
the distribution of the total moral hazard reduction is almost 70 per cent to the 
insurer and 30 per cent to the insured. This means that the largest part of the 
moral hazard reduction will be reflected in the premium rebate for a voluntary 
deductible and not in lower out-of-pocket expenses for the insured. For our 
sensitivity analysis, this implies a reduction of the out-of-pocket expenses of 
1.36 per cent of the total individual healthcare expenses.
Premium rebate
Besides the out-of-pocket expenses, the premium rebate determines the profit-
ability of a voluntary deductible. Since Dutch data is used, the Dutch average 
premium rebate for a voluntary deductible of €500 (i.e., €240 in 2014) is ap-
plied. This regards the average over all Dutch insurance policies. To check the 
sensitivity, the profitability of a voluntary deductible is also determined with 
the lowest and highest offered premium rebates in 2014 for a voluntary deduct-
ible of €500 (i.e., €180 and €300).
2.4.2 Statistical analyses
To determine the financial profitability of a voluntary deductible, we calculated 
per insured in retrospect whether the out-of-pocket expenses exceed the aver-
age premium rebate. Fig. 2.1 illustrates four scenarios of the profitability of a 
voluntary deductible of €500 on top of a mandatory deductible of €360 given an 
average premium rebate of €240. If the healthcare expenses are lower than the 
mandatory deductible (no. 1), the financial profit equals the maximum gain (i.e., 
the premium rebate of €240). If the healthcare expenses are higher than the 
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mandatory and voluntary deductible together (no. 4), the financial profit equals 
the maximum loss (i.e., the voluntary deductible minus the premium rebate, 
€-260). If the healthcare expenses are lower than the sum of the mandatory 
deductible and the premium rebate but higher than the mandatory deductible 
(no. 2), the financial profit equals a gain between €0 and €240. If the healthcare 
expenses are lower than the sum of the mandatory and voluntary deductible 
but higher than the sum of the mandatory deductible and the premium rebate 
(no. 3), the financial profit equals a loss between €0 and €260.
Bivariate approach
After calculating the profitability of a voluntary deductible at the individual 
level, different groups of insured will be distinguished using background char-
acteristics available in the database. Some of these groups are also explicitly 
included in the Dutch risk equalisation scheme and defined as such (see Van 
Kleef and Van Vliet, (2010)). The risk classes in our analyses are based on the 
following risk characteristics: age/gender, classification in a PCG, classification 
in a DCG, ethnicity, degree of urbanisation in the area of residence and profit-
ability of a voluntary deductible in previous years. The latter differentiates in 
which of the previous years and in how many previous years a voluntary deduct-
ible would have been profitable in retrospect. Chi-square tests are performed to 
test whether the profitability of a voluntary deductible correlates significantly 
with the different groups of insured. Since a large database is used, the results 
not only represent the profitability in retrospect but also provide an indication 
of the expected profitability for groups of insured.
Multivariate approach
To estimate individual probabilities that a voluntary deductible of €500 would 
be profitable in 2014 given the average offered premium rebate on top of the 
mandatory deductible (i.e., the dependent variable), the abovementioned groups 
are jointly entered as independent variables into a multivariate binary logistic 
regression analysis. The individual predicted probabilities are then grouped 
in deciles and the average financial profit per group is determined to indicate 
the relation between the profitability of a voluntary deductible and the ex-ante 
individual predicted probability.
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2.5 RESuLTS
2.5.1 Profitability
Part one of Table 2.1 shows the profitability for different voluntary deductible 
levels in the Netherlands in 2014. Two important results can be observed. First, 
a voluntary deductible would have been profitable for 48 per cent of the insured. 
This figure is substantially higher than the 11 per cent of insured that actually 
opted for a voluntary deductible in the Netherlands in 2014 (Vektis, 2014). 
Second, the larger the voluntary deductible, the larger the share of insured 
for whom a voluntary deductible would have been profitable. This is because 
the increase in average premium rebate for each €100 increase in deductible is 
nearly the same for all deductible levels, while on average the marginal out-of-
pocket expenses decrease with each additional €100 deductible.
Table 2.1 Profitability of a voluntary deductible on top of a mandatory deductible of €360 in the 
Dutch basic health insurance in 2014 in retrospect. Part 1 shows the profitability for different 
voluntary deductible levels. Part 2 shows the profitability for a voluntary deductible of €500 for 
different premium rebates (PR), both with and without moral hazard reduction. Part 3 shows 
the profitability for a voluntary deductible of €500 for different mandatory deductibles.
Percentage of insured for whom a voluntary 
deductible (of €500) would have been 
profitable in retrospect in 2014
1
voluntary 
deductible 
level
€100 42.3 %
€200 43.7 %
€300 45.1 %
€400 46.4 %
€500 48.4 %
2
no moral 
hazard 
reduction
Minimum PR (€180) 46.6 %
Average PR (€240) 48.4 %
Maximum PR (€300) 50.0 %
Including 
moral hazard 
reductiona
Minimum PR (€180) 46.9 %
Average PR (€240) 48.6 %
Maximum PR (€300) 50.2 %
3
Mandatory 
deductible 
levelb
€0 35.8 %
€170 43.7 %
€360 48.4 %
a The moral hazard reduction equals 1.36 per cent.
b Since the average premium rebate corresponding to a situation without a mandatory deduct-
ible is unknown, the average premium rebate corresponding to the situation where the manda-
tory deductible is €360 (i.e., €240) is applied in that case. This is a valid approach since the aver-
age premium rebate for a voluntary deductible has only slightly increased with the increases in 
the mandatory deductible in the Netherlands in recent years (NZa, 2014). In case the manda-
tory deductible is €170, the average offered premium rebate in that year (i.e., €219) is applied.
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Part two of Table 2.1 shows the profitability of a voluntary deductible of 
€500 for different premium rebates, both with and without moral hazard reduc-
tion in 2014. First, the profitability increases with higher premium rebates. 
Compared to the average premium rebate, a voluntary deductible would have 
been profitable for an additional 1.6 per cent of insured if their insurer had 
offered them the highest premium rebate. Second, the effect of moral hazard 
reduction on the out-of-pocket expenses caused by the voluntary deductible 
increases the percentage with about 0.2.
Part three of Table 2.1 shows the profitability of a voluntary deductible of 
€500 for different mandatory deductible levels. The percentage increases as the 
mandatory deductible level increases. This is expected since, with an increase 
in the mandatory deductible level, a larger share of the healthcare expenses is 
subject to the mandatory deductible. This decreases the out-of-pocket expenses 
under the voluntary deductible and increases its profitability. The results 
 
A:     Mandatory deductible (i.e. €360) 
B:     Mandatory deductible + average premium rebate (i.e. €600) 
C:     Mandatory deductible + voluntary deductible (i.e. €860) 
 
#1:   FR = max          
#2:   max > FR ≥ 0       
#3:   0 > FR > min        
#4:   FR = min           
(i.e. maximum gain) 
(i.e. gain) 
(i.e. loss) 
(i.e. maximum loss) 
C 
∞ 
Healthcare 
expenses for 
basic health 
insurance 
0 
#2 #3 #4 #1 A  B 
- 260 
240 
Financial profit 
(in €) of opting 
for a voluntary 
deductible of 
€500 
40.6% 
7.7%  
7.6%  
44.1% 
fig. 2.1 Four scenarios of the profitability of a voluntary deductible of €500 (on top of the man-
datory deductible) as a function of healthcare expenses, given the average premium rebate of 
€240 in 2014. The figures indicate the percentage of insured in each scenario based upon our 
empirical analyses.
A: Mandatory deductible amount (€360)
B: Mandatory deductible amount + average premium rebate (€600)
C: Mandatory deductible amount + voluntary deductible amount (€860)
#1: Financial profit equals the axi um gain
#2: Financial profit equals a gain between zero and the premium rebate
#3: Financial profit equals a loss between zero and the voluntary deductible amount minus the 
premium rebate
#4: Financial profit equals the maximum loss
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furthermore show (not in the table) that 33.5 per cent of the insured has health-
care expenses below a mandatory deductible of €170 and 40.6 per cent below 
a mandatory deductible of €360. This is caused by the skewness of healthcare 
expenses and the exclusion of routine primary care from the deductible. The 
results imply that, considering a mandatory deductible of €360, any positive 
premium rebate would make a voluntary deductible of €500 profitable for over 
40 per cent of the insured.
Fig. 2.1 shows the percentage of insured in the different scenarios of the 
profitability of a voluntary deductible based upon our empirical analyses. Over 
44 per cent of the insured would have ended up with the maximum loss if they 
had opted for this voluntary deductible, while about 41 percent would have 
ended up with the maximum gain. In the sample, the average financial profit of 
a voluntary deductible of €500 equals €-40. The next section will show however 
that the average financial profit substantially differs across groups of insured.
2.5.2 groups of insured
Table 2.2 shows the profitability of a voluntary deductible for groups of insured. 
First, a voluntary deductible is more profitable for men than for women. Only 
young females have a positive average profit, while males up to 50 years old 
have a positive profit. This is probably caused by pregnancy-related healthcare 
expenses. Second, the profitability strongly decreases with age, both for men 
and women. This is due to the increase of healthcare expenses with age without 
the adjustment of the premium rebate to age. Third, a voluntary deductible 
is more profitable for insured not classified in a PCG than for insured who 
are classified in a PCG. Fourth, a voluntary deductible is never profitable for 
insured classified in a DCG and the corresponding average financial profit 
equals the maximum loss. Finally, the profitability increases as a voluntary 
deductible would have been profitable in more previous years and as these 
‘profitable’ years are more recent. This could be attributed to the autoregres-
sive character of healthcare costs (French and Jones, 2004). The chi-square 
tests confirm significant correlation for all groups with the profitability of a 
voluntary deductible (p-value is 0.000 for all groups).
Since we use a large database, the proportions in Table 2.2 may be inter-
preted as the expected probability that a voluntary deductible would be profit-
able for these groups of insured. As such, the results can facilitate the insured’s 
ex-ante decision to opt for a voluntary deductible. For instance, young men have 
a probability larger than 0.7 that a voluntary deductible would be profitable, 
just as insured with few healthcare expenses in the past. Meanwhile, for insured 
classified in a PCG or DCG a voluntary deductible is not likely to be profitable.
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Table 2.2 Profitability of a voluntary deductible of €500 on top of a mandatory deductible of 
€360 given the average offered premium rebate of €240 and the average financial profit (FP) for 
groups of insured in the Dutch basic health insurance in 2014.
group size 
as % of total
(n = 808,189)
Proportion of insured for 
whom a voluntary deductible 
results in a positive fP
average fP 
(in €) of total 
subgroup
M
a
le
18 – 24 4.2 0.786 119
25 – 29 3.2 0.759 104
30 – 34 3.4 0.729 87
35 - 39 3.8 0.701 71
40 – 44 4.7 0.659 48
45 – 49 4.8 0.603 16
50 – 54 4.2 0.542 -14
55 – 59 3.6 0.476 -43
60 – 64 3.6 0.421 -68
65 – 69 3.1 0.352 -98
70 – 74 2.7 0.289 -127
75 – 79 2.2 0.219 -157
80 – 84 1.5 0.178 -177
84+ 1 0.160 -185
f
em
a
le
18 – 24 3.9 0.651 44
25 – 29 3.2 0.551 -10
30 – 34 3.5 0.528 -21
35 – 39 4.1 0.537 -16
40 – 44 4.9 0.547 -12
45 – 49 4.9 0.507 -30
50 – 54 4.5 0.454 -53
55 – 59 4.2 0.418 -69
60 – 64 4.3 0.388 -82
65 – 69 4.0 0.339 -104
70 – 74 3.6 0.278 -131
75 – 79 3.3 0.224 -155
80 – 84 2.7 0.194 -169
84+ 2.9 0.189 -172
P
C
g yes 28.9 0.132 -196
no 71.1 0.626 29
d
C
g yes 4.7 0.000 -260
no 95.3 0.507 -30
E
th
n
ic
it
y native 81.4 0.477 -43
non-native 18.6 0.510 -29
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2.5.3 Individual predicted probabilities
The logit model (see Table A2 in Appendix 2) generates the individual predicted 
probability that a voluntary deductible of €500 would be profitable in 2014 
given the average offered premium rebate. The probabilities range from 0.000 
to 0.910 and the average predicted probability equals 0.483. Fig. 2.2 shows the 
frequency distribution of the predicted probabilities and the associated average 
financial profit per probability decile. About 26 per cent of the insured has an 
individual predicted probability between 0.0 and 0.1 with an average financial 
profit of €-239, which is close to the maximum loss. On the contrary, another 
26 per cent has an individual predicted probability larger than 0.8 with an 
average financial profit of €158.
Table 2.2 (continued)
group size 
as % of total
(n = 808,189)
Proportion of insured for 
whom a voluntary deductible 
results in a positive fP
average fP 
(in €) of total 
subgroup
u
rb
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
very highly 
urbanised
38.3 0.476 -44
highly urbanised 25.6 0.484 -40
Moderate 
urbanised
15.7 0.486 -39
Poorly urbanised 15.8 0.488 -38
very poorly 
urbanised
4.5 0.512 -27
P
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
 i
n
 p
re
v
io
u
s 
y
ea
rs
P
ro
fi
ta
b
le
 i
n
2006 48.5 0.683 62
2007 46.7 0.696 69
2008 46.1 0.692 67
2009 45.2 0.707 75
2010 44.1 0.736 92
P
ro
fi
ta
b
le
 i
n
 x
 
p
re
v
io
u
s 
y
ea
rs
x = 0 30.3 0.045 -236
x = 1 10.2 0.248 -141
x = 2 11.3 0.407 -72
x = 3 13.5 0.565 -4
x = 4 16.6 0.707 75
x = 5 18.2 0.838 149
Total 100 0.483 -40
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2.6 COnCLuSIOn and dISCuSSIOn
2.6.1 Conclusion
This paper studied the financial profitability of a voluntary deductible in the 
Dutch basic health insurance. A voluntary deductible is financially profitable 
when the insured’s out-of-pocket expenses do not exceed the premium rebate. 
We find that given the average premium rebate a voluntary deductible of €500 
on top of the mandatory deductible would have been profitable for 48 per cent of 
the insured in 2014. If the whole population had opted for a voluntary deduct-
ible in 2014, 44 per cent would have ended up with the maximum loss and 41 
per cent with the maximum gain. The latter implies that any positive premium 
rebate would make a voluntary deductible profitable for these insured. Bi-
variate group analyses show that a voluntary deductible is profitable for males, 
young insured, insured not classified in a PCG or DCG and insured with low 
past healthcare expenses. Multivariate analyses show that 26 per cent of the 
insured has a predicted probability that a voluntary deductible would be profit-
able between 0.0 and 0.1 with an average financial profit of €-239. Meanwhile, 
another 26 per cent has a predicted probability larger than 0.8 with an average 
financial profit of €158. In contrast, only 11 per cent of the Dutch population 
actually opted for a voluntary deductible in 2014 (Vektis, 2014). Apparently, 
the other determinants (i.e., risk aversion, loss aversion, status quo bias and 
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fig. 2.2 Frequency distribution of the individual predicted probability that a voluntary deduct-
ible on top of the mandatory deductible is profitable given the average premium rebate in the 
Dutch basic health insurance in 2014 and the corresponding average financial profit.
36
limited knowledge regarding the voluntary deductible) play a major role when 
it comes to the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible.
2.6.2 discussion
First, our results show a lower bound of the profitability of a voluntary deduct-
ible, because there are two reasons indicating that the average health of the 
insured in our dataset is somewhat worse compared to the Dutch population. 
Firstly, the comparison of the data (including adults and children) with the 
Dutch population showed that the average health in the dataset is somewhat 
worse compared to the Dutch population. This is probably caused by the fact 
that the Achmea Health Database belongs to a former sickness fund. Although 
only adults are included in our analyses, we expect the difference in average 
health to partially remain. We have no indication that groups are on aver-
age less healthy compared to the Dutch population. Therefore, we expect the 
group analyses (i.e., Table 2.2) to be representative. Secondly, we restricted our 
sample to individuals who were fully insured during the six research years, 
meaning that they have been with the same health insurer for at least six 
years. Especially elderly and unhealthy insured are less likely to switch insurer 
(Hendriks et al., 2009; Mosca and Schut-Welkzijn, 2008; Reitsma-van Rooijen 
et al., 2011), which could explain why the insured in our data might on average 
be less healthy compared to the Dutch population. Furthermore, due to our in-
clusion criterion, no decedents are included in our analyses. Consequently, the 
healthcare expenses in our data would be lower compared to the Dutch popula-
tion since healthcare expenses are highest during the final year of life (Polder 
et al., 2006). We expect the first effect to prevail the second effect since 6.5 per 
cent of the Dutch insured switched health insurer in 2014 (Vektis, 2014) and 1 
per cent of our dataset deceased in 2011. Overall, this implies that, within this 
paper, the average profitability of a voluntary deductible is underestimated 
and a lower bound of the profitability of a voluntary deductible is provided.
Second, attention should be given to the reduction of the premium rebate as 
risk equalisation further improves. The Dutch government intends to further 
improve the risk equalisation formula (House of Representatives, 2014; Van 
Ginneken et al., 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2013) in the near future. Consequently, 
differences in expected healthcare expenses between low-risk and high-risk 
individuals are better compensated and therefore the adverse selection compo-
nent of the premium rebate will reduce (Van Kleef et al., 2007). Subsequently, 
the premium rebate will decrease, which could lessen the financial profitability 
of a voluntary deductible. Overall, a voluntary deductible may become a less 
effective tool for reducing moral hazard as risk equalisation further improves.
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2.7 POLICy RECOMMEndaTIOnS
2.7.1 Information
Only 11 per cent of the Dutch insured opted for a voluntary deductible in 2014 
(Vektis, 2014). Therefore, the voluntary deductible is expected to result in 
only a modest total moral hazard reduction. If more insured would opt for a 
voluntary deductible, the moral hazard reduction would increase. Providing 
insured with understandable information regarding the voluntary deductible 
is a potential strategy to increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary 
deductible, since insured have difficulty understanding their health insurance 
(Baicker et al., 2012; Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004; Marquis, 1981). The 
information could emphasise the possibility to opt for a voluntary deductible in 
return for a premium rebate. Moreover, it could mention the excluded health-
care expenses from the voluntary (and mandatory) deductible, such as GP-care 
in the Netherlands. Furthermore, it could stress that potentially other cost-
sharing arrangements take precedence over the voluntary deductible. Finally, 
information could be given regarding the probability of a financial profit, like 
in Table 2.2. These insights are not only relevant for the Netherlands, but also 
for Germany, Switzerland and the USA since they offer a voluntary deductible 
in order to reduce moral hazard as well.
2.7.2 Shifted deductible
Our results indicate groups of insured for whom a voluntary deductible is prob-
ably not profitable, like insured classified in a PCG or DCG. Nevertheless, a 
monetary incentive may cause a substantial moral hazard reduction for these 
insured, because of their high healthcare usage. The introduction of a shifted 
deductible could make a voluntary deductible also profitable for these insured 
(Van Kleef et al., 2009). In that case, the deductible range is shifted from [0,d] 
to [si, si + d], with d corresponding to the deductible level and si corresponding 
to the deductible’s starting point based upon relevant risk characteristics for 
individual i. If such a shifted deductible would be introduced, the probability of 
exceeding the deductible amount will be reduced and the price sensitivity of the 
insured in the deductible range will be increased.

Chapter 3
A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the 
more years you opt for it, the lower your 
premium?
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abSTRaCT
Adverse selection regarding a voluntary deductible in health insurance 
implies that insured only opt for a voluntary deductible if they expect no (or 
few) healthcare expenses. This paper investigates two potential strategies to 
reduce adverse selection: 1) differentiating the premium to the duration of the 
contract for which the voluntary deductible holds (ex-ante approach), and 2) 
differentiating the premium to the number of years for which insured have 
opted for a voluntary deductible (ex-post approach). It can be hypothesised that 
premiums will decrease with the duration of the contract or the number of 
years for which insured have opted for a voluntary deductible, providing an 
incentive to insured to opt for a deductible also in (incidental) years they expect 
relatively high expenses. To test this hypothesis, we examine which premium 
patterns would occur under these strategies using data on healthcare expenses 
and risk characteristics of over 750,000 insured from six years. Our results 
show that, under the assumptions made, only without risk equalisation the 
premiums could decrease with the duration of the contract or the number of 
years for which insured have opted for a voluntary deductible. With (sophisti-
cated) risk equalisation, decreasing premiums seem unfeasible, both under the 
ex-ante and ex-post approach. Given these findings, we are sceptical about the 
feasibility of these strategies to counteract adverse selection.
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3.1 InTROduCTIOn
In several regulated health insurance markets, such as Germany, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, and the US, insured are offered the possibility to opt for a 
voluntary deductible in return for a premium rebate. These deductibles may 
counteract moral hazard (Folland et al., 2010; Zweifel and Manning, 2000), 
which is a well-known consequence of (comprehensive) health insurance and 
refers to the change in health behaviour and healthcare consumption caused 
by the fact that the insurer reimburses (part of) the costs. Economic theory 
predicts that rational consumer behaviour causes individuals to opt for a 
voluntary deductible only if the expected expenses under the deductible fall 
below the premium rebate. This phenomenon is referred to as adverse selection 
and implies that low-risk individuals are more inclined to opt for a voluntary 
deductible than high-risk individuals within the same premium-risk group (Ak-
erlof, 1970; Cummins et al., 1982; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998; Neudeck and 
Podczeck, 1996; Pauly, 1986). Such behaviour would also imply that insured do 
not opt for a deductible in a (incidental) year they expect (high) expenses. This 
may limit the moral hazard reduction resulting from the deductible.
In free markets, insurers can reduce adverse selection by risk-rating the 
premium or by denying insured to reduce the deductible level (or metal tier) 
in later years. Furthermore, insurers in either free or regulated markets can 
reduce adverse selection by an ex-ante or ex-post differentiation of the premium 
according to, respectively, the duration of the contract for which the voluntary 
deductible holds or the number of previous years for which insured have opted 
for a voluntary deductible2. It is hypothesised that the longer the period for 
which the voluntary deductible holds or the more previous years insured have 
opted for a voluntary deductible, the lower the premium can be. This could 
incentivise insured to opt for a voluntary deductible for a longer period or more 
consecutive years, implying a larger moral hazard reduction since insured 
then also opt for a voluntary deductible in (incidental) years they expect high 
expenses. Related to the ex-ante differentiation, the German law states that 
the deductible holds for at least three years. Related to the ex-post differentia-
2 Zweifel (1987) has studied the effect of bonuses (instead of deductibles used as a sanction 
method) in West Germany comparing three insurers. He shows that a no-claim bonus and an 
experience rated bonus even more, dampens the demand for ambulatory care. The experience-
rated bonus implies that insured received a bonus of two monthly premiums in the first year 
with no claims, three monthly premiums in the second year, and four monthly premiums in 
the third consecutive year with no claims. Note, however, that with an ex-post differentiation, 
the premium is only differentiated to the number of previous consecutive years insured have 
opted for a voluntary deductible. The amount of claims is of no importance to the premium in 
the next year the insured opts for a voluntary deductible.
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tion, the Dutch law offers insurers the possibility to differentiate the premium 
rebate to the number of years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible.
This paper explores the premium patterns in case of either an ex-ante or 
ex-post differentiation of the premium. Our central research question reads: 
What would the premiums look like when differentiated to either the duration 
of the contract for which the voluntary deductible holds (i.e., the ex-ante ap-
proach) or the number of previous consecutive years insured have opted for a 
voluntary deductible (i.e., the ex-post approach)? These premiums depend upon 
the predicted expenses of insured choosing the different deductible options. 
However, for which deductible option insured choose depends on their predicted 
expenses and the premium. Our variable of interest, the premium, therefore is 
an endogenous variable. Consequently, we have to simulate the distribution 
of insured across the deductible options and subsequently determine the cor-
responding premiums. To achieve this, we use data on healthcare expenses and 
risk characteristics of 762,982 insured from six years.
The theoretical background (section 3.2) discusses the moral hazard reduc-
tion resulting from deductibles, how to counteract adverse selection in regulated 
markets, the composition of the premium and the effect of risk equalisation on 
the premium. The data and methods are explained in sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
Sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, respectively, present the results, the conclusions and 
the discussion.
3.2 ThEORETICaL baCKgROund
3.2.1 Moral hazard and deductibles
Moral hazard is a well-known consequence of comprehensive health insurance, 
such as in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the US. It refers to 
the change in health behaviour and healthcare consumption resulting from 
the reimbursement of the costs for healthcare services by the insurer. It could 
be counteracted by cost-sharing arrangements. Many have studied the effect 
of different cost-sharing arrangements on the moral hazard reduction (Cum-
mins et al., 1982; Folland et al., 2010; Gerfin and Schellhorn, 2006; Gerfin et 
al., 2015; Trottmann et al., 2012; Zweifel et al., 2009). This paper focuses on 
the voluntary deductible as an instrument to reduce moral hazard. Gerfin et 
al. (2015) show that due to high voluntary deductibles, healthcare demand in 
Switzerland dropped by 27 per cent. Additionally, Trottmann et al. (2012) cor-
rect for the selection effect that results from the voluntary deductible and show 
that high voluntary deductibles in Switzerland reduced healthcare expenses 
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by 23 per cent. These studies thus show that deductibles could indeed be an 
effective instrument to counteract moral hazard.
3.2.2 Counteracting adverse selection in regulated health insurance 
markets
Rational economic behaviour predicts that individuals will only opt for a vol-
untary deductible if their expected out-of-pocket expenses under the deductible 
are smaller than the offered premium rebate. This could lead to adverse selec-
tion, meaning that low-risk individuals are more inclined to opt for a voluntary 
deductible than high-risk individuals within the same premium-risk group 
(Akerlof, 1970; Neudeck and Podczeck, 1996; Pauly, 1986). Eventually, this 
could result in an adverse selection (or death) spiral. Several studies indicate 
that the key conditions for adverse selection – the ability to forecast risk and 
the fact that this forecast affects insurance takeout (Cave, 1985; Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977) – exist (Manning and Marquis, 1989; Marquis 
and Holmer, 1986; Marquis and Phelps, 1987). Insurers in free markets can 
reduce adverse selection by risk-rating the premium or by denying insured to 
reduce their deductible level in later years. However, insurers in regulated 
health insurance markets, such as in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
and the US, do not have these options. In these markets, both the premium 
and the premium rebate for voluntary deductibles must be community-rated, 
meaning that insurers must offer the same premium (rebate) to each insured 
with the same insurance policy and the same deductible level3. Additionally, 
the abovementioned countries have open enrolment, which means that appli-
cants cannot be rejected. Therefore, insured can determine each year whether 
to opt for a voluntary deductible4. The requirements of both community-rating 
and open enrolment cause adverse selection to be larger in regulated markets 
than in free markets, which limits the moral hazard reduction resulting from 
voluntary deductibles. Insurers in regulated markets may have two options to 
reduce adverse selection5. The first option regards an ex-ante differentiation of 
the premium to the duration of the contract for which the voluntary deductible 
holds (e.g., 1, 5, 10 years, etc.). The second option regards an ex-post differen-
tiation of the premium to the number of previous consecutive years insured 
3 Only in the Health Insurance Marketplaces in the US (formerly known as the Health 
Insurance Exchanges) premiums may be conditioned on age (1:3), smoking (1:1.5), family size 
and geography, but not on other risk characteristics.
4 Note that the voluntary deductible in Germany holds for three years and insured can only 
adjust their voluntary deductible after these three years.
5 Note that due to the requirements of community-rating and open enrolment, insurers in 
regulated markets are, compared to insurers in free markets, unable to risk-rate the premium 
(rebate) or to deny insured to reduce the deductible level to counteract adverse selection.
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have opted for a voluntary deductible. Note that with this option, compared to 
the ex-ante option, insured have the possibility to adjust (or even opt out of) 
the deductible level each year. Assuming that insured who opt for a voluntary 
deductible for a longer contract period or in multiple consecutive years are 
healthier than insured who only opt for a voluntary deductible in one year, it 
can be hypothesised that the premium would, ceteris paribus, decrease with 
the contract period for which the deductible holds or the number of previous 
consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible. In Germany, 
the law states that voluntary deductibles hold for three years, which is related 
to the ex-ante differentiation as discussed within this paper, except that Ger-
man insured have no choice regarding the contract period (i.e., insured either 
choose no deductible or a deductible that holds for three years). The Dutch 
law provides insurers the possibility to apply an ex-post differentiation of the 
premium as discussed within this paper, stating that “the premium rebate 
may depend on the number of calendar years for which the insured has opted 
for a voluntary deductible”6. It was mentioned that insured had to weigh the 
increase in premium rebate against the possibility to decrease the voluntary 
deductible (House of Representatives, 2004) and that this would provide in-
sured with an incentive to opt for a deductible also in a year they incidentally 
expect (high) healthcare expenses. After a decade, however, none of the Dutch 
insurers utilises the option.
3.2.3 Composition of the premium
To determine the ex-ante and ex-post differentiated premiums, this section dis-
cusses the composition of the premium. Generally speaking, the premium paid 
by insured equals the expected insurance claims7 (see Fig. 3.1). Insured with 
a voluntary deductible receive a premium rebate that can be decomposed into 
three components (Van Kleef et al., 2006). The first component is the effect of 
self-selection that arises because, given a certain premium rebate, healthy in-
sured have a greater incentive to opt for a voluntary deductible than unhealthy 
insured (i.e., the adverse selection component). Consequently, market segmen-
tation is created where insured with a voluntary deductible are on average 
healthier and have lower insurance claims than insured without a voluntary 
deductible. The second component is the moral hazard reduction resulting from 
6 In the corresponding amendment, this was originally formulated as: “the premium rebate 
may depend on the duration of the health insurance policy” [House of Representatives, 2004], 
which is actually an ex-ante differentiation of the premium rebate.
7 In this paper, we solely focus on the insurance claims and disregard the insurers’ loading 
fee (e.g., overhead costs and administration costs), since in our data (section 3.3) we have no 
information on the loading fee and since the loading fee only constitutes a small part of the 
premium.
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the voluntary deductible, which (ceteris paribus) lowers the total healthcare 
expenses. The third component regards the expected out-of-pocket expenses 
paid by insured with a voluntary deductible. Consequently, the insurer has 
to reimburse less than for insured without a voluntary deductible (ceteris 
paribus).
Many studies show that mostly young and healthy insured opt for a volun-
tary deductible (e.g., Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), Gabel et al. (2002), Marquis 
(1992), Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981), Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991)). Given 
these findings, it is expected that insured who opt for a voluntary deductible 
with a long contract period or in more consecutive years are healthier than 
insured with short contract periods and few years. Subsequently, the expected 
insurance claims, moral hazard reduction, and out-of-pocket expenses of in-
sured with a voluntary deductible for a long contract period or in more consecu-
tive years could be smaller than for insured with short contract periods or few 
years. So, if the premium is either ex-ante or ex-post differentiated, one possible 
outcome could be that the premium decreases with respectively the contract 
period or the number of years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible. 
However, insured with long contract periods could incur (unexpected) high 
healthcare expenses during the contract. As a result, the differentiation could 
 
Adverse selection
Out-of-pocket expenses
Moral hazard reduction
Insurance claims
Insured without a 
voluntary deductible 
Insured with a 
voluntary deductible 
Premium 
rebate 
  Premium 
  
Premium 
fig. 3.1 Composition of the premium and premium rebate in health insurance markets without 
risk equalisation.
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also result in an increasing premium with the contract period. Furthermore, if 
the ex-post differentiation indeed results in a behavioural effect (i.e., insured 
keep the deductible also in years they expect high healthcare expenses), the 
premium could also increase with the number of years insured have opted for 
a deductible.
3.2.4 Effect of risk equalisation on the premium
In addition to the requirements of community-rating (i.e., insurers must offer 
the same premium to each insured with the same policy and the same deduct-
ible level) and open enrolment (i.e., applicants cannot be rejected), Germany, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the US have a risk equalisation scheme 
that compensates insurers for differences in predicted expenses between low-
risk and high-risk individuals. The current German risk equalisation scheme 
includes demographic risk adjusters and a set of morbidity-based risk adjusters 
(Buchner et al., 2013). The Swiss risk equalisation scheme includes age, gender, 
and prior hospitalisation as risk adjusters (Shmueli et al., 2015). The Dutch 
scheme includes an age and gender interaction, Pharmacy-based Cost Groups 
(PCGs), Diagnoses-based Cost Groups (DCGs), durable medical equipment 
cost groups, source of income, region, social economic status, multiple-year 
high costs and generic somatic morbidity (iBMG, 2015). In 2014, the Health 
Insurance Marketplaces in all states in America (except Massachusetts) use 
the risk equalisation model developed by the US Department of Health and 
Human Services based upon the Hierarchical Condition Categories (Kautter et 
al., 2014). These risk equalisation systems affect the premium paid by insured. 
Let us assume that risk equalisation perfectly adjusts for the differences in 
predicted expenses between low-risk and high-risk individuals. In that case, 
the premium consists of the expected insurance claims and a risk equalisa-
tion payment. Firstly, for insured without a voluntary deductible, this risk 
equalisation payment is equal to the difference between the average healthcare 
expenses in the population and the individuals’ average predicted insurance 
claims. This implies that risk equalisation has a negative effect on the pre-
mium if the individual expenses are larger than the average expenses, and a 
positive effect on the premium if the individual expenses are smaller than the 
average expenses. Secondly, the risk equalisation payment for insured with 
a voluntary deductible equals the difference between the average healthcare 
expenses in the population and the sum of the predicted expenses, the moral 
hazard reduction, and the out-of-pocket expenses resulting from the voluntary 
deductible. After all, risk equalisation aims to equalise the adverse selection 
component. In case of perfect risk equalisation, this adverse selection com-
ponent is fully equalised and incorporated into the premium. Therefore, the 
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premium rebate only consists of the moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket 
expenses. However, if risk equalisation does not perfectly adjust for differences 
in predicted expenses between low-risk and high-risk individuals, a share of 
the adverse selection component is not equalised and therefore reflected into 
the premium rebate. The difference in quality between the Swiss and the Dutch 
risk equalisation schemes might also (partially) explain why in Switzerland 56 
per cent of the insured opted for a voluntary deductible in 2013 (Bundesamt 
für Gesundheit, 2013), while in the Netherlands only 12 per cent opted for a 
voluntary deductible in 2015 (Vektis, 2015c). After all, Swiss insurers might 
be able to reflect a larger share of the adverse selection component into the 
premium rebate.
3.2.5 Conclusion
In sum, voluntary deductibles are offered in the regulated health insurance 
markets of Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the US in order to 
counteract moral hazard. However, the moral hazard reduction is limited due 
to adverse selection, where insured only opt for a voluntary deductible if their 
expected expenses are smaller than the premium rebate. In these regulated 
markets, adverse selection could potentially be reduced by an ex-ante or ex-post 
differentiation of the premium to respectively the contract period for which 
the voluntary deductible holds or the number of previous consecutive years an 
insured has opted for a voluntary deductible. To determine the differentiated 
premiums that could then be offered, we perform several empirical simulations 
in which we also include the effect of risk equalisation on the premium.
3.3 daTa
For the empirical analyses, we use the Achmea Health Database that contains 
administrative data from a large Dutch health insurer who operates mainly 
in the western and eastern parts of the Netherlands. It includes individual 
level information on insurance claims in the years 2006–2011 aggregated at 
and categorised into the following 11 types of healthcare services: GP-care, 
pharmacy, inpatient care, hospital admissions, outpatient care, dental care, 
maternity care, durable medical equipment, physiotherapy, mental healthcare, 
and care consumed in a foreign country. Moreover, the database includes an 
encrypted ID number and (per year) information on the year of birth, sex, eth-
nicity, degree of urbanisation, the number of days of enrolment, and in which 
PCG and/or DCG the insured is classified for the risk equalisation scheme. 
Remember that PCGs and DCGs are risk adjusters used as a proxy for health 
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status, based upon prior use of pharmaceuticals and prior hospital inpatient 
diagnoses, respectively (Van Kleef et al., 2013). For simplicity reasons, two 
selection criteria are applied to our simulation sample: individuals must be 
fully insured in all six years8 and individuals must be 18 years or older on 
January 1, 2007, since in the Netherlands only adults can opt for a volun-
tary deductible. These selection criteria provide us with a sample of 762,982 
insured. In order to be able to compare the premium of both the ex-ante and 
ex-post differentiation and since the deductible amount remains the same for 
all years (see section 3.2.3), all healthcare expenses are corrected for inflation 
to the level of 2007. When comparing our sample with the Dutch population, it 
shows that the average health in the dataset is somewhat worse compared to 
the Dutch population: e.g., more insured are classified into a PCG or DCG and 
the average healthcare expenses are higher. This is probably caused by the fact 
that the Achmea Health Database belongs to a former sickness fund. Since we 
select insured opting for a voluntary deductible relative to the entire sample, 
the difference between our sample and the Dutch population could affect the 
absolute level of the premium but would not affect the premium patterns over 
the deductible options.
8 In our dataset, few insured (0.9 per cent) opted for a voluntary deductible in 2011. Note that 
it is impossible to perform the empirical analyses with the insured who actually opted for a vol-
untary deductible since we only have data from one Dutch insurer. This means that we cannot 
follow insured who switch insurers. Research shows that especially young and healthy insured 
switch insurers (Hendriks et al., 2009; Mosca and Schut-Welkzijn, 2008; Reitsma-van Rooijen et 
al., 2011). These are also the insured who are most likely to opt for a voluntary deductible (e.g., 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), Gabel et al. (2002), Marquis (1992), Van de Ven and Van Praag 
(1981), Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991)). Consequently, our results could become biased if we would 
perform the analyses with the insured who actually opted for a voluntary deductible in the 
dataset. To overcome this problem, we perform a simulation study. Prior to the simulation, we 
have corrected the healthcare expenses of the insured in the dataset who opted for a voluntary 
deductible in any year. For each of these insured in each of the years for the five different Dutch 
voluntary deductible levels (i.e., €100, €200, €300, €400 or €500), we increased their healthcare 
expenses with a percentage based upon extensive research by Keeler et al. (1988) (see also 
Bakker (1997), Bakker et al. (2000)), to correct for the moral hazard reduction that results from 
the voluntary deductible. Note that in this case we apply the results of the study by Keeler et 
al. (1988) since this enables us to apply different percentages for different deductible levels in 
different years. For the moral hazard reduction in the rest of the paper, we apply the results by 
Trottmann et al. (2012) since these results are more recent.
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3.4 METhOdS
3.4.1 Opting for a voluntary deductible
In order to determine the premiums in year t, we need to know which insured 
opt for which deductible option. In other words, for the ex-ante differentiation, 
we need to know for year t which group of insured did not opt for a voluntary 
deductible and which groups of insured opted for a voluntary deductible with 
either a 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, or 5-year contract period. For the ex-post differentiation, 
we need to know for year t which group of insured did not opt for a voluntary 
deductible, which group opted for a voluntary deductible in year t, but not in 
year t-1, which group opted for a voluntary deductible in year t and t-1, but not 
in year t-2, etc.
Following the theory of rational consumer behaviour, the distributions of 
insured over the deductible options would ideally be determined by comparing 
the insured’s expected benefits with his/her expected costs of opting for a volun-
tary deductible, implying that only insured for whom their expected healthcare 
expenses under the deductible are smaller than the premium rebate would 
opt for a voluntary deductible. However, whether insured opt for a voluntary 
deductible in a certain year depends on the premium, but at the same time the 
premium depends on the distribution of insured over the deductible options. 
This makes the premium, which is also our variable of interest, an endogenous 
variable. This means that we cannot use the premium as the input variable 
to determine who opts for a deductible. Therefore, to get an estimate of these 
premiums, we make assumptions about the distribution of insured over the 
deductible options for both the ex-ante and ex-post differentiation. We assume 
that insured with the lowest predicted healthcare expenses would opt for a 
deductible. Several models, which can be found in appendix 3, to determine the 
rank of insured based upon their predicted healthcare expenses in year t have 
been tested. The most accurate model, based upon the Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient, is an OLS model with a log transformation of healthcare expenses 
and we use this model for our empirical simulations. The dependent variable 
regards the total healthcare expenses under basic insurance in year t. The in-
dependent variables indicate several background characteristics that are in the 
dataset: an age and gender interaction, classification into a PCG and/or DCG 
in year t (based upon information from year t-1), degree of urbanisation in the 
residential area, ethnicity and past total healthcare expenses in year t-1 clas-
sified into vigintiles. A detailed description of the independent variables can be 
found in appendix 4. After the healthcare expenses are predicted, insured are 
ranked accordingly. Furthermore, we determine the rank of insured in years 
t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4 based upon their predicted healthcare expenses in those 
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years. In order to do so, we use the same model specification as for year t, but 
the variables are based upon data from earlier years9. Note that for the ex-ante 
differentiation, insured have to decide on the duration of their contract period 
in year t (i.e., 2007) and that we use information from the years t+1, t+2, t+3 
and t+4 (i.e., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) to determine the rank of insured in these 
years. However, one might question whether insured in year t have (all) infor-
mation concerning the upcoming years. An alternative approach would be to 
use only the information from year t and t-1 to determine the rank of insured in 
future years. With the first approach, we would overestimate adverse selection, 
while with the second approach we would underestimate adverse selection into 
multiple-year contracts. After all, research shows that substantial consumer 
information surplus exists also for multiple-year contracts (Van de Ven and 
Van Vliet, 1995), meaning that insured do have some information regarding 
their future healthcare expenses that may not be picked up by administrative 
information from year t-1. Therefore, and for reasons of simplicity, we deter-
mine the rank of insured for all years using the first mentioned approach for 
both the ex-ante and ex-post differentiation. In appendix 5 we will show that 
the possible overestimation of adverse selection under this approach has no 
impact on the main conclusions of this paper.
3.4.2 The ex-ante differentiation
For the ex-ante differentiation, we simulate a distribution of insured over the 
different contract periods. We assume that an insurer wants to determine the 
premiums in year t (i.e., 2007 for the ex-ante differentiation) in case he would 
offer six different insurance policies: a policy without a voluntary deductible 
and five policies with different contract periods for the voluntary deductible, 
i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 years. Remember that for all years we have ranked insured 
according to their predicted expenses in that year. We assume that the half of 
the sample with the lowest predicted expenses in year t opts for an insurance 
policy with a deductible. To then determine who will opt for which multiyear 
contract, we sum the rank of the insured over the different contract periods. 
In other words, for a 2-year contract, we sum the rank of insured in year t and 
t+1, and for a 3-year contract, we sum the rank of insured in year t, t+1 and 
t+2, etc. From the half of the sample that is assumed to opt for a policy with a 
deductible, the quintile with the lowest sum-rank for a 5-year contract is as-
sumed to opt for that policy. From the remaining 40 per cent of insured opting 
9 E.g., for the rank of insured in year t-1 this implies that the dependent variable regards 
the total healthcare expenses under basic insurance in year t-1 and the independent variables 
regard an age and gender interaction, classification into a PCG and / or DCG in year t-1 (based 
upon information from year t-2), degree of urbanisation in the residential area, ethnicity and 
past total healthcare expenses in year t-2 classified into vigintiles.
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for a deductible, the quarter with the lowest sum-rank for a 4-year contract 
is assumed to opt for that policy. From the remaining 30 per cent of insured 
opting for a deductible, the third with the lowest sum-rank for a 3-year contract 
is assumed to opt for that policy. From the remaining 20 per cent of insured opt-
ing for a deductible, the half of insured with the lowest sum-rank for a 2-year 
contract is assumed to opt for that policy and the other half is assumed to opt 
for a 1-year contract with a deductible. Note that this process does not include 
the simulation of a behavioural effect where insured would also opt for a long 
contract period even if they incidentally expect high healthcare expenses in 
one year during the contract period. In the end, this process provides us with a 
distribution of insured in year t where a group of 50 per cent of the insured does 
not opt for a deductible and five groups of 10 per cent do opt for a deductible 
with respectively a 1-, 2-, 3-, 4- or 5-year contract period. For this distribution 
of insured, we subsequently determine the premiums per insurance policy.
3.4.3 The ex-post differentiation
For the ex-post differentiation, we simulate a distribution of insured in year 
t (i.e., 2011 for the ex-post differentiation) based upon the number of previ-
ous consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible. For this 
differentiation, we assume that an insurer decreases the premium with each 
additional consecutive year an insured has opted for a voluntary deductible 
since year t-4 (i.e., 2007 for this differentiation). Two scenarios are simulated 
depending on the potential behavioural effect of this differentiation.
In scenario I, we assume that the differentiation of the premium has no 
effect on the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible, which is contrary to 
what would be expected (and was expected by the Dutch government). Insured 
only opt for a deductible if they belong to the half of the sample with the lowest 
predicted expenses. Looking back from year t, we determine for insured who 
are assumed to opt for a deductible in year t the number of previous consecutive 
years they are assumed to opt for a voluntary deductible as well.
In scenario II, we assume a moderate behavioural effect of the differentia-
tion of the premium. We assume that insured are willing to keep the voluntary 
deductible for one year they expect (high) healthcare expenses (i.e., belong to 
the half of the sample with the highest predicted healthcare expenses). This 
means for instance that if an insured is assumed to opt for a voluntary deduct-
ible in year t-4, he will also opt for a deductible in year t-3, irrespective of his 
rank in that year. The insured is thereafter assumed to opt out of the voluntary 
deductible in year t-2 only if he belongs to the half of the sample with the high-
est predicted healthcare expenses in both year t-3 and t-2, etc. In the end, this 
process provides us with a scenario where some retention of the voluntary de-
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ductible results from the differentiation of the premium, but where insured also 
opt out of the voluntary deductible if they for instance incur a chronic disease. 
The simulation process for these scenarios results in a distribution of insured 
in year t over six groups: insured without a voluntary deductible, insured with 
a voluntary deductible with different numbers of previous consecutive years 
they have opted for deductible (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 previous consecutive years).
3.4.4 Composition of the premium
After the distribution of insured over the deductible options for both the ex-ante 
and ex-post differentiation in year t are simulated, we calculate the premium 
for each of the six aforementioned groups per distribution. For the analyses 
we assume a voluntary deductible of €1,000. The average healthcare expenses 
per individual (HCE) in the dataset are €1,89410 in all years. The premium is 
determined using equations (1a) and (1b) for respectively insured without and 
with a voluntary deductible:
PNVD = ICNVD + REPNVD (1a)
PVD = ICVD + REPVD (1b)
where P is the premium, NVD indicates insured without a voluntary deduct-
ible, VD indicates insured with a voluntary deductible (with either different 
contract periods or different numbers of previous years they have opted for a 
deductible), IC are the average insurance claims and REP represents the aver-
age risk equalisation payment. Without any risk equalisation, the equations 
show that the premium equals the average insurance claims in the group. With 
risk equalisation, however, the premium is affected by the risk equalisation 
payment, which is determined for insured without a voluntary deductible using 
equation (2a):
REPNVD =  [HCE – ICNVD] (2a)11
10 The average healthcare expenses of €1,894 in the data regard the expenses without any 
cost sharing arrangements (i.e., the insurance claims, out-of-pocket expenses and moral haz-
ard reduction as shown in Fig. 3.1). The average expenses are equal for all years due to the 
correction for inflation to the year 2007.
11 Note that, compared to equation (2b), the moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket ex-
penses in equation (2a) are omitted because insured without a voluntary deductible do not 
have any moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket expenses resulting from a deductible.
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where x indicates the quality of the risk equalisation model12 and HCE indi-
cates the average healthcare expenses in the data without any cost-sharing 
arrangements. Due to the voluntary deductible, the risk equalisation payment 
for insured with a voluntary deductible is different to that of insured without a 
voluntary deductible and determined using equation (2b):
REPVD =  [HCE – (ICVD + MHRVD + OOPVD)] (2b)
where MHR and OOP respectively indicate the average moral hazard reduc-
tion and the average out-of-pocket expenses for the group of insured with a 
voluntary deductible (for different contract periods or in multiple consecutive 
years) resulting from the deductible13. After the risk equalisation payment for 
the different groups of insured is determined, the premiums can be calculated 
using equation (1a) or (1b) depending on whether the insured has a deductible 
or not.
In order to determine the differentiated premiums that can be offered by insur-
ers, we need to know 1) the average healthcare expenses in the data, 2) the 
average insurance claims, the average moral hazard reduction and the average 
out-of-pocket expenses for the different groups of insured, and 3) the quality 
of the risk equalisation model. Firstly, the average healthcare expenses in 
the data are already mentioned and equal €1,894. Secondly, for the average 
insurance claims for insured who are not assumed to opt for a deductible we 
use the healthcare expenses in the data. Since no cost-sharing arrangements 
are in place in our data, the healthcare expenses in the data for insured who 
are assumed to opt for a deductible include a moral hazard reduction and 
out-of-pocket expenses they would have in case of a voluntary deductible. 
Many researchers studied the reduction of healthcare expenses resulting from 
voluntary deductibles (e.g., Bakker (1997), Bakker et al. (2000), Gerfin et al. 
(2015), Keeler et al. (1988), Trottmann et al. (2012)). For our simulations, we 
use the reduction as determined in the study by Trottmann et al. (2012) since 
the researchers of this recent study corrected for the selection effect that arises 
when taking out voluntary deductibles. Consequently, the healthcare expenses 
in the data of insured with a voluntary deductible are reduced by 22.6 per 
cent due to the voluntary deductible. The size of the out-of-pocket expenses is 
12 x indicates the percentage in which risk equalisation is able to equalise the expected differ-
ences in healthcare expenses between low-risk and high-risk individuals caused by differences 
in health.
13 Note that in our simulations the moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket expenses are 
fully reflected into the premium rebate, while in practise different countries make different 
choices.
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determined as the healthcare expenses after the moral hazard reduction in the 
interval [0:1,000]. The insurance claims for insured with a voluntary deduct-
ible are then determined as the healthcare expenses in the data minus the 
moral hazard reduction and minus the out-of-pocket expenses. For instance, an 
insured with healthcare expenses of “€1,250 in the data” and a voluntary de-
ductible of €1,000 will have a moral hazard reduction of €283 (€1,250 x 0.226), 
out-of-pocket expenses of €967 (€1,250 – €283) and no insurance claims (€1,250 
– €283 – €967). However, if an insured who opts for a voluntary deductible of 
€1,000 has healthcare expenses of “€2,500 in the data”, the moral hazard reduc-
tion will be €566 (€2,500 x 0.226), the out-of-pocket expenses will be €1,000 
(€2,500 – €566 = €1,934) and the insurance claims equal €934 (€2,500 – €566 
– €1,000). Thirdly, to determine the effect of risk equalisation on the premium, 
Van Kleef et al. (2008b) show that equalisation based upon region, age and 
gender and equalisation based upon demographic factors, PCGs and DCGs 
reduce the adverse selection component of the premium rebate for the highest 
Swiss voluntary deductibles with respectively 47 and 74 per cent in 2006. For 
our simulations, we therefore study the effect of no risk equalisation, perfect 
risk equalisation and the two models used in the research by Van Kleef et al. 
(2008b). Note that due to extensive research, risk equalisation schemes have 
become more sophisticated and that the Dutch scheme of 2015 is already more 
sophisticated than the 74 per cent model studied by Van Kleef et al. (2008b).
3.5 RESuLTS
3.5.1 Situation without differentiation
Since different percentages of insured who are assumed to opt for a voluntary 
deductible can be studied, Table 3.1 shows the results under the assumption 
that 5, 25, or 50 per cent of the sample with the lowest predicted expenses 
would opt for a voluntary deductible of €1,000 without any differentiation of 
the premium without any risk equalisation. Three insights are drawn from this 
table. Firstly, the table shows that both the premiums and premium rebates 
increase with the percentage of insured opting for a deductible. The latter is 
partially due to the increase of the moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket 
expenses, but largely due to the increase in adverse selection. Secondly, in all 
three cases, the premium rebate is larger than the voluntary deductible itself14. 
14 Note that the Swiss government has capped the offered premium rebate at 70 per cent 
of the voluntary deductible level and that all Swiss insurers offer this premium rebate. Due 
to a relatively poor risk equalisation scheme (and therefore a substantial adverse selection 
component), it may be that if the Swiss government did not oblige this cap, premium rebates 
would be much higher.
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Thirdly, the premium rebate in general exists for the largest part of an adverse 
selection component (i.e., 88 per cent of the premium rebate if 50 per cent of the 
insured would opt for a voluntary deductible).
Table 3.1 Composition of the premium (P) in 2007 for an insurance policy with a voluntary 
deductible of €1,000 for different percentages of insured with the lowest predicted healthcare 
expenses who are assumed to opt for a voluntary deductible, without any differentiation of the 
premium, without any risk equalisation.
% HCE ICa MHR OOP Pa
5 per cent opts for a voluntary deductible
95 nvd
€1,894
€1,981 €1,981
5 vd €46 €51 €129 €46
25 per cent opts for a voluntary deductible
75 nvd
€1,894
€2,417 €2,417
25 vd €75 €74 €176 €75
50 per cent opts for a voluntary deductible
50 nvd
€1,894
€3,289 €3,289
50 vd €128 €113 €257 €128
a Note that since a situation without risk equalisation is shown, no risk equalisation payment is 
in place and the insurance claims equal the premium.
HCE = average healthcare expenses  P = premium
IC = average insurance claims  NVD = insured without a voluntary
MHR = average moral hazard reduction deductible
OOP = average out-of-pocket expenses  VD = insured with a voluntary deductible
Table 3.2 Ex-ante option. Composition of the premium for an insurance policy with a differen-
tiation of the premium to the duration of the contract period for a voluntary deductible of €1,000 
in year t without any risk equalisation.
% HCE ICa MHR OOP Pa
50 nvd
€1,894
€3,289 €3,289
50 vd €128 €113 €257 €128
10 vd 1-year contract €573 €360 €656 €573
10 vd 2-year contract €35 €87 €262 €35
10 vd 3-year contract €19 €56 €173 €19
10 vd 4-year contract €12 €39 €123 €12
10 vd 5-year contract €1 €22 €72 €1
a Note that since a situation without risk equalisation is shown, no risk equalisation payment is 
in place and the insurance claims equal the premium.
HCE = average healthcare expenses  P = premium
IC = average insurance claims  NVD = insured without a voluntary
MHR = average moral hazard reduction deductible
OOP = average out-of-pocket expenses  VD = insured with a voluntary deductible
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3.5.2 The ex-ante differentiation
Remember that, for the ex-ante differentiation, we want to determine the 
premiums in year t (i.e., 2007 for this differentiation) in case an insurer would 
offer six insurance policies: a policy without a voluntary deductible and five 
policies with different contract periods for the voluntary deductible. Table 3.2 
shows the results of this simulation without any risk equalisation and provides 
three insights. Firstly, the table shows that the premium could decrease with 
the duration of the contract. Secondly, the premium for insured with a 1-year 
contract for the deductible is much higher compared to the situation without 
differentiation. Thirdly, the table shows that the moral hazard reduction for a 
1-year contract and the out-of-pocket expenses for both a 1- and 2-year contract 
are larger compared to the situation without differentiation.
3.5.3 The ex-post differentiation
Remember that for the ex-post differentiation, scenario I simulated a situa-
tion without any behavioural effect. The upper part of Table 3.3 shows the 
results for scenario I without any risk equalisation and provides three insights. 
Firstly, the table shows that the premium could decrease with the number of 
previous consecutive years insured have opted for a deductible. Secondly, it 
shows that compared to the situation without differentiation, the premium is 
higher for the first three consecutive years. Thirdly, the table shows that the 
moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket expenses are larger for the first four 
consecutive years opting for a voluntary deductible compared to the situation 
without differentiation.
In scenario II, insured are assumed to keep the voluntary deductible during 
1 year they expect (high) healthcare expenses incentivised by the premium 
differentiation. The bottom part of Table 3.3 shows the results for scenario II 
without any risk equalisation and provides three insights. Firstly, the results 
show that the premium would increase sharply for the second consecutive 
year compared to the first year opting for a deductible and that the premium 
would thereafter considerably decrease. This would imply that only after the 
second consecutive year, offering a decreasing premium with the number of 
years insured have opted for a deductible would be feasible in case of no risk 
equalisation. The increase in premium for the second consecutive year follows 
from the retention of the voluntary deductible in that year even if (high) health-
care expenses are expected, meaning that insured who expect (high) healthcare 
expenses for the second consecutive year opting for a deductible are included 
in that group. Secondly, compared to a situation without differentiation, the 
premium is only lower for the fifth consecutive year opting for a voluntary 
deductible. Thirdly, the moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket expenses are 
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larger for the first four consecutive years opting for a deductible compared to 
the situation without differentiation of the premium. Compared to scenario I, 
the moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket expenses are larger for all groups, 
except for the out-of-pocket expenses for insured with a voluntary deductible 
for five consecutive years.
3.5.4 Risk equalisation
Table 3.4 provides the estimated ex-ante differentiated premiums in case of 
perfect risk equalisation. It shows that, as a result of perfect risk equalisa-
tion, the premium is expected to increase with the duration of the contract. 
Furthermore, Table 3.4 shows that only insured with a 1-year contract period 
for the deductible pay a lower premium compared to the situation without 
differentiation of the premium. Figure 3.2 additionally shows the premium 
patterns for an ex-ante differentiation compared to a 1-year contract for the 
Table 3.3 Ex-post option. Composition of the premium for an insurance policy with a differen-
tiation of the premium to the number of previous consecutive years an insured has opted for a 
voluntary deductible of €1,000 in year t without any risk equalisation.
% HCE ICa MHR OOP Pa
SCEnaRIO I – no behaviour effect
50 nvd
€1,894
€3,287 €3,287
50 vd €133 €113 €254 €133
9.1 1vd €238 €181 €381 €238
6.0 2vd €192 €152 €327 €192
4.7 3vd €141 €126 €291 €141
3.5 4vd €120 €114 €268 €120
26.7 5vd €85 €79 €186 €85
SCEnaRIO II – moderate behavioural effect
40.9 nvd
€1,894
€3,584 €3,584
59.0 vd €262 €163 €296 €262
4.6 1vd €287 €208 €423 €287
4.6 2vd €502 €281 €457 €502
3.5 3vd €349 €219 €400 €349
6.4 4vd €332 €200 €350 €332
39.9 5vd €213 €134 €245 €213
a Note that since a situation without risk equalisation is shown, no risk equalisation payment is 
in place and the insurance claims equal the premium.
HCE = average healthcare expenses  P = premium
IC = average insurance claims  NVD = insured without a voluntary
MHR = average moral hazard reduction deductible
OOP = average out-of-pocket expenses  VD = insured with a voluntary deductible
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Table 3.4 Ex-ante option. Composition of the premium for an insurance policy with a differen-
tiation of the premium to the duration of the contract period for a voluntary deductible of €1,000 
in year t with perfect risk equalisation.
% IC REP P
50 nvd €3,289 €-1,395 €1,894
50 vd €128 €1,396 €1,524
10 vd 1 year contract €573 €305 €878
10 vd 2 year contract €35 €1,510 €1,545
10 vd 3 year contract €19 €1,646 €1,665
10 vd 4 year contract €12 €1,720 €1,732
10 vd 5 year contract €1 €1,799 €1,800
IC = average insurance claims
REP = risk equalisation payment, determined according to equation (2a) or (2b) given the MHR 
and OOP shown in table 3.2
P = premium
NVD = insured without a voluntary deductible
VD = insured with a voluntary deductible
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fig. 3.2 Difference in premium (P) compared to a one-year contract for the voluntary deductible 
(VD) for risk equalisation models that equalise either 0, 47, 74 or 100 per cent of the difference 
in predicted expenses between low-risk and high-risk individuals where the distribution of in-
sured in year t (i.e., 2007) is determined according to the ex-ante differentiation of the premium.
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voluntary deductible for risk equalisation models that equalise 0 per cent, 47 
per cent (i.e., based upon region, age, and gender), 74 per cent (i.e., based upon 
demographic factors, PCGs and DCGs) or 100 per cent of the differences in 
predicted expenses between low-risk and high-risk individuals. It shows that a 
decreasing premium with the duration of the contract for which the deductible 
holds is only feasible without any risk equalisation.
Table 3.5 provides the estimated ex-post differentiated premiums in case of 
perfect risk equalisation. For scenario I (i.e., without any behavioural effect), 
the table shows that the premium is expected to increase with the number of 
years insured have opted for a deductible. For scenario II (i.e., with a moderate 
behavioural effect), the table shows that the premium could decrease between 
the first and second consecutive year insured have opted for a deductible, but 
that it would thereafter increase with the number of consecutive years insured 
have opted for a voluntary deductible. In both scenarios, only insured who opt 
Table 3.5 Ex-post option. Composition of the premium for an insurance policy with a differen-
tiation of the premium to the number of previous consecutive years an insured has opted for a 
voluntary deductible of €1,000 in year t with perfect risk equalisation.
% IC REP P
SCEnaRIO I no behavioural effect
50 nvd €3,287 €-1,393 €1,894
50 vd €133 €1,394 €1,507
9.1 1vd €238 €1,094 €1,299
6 2vd €192 €1,223 €1,389
4.7 3vd €141 €1,336 €1,456
3.5 4vd €120 €1,392 €1,495
26.7 5vd €85 €1,544 €1,617
SCEnaRIO II moderate behavioural effect
40.9 nvd €3,584 €-1,690 €1,894
59 vd €262 €1,173 €1,435
4.6 1vd €287 €976 €1,263
4.6 2vd €502 €654 €1,156
3.5 3vd €349 €926 €1,275
6.4 4vd €332 €1,012 €1,344
39.9 5vd €213 €1,302 €1,515
IC = average insurance claims
REP = risk equalisation payment, determined according to equation (2a) or (2b) given the MHR 
and OOP shown in table 3.3
P = premium
NVD = insured without a voluntary deductible
VD = insured with a voluntary deductible (the number corresponds to the number of consecutive 
years)
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fig. 3.3 Difference in premium (P) compared to one year opting for a voluntary deductible (VD) 
for risk equalisation models that equalise either 0, 47, 74 or 100 per cent of the difference in 
predicted expenses between low-risk and high-risk individuals where the distribution of insured 
in year t (i.e., 2011) is determined according to the ex-post differentiation of the premium for 
scenario I (no behavioural effect).
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for a voluntary deductible for the fifth consecutive year are offered a higher 
premium compared to the situation without differentiation of the premium. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 additionally show the premium patterns for an ex-post 
differentiation for, respectively, scenario I and II compared to one year opting 
for a voluntary deductible for risk equalisation models that equalise 0, 47, 74, 
or 100 per cent of the differences in predicted expenses between low-risk and 
high-risk individuals. Figure 3.3 for scenario I confirms that only without any 
risk equalisation the premium could decrease with the number of consecutive 
years insured have opted for a deductible. Figure 3.4 for scenario II shows 
that the premium could only decrease for the second consecutive year insured 
have opted for a voluntary deductible in case of perfect or sophisticated (i.e., 
74 per cent) risk equalisation. But thereafter, the premium would substan-
tially increase with the number of consecutive years insured have opted for 
a deductible. Furthermore, the premium could only decrease from the second 
consecutive year insured have opted for a deductible in a situation without risk 
equalisation. It might therefore not be that surprising that none of the Dutch 
insurers utilises the option to ex-post differentiate the premium. Overall, under 
the assumptions made within this paper, these results imply that, due to risk 
equalisation, it does not seem likely that insurers in Germany, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, or the US could offer a decreasing premium if it is either 
differentiated to the duration of the contract for which the voluntary deductible 
holds or the number of previous consecutive years insured have opted for a 
voluntary deductible.
3.6 COnCLuSIOnS
Voluntary deductibles are implemented in regulated insurance markets such 
as Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the US to counteract moral 
hazard. However, the moral hazard reduction resulting from these deductibles 
could be mitigated by adverse selection, since insured only opt for a deductible 
if their expected out-of-pocket expenses under the deductible are smaller than 
the premium rebate. Insurers in regulated markets may reduce this adverse 
selection by differentiating the premium according to either the duration of 
the contract for which the voluntary deductible holds (ex-ante approach) or the 
number of previous years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible (ex-
post approach). It can be hypothesised that, the longer the period for which the 
voluntary deductible holds or the more previous years an insured has opted for 
a voluntary deductible, the lower the premium will be. This would incentivise 
insured to opt for a voluntary deductible for a longer period or for another con-
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secutive year. To determine the premiums that could be offered in case of such 
differentiations, we simulated the distribution of insured over the deductible 
options for both the ex-ante and ex-post differentiation. Thereafter, we calcu-
lated the premiums based upon the insurance claims and a risk equalisation 
payment. The results show that only without risk equalisation insurers would 
be able to offer a decreasing premium with the duration of the contract or with 
the number of previous consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary 
deductible. With moderate, sophisticated, or perfect risk equalisation, the pre-
miums are expected to increase for both the ex-ante and ex-post differentiation. 
These results are due to the fact that as either the duration of the contract or 
the number of years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible increases, 
the insurance claims decrease but the risk equalisation payments increase, 
which overall increases the premium. In sum, under the assumptions made in 
this paper, the results imply that, due to risk equalisation, it seems unlikely 
that insurers in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, or the US can offer 
premiums that decrease with either the duration of the contract for which the 
voluntary deductible holds or the number of previous consecutive years insured 
have opted for a voluntary deductible. Given these findings, we are sceptical 
about the feasibility of these strategies to counteract adverse selection.
3.7 dISCuSSIOn
3.7.1 general discussion points
This section provides four general discussion points regarding the representa-
tiveness of our data, the sample sizes of the groups under study, the way risk 
equalisation is taken into account and the omission of the loading fee in our 
analyses. Firstly, as mentioned when discussing the data, the average health in 
the sample is somewhat worse compared to the Dutch population. This implies 
that the absolute premiums presented in this paper are probably higher than 
they would be in the Dutch population. The effect of this limitation on relative 
premiums (i.e., the increase or decrease of the premium with the duration of 
the contract period or the number of previous consecutive years opting for a 
voluntary deductible) and our conclusions, however, will be minor since deduct-
ible choice is simulated relative to spending and characteristics in our sample 
and not relative to an absolute benchmark. Furthermore, it seems most likely 
that if insurers would want to differentiate the premiums for their health in-
surance policies, they would use their own data to determine these premiums. 
Nevertheless, we emphasise that our absolute results are not generalisable to 
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the entire (Dutch) population. In order to achieve more generalisable results, a 
more representative dataset would be necessary.
Secondly, some of the groups resulting from our simulations are quite small 
(e.g., 3.5 per cent of the sample) and the results of these groups could be af-
fected by a few insured in the data with very large insurance claims. However, 
only 176 insured (i.e., 0.02 per cent) and 17 insured (i.e., 0.002 per cent) in the 
data had healthcare expenses, respectively, larger than €100,000 or €200,000 
in 2011. Sensitivity checks where these insured are omitted show that the 
absolute premiums change only marginally and that the relative premiums 
remain unchanged.
Thirdly, contrary to our analyses, cost reductions resulting from the vol-
untary deductible (i.e., moral hazard reduction and out-of-pocket expenses) 
are in Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands partially captured by risk 
equalisation and can consequently not be fully reflected into the premium re-
bate (Van Kleef et al., 2008a). This implies that the premium for insured with 
a deductible would be higher compared to our paper, but it does not affect the 
relative premiums found in this paper.
Fourthly, this paper only studied insurance claims and disregarded the in-
surer’s loading fee. Although the loading fee does not constitute a large part of 
the premium, it could affect the premium, the premium rebate and risk equali-
sation if the average loading fee differs between insured with and without a 
voluntary deductible. For instance, administration costs differ between these 
groups since insured with a deductible do not send their bills to the insurer 
before the total amount exceeds the deductible. Consequently, the insurer does 
not have to handle the bills of these insured (Van Kleef et al., 2007). Even in 
a system where most bills are settled between the insurer and the provider, 
such as in the Netherlands, a difference in administration costs between in-
sured who do and do not opt for a deductible can exist. One can hypothesise 
that, since upcoding is a serious problem (Steinbusch et al., 2007), insurers 
spend a lot of time verifying the received bills. Since insured with a voluntary 
deductible on average use less healthcare services and therefore file less bills 
compared to insured without a deductible, it could be assumed that verifying 
the bills of the latter group is more expensive. In a market without any (or with 
poor) risk equalisation, this could imply that the premiums could potentially 
decrease for insured with a voluntary deductible compared to the simulations 
showed within this paper due to smaller administrative costs. However, further 
research regarding the effect of the loading fee on the premium - also in case of 
an ex-ante or ex-post differentiation - is necessary.
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3.7.2 Empirical assumptions
This section provides five discussion points regarding the assumptions in our 
empirical simulations. Firstly, we based the assumption of which insured opt 
for a voluntary deductible solely on the predicted healthcare expenses. How-
ever, research shows that other determinants than the predicted expenses 
affect the decision to opt for a deductible as well, such as loss aversion, risk 
attitude, ambiguity aversion, debt aversion and omission bias (Van Winssen et 
al., 2015b). As a result of these factors, it could be expected that fewer insured 
(i.e., less than 50 per cent) opt for a voluntary deductible. As shown in Table 
3.1, fewer insured opting for a deductible affects the absolute premium, but 
sensitivity analyses showed that the relative premiums for both the ex-ante 
and ex-post differentiation would not be affected.
Secondly, since we simulate who opts for a deductible based upon predicted 
expenses, we are unable to incorporate planned medical decisions not identified 
by the explanatory variables used in our estimation models, such as pregnancy. 
In our simulations, insured with unidentified planned medical decisions might 
opt for a deductible, while in practice they would not due to (high) expected 
healthcare expenses. We therefore may underestimate adverse selection into 
the different deductible options.
Thirdly, we do not study expenses for different types of healthcare ser-
vices, but only use total healthcare expenses. Gerfin et al. (2015) show that 
deductibles affect different types of healthcare differently, where the decrease 
in healthcare expenses due to the deductible is most pronounced for inpatient 
care and prescription drugs. This could impact the insured’s decision to opt for 
a voluntary deductible, which is not taken into account in our analyses.
Fourthly, we assume very strong adverse selection into the different deduct-
ible options: the entire half of the sample with the lowest predicted expenses 
opts for a voluntary deductible. A sensitivity check for scenario I of the ex-
post differentiation shows that if this assumption is relaxed (i.e., one in two 
insured belonging to the half of the sample with the lowest predicted expenses 
randomly opts for a deductible in year t), the premiums still increase with the 
number of consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible in 
case of perfect risk equalisation.
Fifthly, for the ex-ante differentiation, we determine the rank of insured in 
the upcoming years using information from these years. It might, however, be 
questionable how much information insured actually have on future expenses. 
Therefore, we performed a sensitivity check for the ex-ante differentiation us-
ing only the information known at the start of year t to rank insured (see the 
results in appendix 5). This approach implies an underestimation of adverse 
selection, since research shows that insured do have some information on 
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future healthcare expenses (Van de Ven and Van Vliet, 1995). The sensitivity 
check shows that, although the absolute premiums are somewhat different, the 
relative premiums show the same pattern as with the approach used within 
this paper: without risk equalisation, the premiums decrease with the duration 
of the contract period and with risk equalisation, the premiums increase with 
the duration of the contract period.
3.7.3 Market dynamics
Our results show the first-order effects (i.e., the premiums when starting to 
offer insurance policies with ex-ante or ex-post differentiated premiums) and 
disregard any market dynamics. This section elaborates on these market dy-
namics for markets without risk equalisation since the results already showed 
that ex-ante or ex-post differentiated decreasing premiums are impossible with 
sophisticated or perfect risk equalisation.
Regarding the ex-ante differentiation, if insurer ‘A’, for instance, would offer 
these six health insurance policies, insured would have a large incentive to 
opt for a policy with a contract period longer than 1 year due to the decreasing 
premium. However, if a competitor would not offer differentiated premiums, 
his premium for a policy with a voluntary deductible would be much lower 
(i.e., €128 compared to €573; see Table 3.2). If insurer ‘A’ would be able, due to 
optimal marketing, to attract the healthiest insured away from his competitor 
into the long contract policies, it might indeed be attractive to offer ex-ante 
differentiated premiums. The reason is that in that case, his competitor has set 
the premium for a policy with a voluntary deductible too low and must increase 
it. Additionally, since the results only show the first-order effects, the estimated 
premiums could change over time when the contract expires and insured once 
again get to choose between the different deductible options. As with the ex-
post approach, it could be that insured are willing to accept (high) healthcare 
expenses during one year of their contract period. Further research into this 
dynamic behavioural effect for insurance markets without risk equalisation 
would be necessary to provide insights into the resulting premium patterns.
Regarding the ex-post differentiation, scenario I (Table 3.3) especially shows 
the first-order effects. In that case, insurer ‘B’, for instance, could offer these 
six health insurance policies, but he could also decide to combine two or three 
insurance policies. Note that, as with the ex-ante differentiation, a competi-
tor of insurer ‘B’ who might not offer differentiated premiums, might be less 
expensive than insurer ‘B’. Again, in that case, insurer ‘B’ should try to attract 
the healthiest insured away from his competitors into the policies for insured 
who opted for a deductible in more consecutive years. From scenario I, scenario 
II could be interpreted as the situation after 5 years (i.e., year t+5) with some 
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market dynamics simulated as a moderate behavioural effect of the decreasing 
premium on the insured’s decision to opt for a deductible. It already shows that 
decreasing premiums could only be offered upward of two consecutive years, 
but further research into market dynamics and behavioural effects in insur-
ance markets without risk equalisation would be necessary to provide further 
insight into the resulting premium patterns.


Chapter 4
Potential determinants of deductible uptake in 
health insurance: how to increase uptake in The 
Netherlands?
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abSTRaCT
In health insurance, voluntary deductibles are offered to the insured in return 
for a premium rebate. Previous research has shown that 11 per cent of the 
Dutch insured opted for a voluntary deductible in health insurance in 2014, 
while the highest voluntary deductible level was financially profitable for al-
most 50 per cent of the population in retrospect. To explain this discrepancy, 
this paper identifies and discusses six potential determinants of the decision to 
opt for a voluntary deductible from the behavioural economic literature: loss 
aversion, risk attitude, ambiguity aversion, debt aversion, omission bias, and 
liquidity constraints. Based on these determinants, five potential strategies 
are proposed to increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary deduct-
ible. Presenting the voluntary deductible as the default option and providing 
transparent information regarding the voluntary deductible are the two most 
promising strategies. If, as a result of these strategies, more insured would opt 
for a voluntary deductible, moral hazard would be reduced.
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4.1 InTROduCTIOn
Although fiercely debated (e.g., Hurley (2013), Smith (2013)), cost-sharing is 
an effective way to counteract moral hazard15 in health insurance (Newhouse, 
1993; Pauly, 1968; Zweifel and Breuer, 2006). One type of cost-sharing is to 
provide insured with the possibility to opt for a voluntary deductible in return 
for a premium rebate. Previous research has shown that a voluntary deductible 
was expected to be financially profitable for almost 50 per cent of the Dutch 
population in 2014 (Van Winssen et al., 2015a), while at the same time only 11 
per cent of the Dutch insured opted for a voluntary deductible (Vektis, 2014). 
This discrepancy suggests that reasons other than the profitability influence 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible. The aim of this paper is twofold: 
1) to identify determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible to 
shed light on the observed discrepancy, and 2) to provide strategies that can 
potentially increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible. 
After all, if more insured would opt for a voluntary deductible, moral hazard 
will, ceteris paribus, be reduced.
In the next section, we elaborate on the Dutch example in which the dis-
crepancy is observed (section two). In section three, six potential determinants 
of the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible are identified from the behav-
ioural economic literature, and these determinants are discussed in order to 
shed light on the observed discrepancy. Subsequently, section four provides five 
potential strategies to increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary 
deductible. Finally, the implications for moral hazard are discussed in section 
five and the conclusion is provided in section six.
4.2 ThE duTCh SITuaTIOn
The Health Insurance Act, enacted in 200616, obligates all Dutch residents to 
buy basic health insurance from a private insurer for community-rated premi-
ums, which are mostly automatically deducted from the insured’s bank account 
(Schut and Van de Ven, 2011). By this law, a mandatory deductible requires 
each adult to pay the first €360 (i.e., deductible level of 2014) of healthcare 
15 Moral hazard refers to the change in health behavior and consumption caused by the fact 
that the health insurer reimburses the costs (Folland et al., 2010; Zweifel and Manning, 2000).
16 Since the possibility to opt for a voluntary deductible has already existed for a decade, 
we do not expect that unfamiliarity with the deductible would be a large contributor to the 
explanation of why insured forego deductibles. However, the percentage of insured with a 
voluntary deductible has increased considerably in these years (i.e., from 5 per cent in 2006 
(Vektis, 2006) to 11 per cent in 2014 (Vektis, 2014)).
72
expenses out-of-pocket per year. On top of the mandatory deductible, adults 
can opt for a voluntary deductible of one of five levels (€100, €200, €300, €400 
or €500) for which they receive a premium rebate in return that is deducted 
from their monthly premium. Lawfully, the rebate must be equal for each 
insured opting for the same deductible level within the same health insurance 
product17. In 2014, the average premium rebate for the highest deductible level 
was €240 and varied among insurers from €180 to €300 per individual per year. 
In financial terms, opting for a voluntary deductible in a specific year has been 
profitable for an individual if the out-of-pocket expenses under the voluntary 
deductible (on top of the mandatory deductible) in that year were smaller than 
the offered premium rebate of that year (Van Kleef et al., 2006; Van Winssen et 
al., 2015a). Based on Dutch claims data of more than 800,000 individuals, Van 
Winssen et al. (2015a) showed that opting for the highest voluntary deductible 
level against the average premium rebate would retrospectively have been 
profitable for 48 per cent of the Dutch insured in 2014. Their research showed 
that, on average, a voluntary deductible was profitable for males up to the age 
of 50, for healthy insured, and for insured for whom opting for a voluntary 
deductible would have been profitable in previous years. They additionally 
show that for almost 20 per cent of the insured, a voluntary deductible would 
have been profitable in all 5 years prior to their research year, implying that for 
a substantial group of insured the profitability is fairly stable over the years. 
In real life, however, only 11 per cent of the Dutch insured indeed opted for a 
voluntary deductible in 2014 (Vektis, 2014). The discrepancy between the lat-
ter group and the group of insured for whom a voluntary deductible would have 
been profitable (e.g., 48 per cent) implies that determinants other than the 
potential financial benefit might influence the decision to opt for a voluntary 
deductible. Six potential determinants are identified and discussed in the next 
section.
4.3 POTEnTIaL dETERMInanTS Of ThE dECISIOn TO OPT fOR 
a vOLunTaRy dEduCTIbLE
4.3.1 Loss aversion
A first potential explanation for the observed discrepancy between the percent-
age of insured (i.e., about 48 per cent in the Netherlands in 2014) for whom a 
voluntary deductible is expected to be profitable and the percentage of insured 
(i.e., 11 per cent in the Netherlands in 2014) who actually opted for a voluntary 
17 Additionally, insurers may offer insured who have opted for a voluntary deductible in 
previous years a different premium rebate. However, in practice, this does not happen.
73
4
deductible, is loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explain loss aver-
sion by stating that ‘losses loom larger than gains’ and that ‘the aggravation 
that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the 
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount’. Loss aversion is denoted by 
λ, where λ> 1 implies loss aversion with avoidance of losses and little attention 
to gains and λ< 1 implies gain seeking with little attention to losses (Wakker, 
2010). Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated λ to be 2.25, meaning that the 
pain of losses is felt 2.25 times as much as the joy of gains. Attema et al. (2013) 
on the other hand estimated λ in the health domain to be 1.18.
According to Kahneman and Tversky’s cumulative prospect theory (CPT) 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the overall 
value (V) of a decision (or prospect) is expressed in terms of a subjective value 
(υ), which assigns to each possible outcome (x) a number that reflects the 
subjective value of that outcome, and a decision weight (ω), which associates 
with each probability (p) a decision weight that reflects the impact of this prob-
ability on the overall value of the prospect. Opposed to previous studies (e.g., 
Friedman and Savage (1948), Markowitz (1952)), CPT applies the principle of 
diminishing marginal sensitivity to both the value function and the weighting 
function. For decision weights, this implies an inverted S-shaped weighting 
function that differs for gains and losses. The outcomes are defined relative to 
a reference point, which implies that the value function measures the value of 
deviations from this reference point: either gains or losses (respectively ω+ and 
ω-)18 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In case of a binary prospect (p, x; y), where 
the outcome is x with probability p and the outcome is y with probability 1 - p 
(such as is the case with opting for a voluntary deductible), the evaluation of 
prospects becomes (Wakker, 2010):
V (p, x ; y) = w+(p) × (u(x) – u(y)) + u( y ) for pure gain prospects;
V (p, x ; y) = w-(p) × (u(x) – u(y)) + u( y ) for pure loss prospects, and;
V (p, x ; y) = w+(p) × u(x) + w- (1 – p) × u( y ) for mixed prospects, where x > y.
Often it is assumed that the reference point in any decision is the current state 
of wealth, although the expected state might be the relevant reference point in 
some situations (Wilkinson, 2008). In case of the decision to opt for a voluntary 
deductible, several views and associated reference points can be considered. 
Table 4.1 shows four potential scenarios and the way they are evaluated ac-
18 The overall value of a prospect in CPT differs from that in expected utility theory (EUT) 
where choices under uncertainty are evaluated by their expected utility (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). The main deviations from CPT with respect to EUT are the dependence 
upon a reference point, probability weighting and loss aversion (Attema et al., 2013). We 
prefer to use CPT since it proves to have more descriptive validity than EUT.
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cording to CPT based upon two dimensions of the decision to opt for a voluntary 
deductible. The first dimension regards whether the premium for health insur-
ance is excluded or included in the insured’s perception. The second dimension 
regards whether the decision is perceived as a one-stage or two-stage process. 
If the decision is perceived as a one-stage process, the premium rebate is in-
tegrated into the deductible amount, while if a two-stage process is perceived, 
the received premium rebate is separated from the deductible amount. Hershey 
and Schoemaker (1985) and Bleichrodt et al. (2001) found that one of the of-
fered alternatives is often taken as the reference point. Schmidt (2012) adds 
that the reference point when opting for a voluntary deductible is most likely 
full insurance. This would imply that not opting for a voluntary deductible 
seems to be the relevant reference point in each of the four scenarios in Table 
4.1. This means that, from this reference point, the insured decides whether to 
opt for a voluntary deductible or to retain the reference point.
The presence of loss aversion largely depends on the perception of the ref-
erence point. Prospects coded as losses from the reference point are affected 
by loss aversion. Wakker (2010) emphasises that loss aversion only concerns 
mixed prospects (i.e., where the outcome is either a gain or a loss) and does not 
affect preferences between pure gain and pure loss prospects. In that case, loss 
aversion is only present in scenario 1, since only this scenario regards a mixed 
prospect. For scenario 2, loss aversion is expected to be absent because the 
separate stages respectively regard a gain prospect and a loss prospect19 but 
not a mixed prospect. Scenario 3 regards a loss prospect and the two stages in 
scenario 4 both regard a loss prospect and therefore loss aversion is expected 
to be absent in these scenarios. Regarding the latter scenarios, the issue of 
whether the health insurance premium is perceived as an intended expendi-
ture (i.e., in some countries, including the Netherlands, individuals are obliged 
to buy health insurance) and therefore not subject to loss aversion or perceived 
as a loss and therefore potentially subject to loss aversion, is unresolved in 
the scientific literature to date (e.g., Bateman et al. (1997), Bateman et al. 
(2005), Heath and Soll (1996), Novemsky and Kahneman (2005a), Novemsky 
and Kahneman (2005b), Thaler (1985)). So from the viewpoint of scenario 1, 
the insured may forego the voluntary deductible since they are loss averse and 
prefer the reference point (i.e., no voluntary deductible).
19 We define a mixed prospect as a prospect that involves a gain and a loss and do not regard 
zero to be a gain. Therefore, we do not regard the second stage of scenarios 2 and 4 as mixed 
prospects but respectively as a gain and loss prospect.
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4.3.2 Risk attitude
Risk attitude is a second potential determinant of the decision to opt for a 
voluntary deductible. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that diminish-
ing marginal sensitivity with respect to outcomes for both gains and losses 
enhances risk aversion20 for gains and risk seeking for losses. Illustratively, 
individuals generally prefer a certain gain of 100 over a gain of 200 with a prob-
ability of .5, but if the prospects are reversed (i.e., a certain loss of 100 or a loss 
of 200 with a probability of .5), individuals prefer the latter option. However, 
the combination of diminishing marginal sensitivity for both the value function 
and the decision weighting function implies a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: 
individuals are risk-averse for gains and risk seeking for losses of moderate to 
high probabilities (larger than approximately .35) and risk-seeking for gains 
20 For the definition of risk aversion see (Pratt, 1964).
Table 4.1 Four scenarios, and the way they are evaluated according to CPT, regarding the 
insured’s perception of the decision (or prospect) to opt for a voluntary deductible of €500, as-
suming that ‘not opting for a voluntary deductible’ is the reference point.
P
ro
ce
ss
Premium
Excluded Included
Scenario 1
Mixed prospect
Scenario 3
Loss prospect
O
n
e 
st
a
g
e 
p
ro
ce
ss
Probability p to gain €240 (x)
Probability 1 – pa to lose €260 (y)b,c
V (p, x; y) =
ω+(p) × υ(240) + ω-(1-p) × υ(-260)
Probability p to lose €917 (x)
Probability 1 – p to lose €1,417 (y)
V (p, x; y) =
ω-(p) × (υ(-1,417) - υ(-917)) + υ(-917)
Scenario 2
gain and loss prospect
Scenario 4
Loss and loss prospect
T
w
o
 s
ta
g
e
p
ro
ce
ss
Certainty of gaining €240 (x)
AND
Probability p to lose nothing (y)
Probability 1 – p to lose €500 (z)
V (1, x) = υ(240)
AND
V (p, y; z) =
ω+(p) × υ(0) + ω-(1-p) × υ(-500)
Certainty of losing €917 (x)
AND
Probability p to lose nothing (y)
Probability 1 – p to lose €500 (z)
V (1, x) = υ(-917)
AND
V (p, y; z) =
ω+(p) × υ(0) + ω-(1-p) × υ(-500)
a p is in all scenarios defined as the probability of staying healthy, while 1 - p is defined as the 
probability of getting sick
b The proposed prospects (in all scenarios) concern a simplified version (i.e., either no healthcare 
expenses under the voluntary deductible are incurred or healthcare expenses that exceed the 
voluntary deductible are incurred), while, in practice, the insured has to deal with a more con-
tinuous distribution of healthcare expenses
c The outcomes and premiums in all scenarios are based upon the average offered premium re-
bate (i.e., €240) for a voluntary deductible of €500 and the average premium (i.e., €1,157) in the 
Dutch basic health insurance in 2014
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and risk-averse for losses of small probabilities (smaller than approximately 
.35) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
The insured’s objective probability of the outcomes of opting for a voluntary 
deductible is unknown21. The probability that opting for a voluntary deductible 
results in a loss would be small for healthy insured. Van Winssen et al. (2015a) 
have shown that especially young males and insured for whom a voluntary 
deductible would have been profitable in the past have a high probability (i.e., 
larger than .65) of a positive financial result. Furthermore, their results show, 
based upon a combination of background characteristics of insured, that more 
than 40 per cent of the insured have a predicted probability larger than .65 
that opting for a voluntary deductible is profitable. Note that insured might 
not be aware of their own probability that opting for a voluntary deductible 
is financially profitable. Furthermore, prospect theory shows that individu-
als are bad at estimating probabilities and often overestimate probabilities 
of rare events (Wilkinson, 2008). Additionally, determining this probability 
might be very complicated and may impose a high cognitive burden. Assuming 
scenario 1 in Table 4.1 and based upon the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, 
it is expected that insured within the observed discrepancy (i.e., the differ-
ence between the 11 per cent of insured who actually opted for a voluntary 
deductible and the 48 per cent of insured for whom a voluntary deductible 
would have been profitable) will be risk-averse since the probability of loss is 
considered to be small. However, assuming scenarios 2 and 4, where the choice 
is considered a two-stage process, the effect of the risk attitude is unclear. Since 
the first stage of the decision does not involve any uncertainty, risk attitude 
is not expected to have any effect on the decision in that stage. In the second 
stage, risk aversion is expected such as in scenario 1 because the risk of a 
loss remains small. However, the combined effect of both stages is unknown. 
Assuming scenario 3, where the decision always results in a loss, risk-seeking 
behaviour is expected. Gorter and Schilp (2012) support the notion that risk 
aversion potentially plays a role in the decision to opt for a voluntary deduct-
ible by showing that risk preferences (e.g., financial risk tolerance, smoking 
and drinking behaviour) have a significant positive effect on the choice for a 
voluntary deductible. Rice (2013) emphasises that the degree of risk aversion 
alone cannot explain individuals’ preference for low deductibles and that loss 
21 Obviously, chronically ill insured are aware of their probability since they know for certain 
that opting for a voluntary deductible is not profitable for them under the current design. 
However, the aim of this paper is to shed light on the discrepancy between the low percentage 
of insured who do opt for a voluntary deductible and the high percentage of insured for whom 
opting for a voluntary deductible is expected to be profitable. Opting for a voluntary deductible 
is not expected to be profitable for chronically ill and therefore we do not aim to provide 
determinants of their decision to opt for a voluntary deductible.
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aversion remains an important determinant. Additionally, several studies have 
shown that presenting individuals with prospects within an insurance context 
may enhance risk aversion. Schoemaker and Kunreuther (1979) report that, 
although mathematically equivalent, 45 per cent of the respondents preferred 
a zero deductible option presented in an insurance context, while only 13 per 
cent preferred this option outside the insurance context. Hershey et al. (1982) 
demonstrate a similar result and state that individuals are more risk averse 
under the insurance formulation than under the gamble formulation of the 
same prospect. Since the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible is considered 
within an insurance context, these studies indicate that risk aversion may be 
more pronounced than mentioned before. In sum, the effect of risk attitude on 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible is largely unclear and depends 
strongly on the scenario. For scenario 1, risk aversion is expected, which might 
explain why insured forego deductibles, while for scenario 3, risk-seeking be-
haviour is expected, which would predict that insured do opt for a deductible.
4.3.3 ambiguity aversion
Ambiguity aversion22 is a third potential determinant of the decision to opt for 
a voluntary deductible and has been incorporated into CPT. According to Ells-
berg (1961) ambiguity regards ‘the nature of one’s information concerning the 
relative likelihood of events’, which depends on ‘the amount, type, reliability 
and ‘unanimity’ of information’. This gives rise to ‘one’s degree of confidence in 
an estimate of relative likelihoods’. Frisch and Baron (1988) add that this un-
certainty about probabilities is created by missing information that is relevant 
and could be known. Ambiguity aversion captures individuals’ preferences for 
prospects with known probabilities over prospects with unknown probabilities 
and was first presented by Ellsberg (1961). In a hypothetical experiment, 
individuals were confronted with two urns. The first urn contained 100 red 
and black balls in an unknown ratio and the second urn contained exactly 50 
red and 50 black balls. The majority of respondents preferred to bet on either 
red or black in urn two rather than in urn one, indicating ambiguity aversion. 
Ritov and Baron (1990) show the presence of ambiguity aversion in healthcare 
in a study on children’s vaccination, where the vaccination reduces the risk of 
dying from a specific disease, but simultaneously might have adverse health 
effects. When ambiguity about the risk of adverse health effects was caused by 
missing information (i.e., a child had a high risk or no risk of adverse effects, 
but it was impossible to find out which) individuals were more reluctant to 
vaccinate, indicating ambiguity aversion. In most experiments on ambiguity 
aversion, respondents had to choose between two situations: one with known 
22 Ambiguity aversion is sometimes also referred to as uncertainty aversion.
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probabilities and another with unknown probabilities. In case of opting for a 
voluntary deductible, a comparison with known probabilities is absent. Chow 
and Sarin (2001) conducted several experiments concerning ambiguity aversion 
under comparative and non-comparative conditions and conclude that the am-
biguity effect exists under both conditions, but that it is significantly reduced 
in the non-comparative condition. This indicates that ambiguity aversion may 
actually influence the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible, even though a 
comparison with known probabilities lacks. Ellsberg (1961) adds that individu-
als often perceive the status quo as the situation with low variation and that 
ambiguities of the new situation are more salient than those of the current 
situation. Therefore, when deciding to opt for a voluntary deductible, ambigu-
ity aversion might create a preference for the current situation. This causes 
insured without a voluntary deductible not to opt for a voluntary deductible in 
the next year even if this would result in the same (or a better) expected value. 
Note that from ambiguity aversion it follows that individuals will value provi-
sion of any information that reduces their ambiguity, even if it will not change 
their decision, while standard economic theory predicts that information is only 
demanded if it affects the decision (Camerer and Weber, 1992).
Several studies argue that a (psychological) driver of ambiguity aversion is 
found in the competence hypothesis that states that individuals prefer to bet on 
their beliefs in situations where they feel knowledgeable, and prefer to bet on 
chance when they feel ignorant (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Keppe and Weber, 
1995; Tversky and Fox, 1995). Several researchers show that insured have lim-
ited knowledge about their health insurance (Hsu et al., 2004; Reed et al., 2009) 
and others add that individuals misunderstand complex price schedules includ-
ing premiums and cost-sharing arrangements (Baicker et al., 2012; Liebman 
and Zeckhauser, 2004; Marquis, 1981). Additionally, estimating the probability 
that a voluntary deductible would be financially profitable might be complex 
and might impose a high cognitive burden. This could especially be the case 
for individuals with low levels of numeracy and/or health literacy. Based upon 
these studies, individuals’ limited knowledge about health insurance could 
indicate that (in)competence affects the degree of ambiguity aversion for the 
decision to opt for a voluntary deductible. In sum, since probabilities regarding 
the profitability of voluntary deductible are absent, ambiguity aversion (par-
tially through incompetence) might explain why insured forego deductibles.
4.3.4 debt aversion
A fourth potential determinant of the decision to opt for a voluntary deduct-
ible is debt aversion, which stems from mental accounting theory (Thaler, 
1985; Thaler, 1999). Thaler defines mental accounting as ‘the set of cognitive 
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operations used by individuals and households to organise, evaluate, and keep 
track of financial activities’ (1999). The theory incorporates CPT and provides 
a better understanding of the psychological processes that underlie choices and 
decisions. Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) build upon Thaler’s theory and pre-
dict strong debt aversion because individuals establish mental accounts that 
create linkages between consumption and payments. Debt aversion in their 
work is defined by individuals’ preferences to prepay for consumption and to 
get paid for work after completion. Individuals dislike the feeling of ‘having 
the meter running’ and prefer flat-rate pricing schemes even if they pay more 
for the same usage (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998; Thaler, 1999). The latter 
is called the flat rate bias and can be illustrated by a preference for unlimited 
Internet access at a fixed monthly price over paying per megabyte. Prelec and 
Loewenstein (1998) provide two motives why individuals are inclined to prepay 
for a product. Firstly, individuals hope to enjoy the product untroubled from 
payment concerns and secondly, individuals want to avoid the unpleasant 
experience of paying for consumption that has already been enjoyed.
Debt aversion firstly predicts that insured dislike paying for healthcare after 
consumption and secondly that insured prefer flat-rate pricing schemes (e.g., 
health insurance) to payment decoupling. This makes debt aversion relevant 
for the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible. Debt aversion could prevent 
insured from opting for a voluntary deductible since, if the insured opts for 
a voluntary deductible, healthcare is paid for after consumption, while if the 
insured does not opt for a voluntary deductible, a flat rate is paid in advance. 
Overall, due to the debt that results from consuming healthcare when having a 
voluntary deductible, insured might forego deductibles.
4.3.5 Omission bias
Omission bias is a fifth potential determinant of the decision to opt for a volun-
tary deductible. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) introduced the status quo 
bias that describes individuals’ tendency of ‘doing nothing or maintaining one’s 
current or previous decision’. Ritov and Baron (1992), however, state that two 
claims are embedded in this bias: firstly, individuals prefer to keep the current 
state and secondly, individuals are reluctant to take action to change this state. 
The latter is called omission bias. Ritov and Baron (1992) explain status quo 
bias by the fact that changing the status quo requires an act, while keeping 
the status quo requires only an omission. Through three experiments they 
show that the omission bias was present in choice whether the status quo was 
changed by action or not. Furthermore, they demonstrate that no consistent 
status quo bias was found in choice when both choices did (not) involve an 
action. This result corresponds to norm theory where Kahneman and Miller 
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(1986) state that omissions are considered the norm, while commissions are 
compared to what would have happened if nothing had been done. So, regard-
less of the outcome, omissions are evaluated as neutral, where commissions are 
evaluated as negative if the outcomes are worse and evaluated as positive if the 
outcomes are better than the expected outcome of inaction.
A potentially underlying factor of omission bias is decision fatigue, which 
means that individuals tire from making decisions in general (Wilkinson, 
2008). A second potentially related factor to omission bias concerns transaction 
costs (Strombom et al., 2002). Transaction costs regard the time and effort that 
it takes to choose a plan with or without a voluntary deductible. Another po-
tentially related factor is regret avoidance, which implies that whenever choice 
can induce regret, individuals have an incentive to eliminate choice (Thaler, 
1980). Regret avoidance helps explain individuals’ preference for first dollar 
coverage, since many individuals find decisions that involve trade-offs between 
healthcare and money unpleasant (Thaler, 1980). Thaler (1980) considered the 
following example: for their child, a couple has to decide on taking a diagnostic 
test that costs x. A small risk exists that the child has a serious disease that can 
only be treated if detected early. The couple will certainly experience regret if 
they decide not to test the child and he/she is found to have the disease. If the 
test is performed and shows the likely negative result, the couple may regret 
the expenditure, especially if it was expensive relative to their wealth. These 
psychic costs could be avoided if all healthcare consumption is prepaid and no 
decision (i.e., act) is required.
Decision fatigue may affect the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible, 
since insured might just be tired from making all kinds of (financial) decisions 
and therefore decide to renew their current plan (i.e., the plan with(out) a 
voluntary deductible). Furthermore, transaction costs may affect the decision 
to opt for a voluntary deductible since insured would want to avoid these costs 
and therefore renew their current plan (i.e., the plan with(out) a voluntary 
deductible). Regret avoidance may affect the decision to opt for a voluntary 
deductible since insured might not want to take the risk of having to regret 
the decision (not) to opt for a voluntary deductible if healthcare expenses that 
exceed (or stay below) the deductible amount are incurred. Additional to these 
direct effects, these factors might also indirectly effect the decision to opt for 
a voluntary deductible. After all, if an insured has opted for a voluntary de-
ductible, he needs to make more and more complex decisions regarding the 
usage of healthcare services (e.g., when and where to seek care and how much 
these services cost) while little support for making these decisions is available. 
With this in prospect when opting for a voluntary deductible, omission bias 
might also indirectly prevent insured from opting for a voluntary deductible. 
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In short, omission bias (and related to that, decision fatigue, transaction costs 
and regret avoidance) may directly and indirectly affect the decision to opt for 
a voluntary deductible since for most insured (i.e., those insured without a 
voluntary deductible) it requires an act to change their current plan to a plan 
with a voluntary deductible, which they are reluctant to do.
4.3.6 Liquidity constraints
A sixth potential determinant of the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible 
is the fear of encountering liquidity problems. Gorter and Schilp (2012) hypoth-
esise that consumption commitments (e.g., mortgage payments) explain the low 
percentage of Dutch insured opting for a voluntary deductible. Additionally, 
several studies researched the impact of liquidity constraints on risk attitude 
and loss aversion. Firstly, Chetty and Szeidl (2007) conclude that consumption 
commitments, since they are costly to adjust (e.g., mortgage payments can only 
be adjusted by moving), increase risk aversion for small and moderate stakes. 
For example, if an individual is forced to reduce his expenditure by 10 per cent 
and has precommitted 50 per cent of his income, he must reduce spending on 
discretionary items by 20 per cent. Since the precommitted expenditure is not 
freely adjustable, the utility curvature is greater than if it would be adjustable 
as to amplify risk aversion. Secondly, Novemsky and Kahneman (2005a) state 
that for consumers who maintain a tight budget, the purchase of a good that 
was not budgeted for is associated with giving up some other good (i.e., either 
consumption or savings). This is then evaluated as a loss, which is consistent 
with the finding of Wicker et al. (1995) that there is more loss aversion when a 
greater proportion of money is designated for necessities. These studies indicate 
that liquidity constraints could be closely related to other determinants that are 
identified within this paper, such as risk attitude and loss aversion. Thirdly, 
Sydnor (2010) investigated if liquidity constraints explain the preference for 
low deductibles in home insurance. Though this was not the case, it could be 
interesting to study whether this holds for the health insurance market.
Due to liquidity constraints, insured might not opt for a voluntary deduct-
ible because they may be unable or may fear to be unable to pay the deductible 
amount if healthcare is consumed23. Furthermore, liquidity constraints are 
expected to increase risk aversion and loss aversion and thereby (negatively) 
affect the decision to opt for a voluntary deducible.
23 Liquidity constraints may also encourage insured to opt for a voluntary deductible since 
the premium rebate reduces the monthly premium and relieves liquidity constraints.
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4.3.7 Overview of potential determinants
This section discusses in short the effect of the six potential determinants on 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible. Note that the different deter-
minants are not per definition independent, and could be closely related (e.g., 
liquidity constraints could be related to risk aversion). Loss aversion is only 
expected to make insured forego voluntary deductibles in scenario 1 from 
Table 4.1. For scenario 1, the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes furthermore 
predicts risk averse behaviour, while the effect for scenarios 2 and 4 (i.e., the 
two-stage scenarios) is unclear since in the first stage uncertainty plays no 
role while risk aversion is expected for the second stage. Regarding scenario 
3, risk-seeking behaviour is expected that may encourage insured to opt for 
a voluntary deductible. Furthermore, irrespective of the scenario, ambiguity 
aversion may arise since the probability distribution of healthcare expenses 
is largely unknown, which may explain why insured forego deductibles. Since 
in case of a voluntary deductible healthcare is consumed first and paid after, 
debt aversion may explain why insured do not opt for a voluntary deductible. 
Omission bias is seen as a fifth potential determinant since individuals are 
reluctant to take action to change their current plan, which is necessary for the 
uptake of deductibles. Finally, liquidity constraints are expected to influence 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible and increase both risk aversion 
and loss aversion. In general, it is expected that especially in scenario 1 of 
Table 4.1, insured would not be inclined to opt for a voluntary deductible since 
the six potential determinants all negatively affect the overall value of opting 
for a voluntary deductible compared to not opting for a voluntary deductible. 
In scenarios 2, 3, and 4, some of the determinants are not or less relevant, i.e., 
loss aversion is expected to be absent in those scenarios and the effect of risk 
attitude is unclear in scenarios 2 and 4. Therefore, the overall effect of these 
scenarios on the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible is unclear.
Which of the proposed scenarios is adopted by insured in practice is unknown. 
For two reasons, however, we believe that scenarios 1 and 2 are most likely to be 
adopted. The first reason is that we suspect that (Dutch) insured do not include 
the premium in their decision. For example, taking out health insurance is man-
datory in the Netherlands and the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible is a 
subsequent decision that may not be directly related to the fact that a premium 
has to be paid for health insurance itself. The second reason is that the premium 
is mostly paid on a monthly basis, while the voluntary deductible concerns a 
yearly amount. This might make integrating the health insurance premium into 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible difficult for insured.
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4.4 POTEnTIaL STRaTEgIES
Based upon the six potential determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary 
deductible, this section discusses five potential strategies that could increase 
the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible. While discussing 
these strategies, we will incorporate nudge theory as proposed by Thaler and 
Sunstein (2009). The idea behind nudging is to move individuals in directions 
that will make their lives better without forcing them. They consider a nudge 
to be ‘any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives’ (2009). Nudges are not considered to be mandates and 
should be easy and cheap to avoid. An illustrative example of a nudge is put-
ting fruit at eye level in a school canteen to make children eat healthier, while 
entirely banning junk food would not be considered a nudge. Note that not all 
proposed strategies can be considered a nudge and that within this paper only 
strategy one and three are considered a nudge. This will be further discussed in 
the subsequent sections. Table 4.2 shows how the five different strategies affect 
the determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible.
4.4.1 default option
A first promising strategy to increase the number of insured opting for a vol-
untary deductible is to present the voluntary deductible as the default option. 
This implies that when buying insurance, the plan includes by default a vol-
untary deductible for the associated premium. The plan would not be manda-
tory because insured can commute the voluntary deductible for an increase in 
premium. Table 4.3 shows the insured’s perception of the voluntary deductible 
as the default option. According to the literature, this strategy is expected to in-
crease the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible (Johnson et al., 
1993; Krieger and Felder, 2013; Moshinsky and Bar-Hillel, 2010; Thaler and 
Benartzi, 2004; Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) since it potentially affects three 
determinants from the theoretical framework. Note that this strategy intends 
to shift the reference point from ‘not opting for a voluntary deductible’ to ‘opting 
for a voluntary deductible’. Firstly, the effect of loss aversion would diminish 
since, assuming that ‘opting for a voluntary deductible’ is the reference point, 
‘not opting for a voluntary deductible’ is a pure loss prospect (i.e., the deductible 
has to be commuted for an increase in premium). In case of a pure loss prospect, 
loss aversion is absent (Wakker, 2010) and therefore has no effect on the deci-
sion to opt for a voluntary deductible if a voluntary deductible is the default 
option. Secondly, with ‘opting for a voluntary deductible’ as the reference point, 
risk seeking behaviour is expected since commuting the voluntary deductible 
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4
implies a certain loss. Thirdly, with this strategy, the insured is inclined to 
retain the voluntary deductible due to omission bias (and decision fatigue and 
transaction costs). If a default option is set, it is expected that more insured 
would opt for a voluntary deductible than under an opt-in design. Therefore, 
making the voluntary deductible the default option can be considered a strong 
nudge. Furthermore, the nudging power of the default option will be reinforced 
if the option comes with some implicit or explicit suggestion that it represents 
the norm, which is related to norm-theory, or the recommended course of ac-
tion (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). An example of the effect of default options 
can be found in MediShield (a basic catastrophic illness insurance scheme) in 
Singapore. In 1990, with the introduction of MediShield, the Singapore govern-
ment wanted to ensure that as many individuals as possible would be covered 
by this plan. In order to reach this goal, they implemented an opt-out scheme 
where everyone would be automatically enrolled. As a result of this, the overall 
coverage for MediShield raised from 51 per cent in 1990 to 88 per cent in 2012 
(Low and Yee, 2012).
4.4.2 Provision of information regarding the voluntary deductible
A second promising strategy to increase the number of insured opting for a vol-
untary deductible is to provide insured with information regarding the volun-
tary deductible. According to the literature, this strategy is expected to increase 
individuals’ competence (Marquis, 1981). Through the increase in competence, 
the effect of ambiguity aversion on the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible 
could be reduced (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Keppe and Weber, 1995; Tversky 
and Fox, 1995), which could result in a higher uptake of voluntary deductibles. 
Table 4.3 Insured’s perception and the associated value function regarding the voluntary de-
ductible for strategy one (i.e., the default option) and strategy four (i.e., a no-claim rebate). 
Presented are the perceptions for scenario one from table 4.1, but they could be applied to the 
other scenarios as well.
Opting for a voluntary deductible Not opting for a voluntary deductible
Strategy 1 – Present the voluntary deductible as the default option
Probability p to lose nothing (x)
Probability 1 - p to lose €500 (y)
Certainty of a premium increase of €240 (x)
V (p, x; y) =
ω+(p) × υ(0) + ω-(1-p) × υ(-500)
V (1, x) = υ(-240)
Strategy 4 – Offer a voluntary deductible in the form of a no-claim rebate
Probability p to gain €240 (x)
Probability 1 - p to pay €260 (y) too much
Certainty to lose nothing (x)
V (p, x; y) =
ω+(p) × υ(240) + ω-(1-p) × υ(-260)
V (1, x) = υ(0)
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The information could for instance concern the functioning of the voluntary 
deductible24. The information could elucidate that a voluntary deductible re-
sults in both a premium rebate and a risk that out-of-pocket payments have 
to be made and that the profit is the balance of these two. The information 
could furthermore describe the relation between the voluntary deductible and 
other cost-sharing arrangements such that individuals can better estimate 
their expected out-of-pocket expenses due to the voluntary deductible (and thus 
whether opting for a voluntary deductible will be profitable). For example, Van 
Winssen et al. (2015a) show that over 40 per cent of the Dutch insured had 
healthcare expenses even below the mandatory deductible of €360. For those 
insured, opting for a voluntary deductible would be profitable, but they need 
to know how the voluntary deductible and other cost-sharing arrangements 
relate in order to consider opting for a voluntary deductible. Finally, Reitsma-
van Rooijen et al. (2012) show that Dutch insured avoid the GP because of 
the mandatory deductible, while GP costs are exempted from the deductible. 
Apparently, these individuals are not aware of the fact that these healthcare 
services are exempted from the deductible. Therefore, information could ad-
dress the exempted healthcare services. Note that all information should be 
understandable because if individuals are provided with information only an 
expert would know how to use, incompetence actually increases (2002).
4.4.3 Provision of information regarding healthcare expenses
A third potential strategy to increase the number of insured opting for a 
voluntary deductible is to provide insured with information regarding their 
healthcare expenses25. For instance, the information could show the number 
of previous years that opting for a voluntary deductible would have been 
profitable. Van Winssen et al. (2015a) show that the more (recent) years the 
voluntary deductible would have been profitable in the past, the larger the 
probability that opting for a voluntary deductible would be profitable in the 
upcoming year. Furthermore, insured could be provided with an objective 
predicted probability that opting for a voluntary deductible would be profitable 
based upon background characteristics such as age, gender, and chronic illness, 
such as Van Winssen et al. (2015a) have estimated. Finally, insurers could 
provide insured with an up-to-date overview regarding their past healthcare 
expenses.
24 It is assumed that individuals are aware of the fact that they can opt for a voluntary 
deductible at all.
25 Note that this strategy could also provide insured with information regarding how unat-
tractive it would be for them to opt for a voluntary deductible, making them less inclined to 
opt for a voluntary deductible.
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Based upon the theoretical framework in section three of this chapter, this 
strategy is expected to directly influence the effect of ambiguity aversion on 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible since information on the outcome 
probability of the voluntary deductible is provided. Note that Ellsberg (1961) 
and Fox and Weber (2002) state that the amount, type, reliability, and unanim-
ity of the information should be considered when providing the information to 
insured to best reduce the effect of ambiguity aversion on the decision to opt 
for a voluntary deductible. Wakker et al. (2007) studied the effect of statistical 
information on the choice of insurance that covers a deductible and show that 
the value of the options that give rise to ambiguity aversion decreased rather 
than increased when ambiguity reduced. They state that probably the more 
familiar option is preferred over the option with known probabilities, which 
could be in accordance with Ellsberg’s (1961) notion that ambiguity aversion 
favours the status quo. Additionally, their results showed that the provision of 
statistical information enhanced adverse selection, which for health insurance 
might be undesirable from the societal perspective (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976). In a study by Kling et al. (2012), a random sample of participants were 
sent a personal letter that explained the costs of their current drug plan, the 
cheapest comparable plan, and the savings they could realise by switching 
plans. Another random sample received generic brochures regarding the dif-
ferent plans. The results show that the personal letters appear to have nudged 
more individuals to pick lower-cost plans and the overall switching rate was 
10 percentage points higher than among the participants who received the 
brochures (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). These results could give an indication 
that providing insured with information regarding their healthcare expenses 
and the savings they could realise by opting for a voluntary deductible could 
potentially increase uptake of voluntary deductibles.
Table 4.4 Example of financing the savings account in case of a voluntary deductible of €500 
with an associated premium rebate of €240.
Premium 
rebate
Total premium 
rebate on savings 
account
healthcare expenses 
under the voluntary 
deductible
account balance 
at the end of the 
calendar year
year 1 €240 €240 €25 €215
year 2 €240 €480 €120 €335
year 3 €240 €720 €500 €75
year 4 €240 €960 €175 €140
year 5 €240 €1,200 €0 €380
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4.4.4 no-claim rebate
A fourth potential strategy to increase the number of insured opting for a volun-
tary deductible is to present the voluntary deductible in the form of a ‘no-claim 
rebate’26. In case of a no-claim rebate, the insured pays a premium for health 
insurance and receives a fixed amount of money (i.e., the no-claim rebate) at the 
end of the year if no healthcare expenses are incurred. If healthcare expenses 
are incurred, the insured receives no rebate. In other words, compared to a situ-
ation with a voluntary deductible, insured pay the full premium (i.e., they do not 
receive a premium rebate that they would have received if they had opted for a 
voluntary deductible) and receive a no-claim rebate equal to the amount of the 
original voluntary deductible (i.e., €500) if no healthcare expenses are incurred. 
Assuming the Dutch voluntary deductible of €500, the premium increase would 
equal €260 and the potential rebate would be €50027. Compared to the current 
design of the voluntary deductible, the potential loss (i.e., €260, which is equal 
to the premium increase) and gain (i.e., €240, which is equal to the no-claim 
rebate minus the premium increase) are essentially unchanged, but integrated 
explicitly. Table 4.3 shows the insured’s perception of the voluntary deductible 
in the form of a no-claim rebate. According to the literature, this measure is 
expected to increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible 
(Johnson et al., 1993) since it potentially affects two determinants from the 
theoretical framework. Firstly, the increase in loss aversion due to the increase 
in premium is expected to be small because of diminishing marginal sensitivity. 
The effect on loss aversion depends however on whether loss aversion for the 
premium is experienced. Secondly, this strategy could reduce the effect of debt 
aversion on the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible since the insured is 
not in debt with the insurer, but the insurer is potentially in debt with the 
individual. Furthermore, this strategy could reduce the effect of debt aversion 
26 In 2006 and 2007, a no-claim rebate of €255 was implemented in the Dutch health insur-
ance system but was substituted by a mandatory deductible in 2008 since the five largest 
health insurers and several politicians argued that the no-claim rebate would be unfair to 
chronically ill and elderly, that it hardly resulted in any restrain on healthcare expenses and 
that it resulted in a lot of administrative hassle (Elsevier, 2006). Research by Holland et al. 
(2009) indicates that the no-claim rebate provided only a weak incentive to reduce healthcare 
consumption. Furthermore, although seemingly contradictory to the previous statement, their 
study shows a potential danger of strategic postponement of healthcare utilisation (i.e., in 
order to receive the no-claim rebate), which may have adverse health effects.
27 In the Dutch health insurance market, the average offered premium rebate was €240 for 
a voluntary deductible of €500 in 2014. If the insured would incur healthcare expenses larger 
than the (mandatory and) voluntary deductible, the loss would be equivalent to €260. In case 
of a no-claim rebate, this potential loss is added to the premium (i.e., the premium is increased 
with €260 compared to the current design of the voluntary deductible). In return for this 
premium increase, the insured will receive up to €500 (i.e., the original voluntary deductible 
amount) in return if no or little healthcare expenses are incurred.
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on the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible, since the insured pays for 
healthcare expenses ex-ante instead of ex-post.
4.4.5 Saving for healthcare
A fifth potential strategy to increase the number of insured opting for a volun-
tary deductible is to offer a savings account in combination with a voluntary 
deductible. Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are increasingly popular in the 
USA, Singapore, South Africa, and China, but have different aims and designs 
(Hurley and Guindon, 2008). In the USA, HSAs are combined with high de-
ductible health plans, which is similar to the strategy proposed here. Note, 
however, that the deductible amounts in the USA are larger (i.e., a plan must 
have a minimum deductible of €1,07428 for individuals and €2,148 for families 
in 2015 to be HSA-eligible with a maximum limit on out-of-pocket spending 
of €5,329 for individuals and €10,658 for families) than the amounts in the 
Netherlands (i.e., the voluntary deductible amounts range from €100 to €500). 
Similar to the HSAs, we propose to deposit the premium rebate upon a savings 
account allowing the insured to use the (earmarked) account balance for the 
voluntary deductible. Literature on savings behaviour shows that individuals 
have self-control problems (Katona, 1975), meaning that individuals have dif-
ficulty with not spending their money on other purposes (Nyhus and Webley, 
2006). An earmarked savings account could mitigate this lack of self-control 
by serving as a precommitment strategy (Thaler, 1980). Table 4.4 provides a 
potential way to finance the savings account in case the insured opted for a 
voluntary deductible of €500 and deposited the premium rebate of €240 on the 
savings account (column 2). A maximum of €1,200 is saved during, for example, 
5 years (column 3). Out-of-pocket payments due to the voluntary deductible are 
paid from the savings account (e.g., €25 in the first year, column 4). Column 5 
shows the account balance at the end of each year (i.e., €215 in the first year). 
In the coming years, the financing of the account continues in the same way.
According to the theoretical framework in section three of this chapter, 
there are two reasons to expect that this strategy will increase the number of 
insured opting for a voluntary deductible. Firstly, the savings account could 
serve as a prepayment vehicle that diminishes the attenuation of the payment 
on the pleasure of consumption, which could reduce the effect of debt aversion. 
Secondly, the earmarked savings account serves as a consumption commitment 
especially for out-of-pocket payments due to the voluntary deductible, which 
could reduce the effect of liquidity constraints. In the USA, savings into the 
HSA are encouraged by tax advantages. This could also be considered for the 
28 US dollars are converted to euros using an exchange rate of US$1 = €0.8262 (January 1, 
2015).
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savings account as described here to encourage insured to save for potential 
out-of-pocket payments due to the voluntary deductible.
4.5 IMPLICaTIOnS fOR MORaL hazaRd
The previous section discussed five potential strategies to increase the number 
of insured opting for a voluntary deductible and consequently to reduce moral 
hazard. Behavioural economics helps to explain the demand for voluntary 
deductibles, but also tells us that the design of the voluntary deductible could 
influence healthcare usage (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). To indicate the net 
effect on moral hazard a crucial question is: in what way does the design of 
the voluntary deductible (within the different strategies) influence the moral 
hazard reduction (assuming that the strategies increase the number of insured 
opting for a voluntary deductible)? Note that the reduction of moral hazard as 
a result of the voluntary deductible could regard both low-value and high-value 
care. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment showed, however, that on aver-
age the moral hazard reduction had no significant effect on most of the studied 
health indicators (Brook et al., 1983).
By presenting the voluntary deductible as the default option and by provid-
ing insured information regarding the voluntary deductible or regarding their 
healthcare expenses (i.e., strategies 1, 2, and 3), the voluntary deductible in 
itself is unchanged and therefore the individual moral hazard reduction due 
to the voluntary deductible is unchanged. However, since, as a result of these 
strategies, an increase in the number of insured opting for a voluntary deduct-
ible is expected (Johnson et al., 1993; Krieger and Felder, 2013; Marquis, 1981; 
Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), an increase in the total 
moral hazard reduction is expected as well. When presenting the voluntary 
deductible as a no-claim rebate (i.e., strategy 4), the effect on the individual 
moral hazard reduction is unclear, since in case of a no-claim rebate insured 
only have the foresight of a potential rebate and do not experience actual 
out-of-pocket payments as they do with the current design of the voluntary 
deductible. It is unknown how many more insured would have to opt for a 
voluntary deductible in the form of a no-claim rebate in order to let the total 
moral hazard reduction increase. To determine the effect of offering a savings 
account in combination with a voluntary deductible (i.e., strategy 5) on moral 
hazard, it would be necessary to know whether the moral hazard reduction 
differs between actual out-of-pocket payments (i.e., the current design) and ex-
penses from a savings account (i.e., strategy 5). Since the money is earmarked 
for healthcare expenses, individuals might be more eager to spend saved money 
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than out-of-pocket money. Therefore, what happens to the account balance at 
the end of the year is essential (e.g., transmitted to next year, paid to insured 
or lapsed). A related (and yet unanswered) question to this is how individuals 
value the account balance at the end of the year, taking into account discount-
ing of money over time (Nyhus and Webley, 2006). As with strategy 4, it is 
unknown how many more insured would have to opt for a voluntary deductible 
as a result of combining it with a savings account to let the total moral hazard 
reduction increase. Overall, each strategy is intended to increase the number 
of insured opting for a voluntary deductible, which, ceteris paribus, increases 
the total moral hazard reduction due to the voluntary deductible. However, the 
effect of (some of) the strategies on the individual moral hazard reduction and 
consequently on the total moral hazard reduction needs further research.
4.6 COnCLuSIOnS
Previous research shows that a large discrepancy exits between the percentage 
of insured for whom a voluntary deductible is expected to be profitable (i.e., 
about 48 per cent in the Netherlands in 2014) and the percentage of insured 
who actually opt for a voluntary deductible (i.e., 11 per cent in the Nether-
lands in 2014). If more insured would opt for a voluntary deductible, a larger 
reduction of moral hazard could, ceteris paribus, be reached. In this paper, six 
determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible are identified: 
loss aversion, risk attitude, ambiguity aversion, debt aversion, omission bias, 
and liquidity constraints. Subsequently, five potential strategies to increase the 
number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible are proposed: 1) present 
the voluntary deductible as the default option, 2) provide insured with informa-
tion regarding the voluntary deductible, 3) provide insured with information 
regarding their healthcare expenses, 4) present the voluntary deductible in the 
form of a no-claim rebate, and 5) combine the voluntary deductible with a sav-
ings account. We believe that implementing the voluntary deductible as the de-
fault option and providing insured with information regarding the functioning 
of the voluntary deductible are the two most promising strategies to increase 
uptake of voluntary deductibles and to reduce moral hazard. Regarding the 
other strategies, further research on their effect on the moral hazard reduction 
would be necessary before implementing such strategies.

Part II The supplementary health 
insurance

Chapter 5
The demand for health insurance and behavioural 
economics: what is going on in the Dutch 
supplementary health insurance?
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abSTRaCT
Traditional economic theory suggests that optimal health insurance design 
a) protects individuals against unpredictable high financial risks, b) provides 
access to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services, c) includes first-dollar 
cost-sharing, and d) incorporates individual caps on out-of-pocket expenses. 
The Dutch supplementary health insurance is far from this optimal design, 
since it does not meet any of these requirements. Nevertheless, many Dutch 
individuals take out this supplementary insurance, which raises the question 
why so many Dutch insured take out non-optimal supplementary health in-
surance. This paper identifies seven key aspects from behavioural economics 
to potentially explain the high uptake of non-optimal insurance in the Dutch 
supplementary health insurance market.
Firstly, four aspects – other than risk reduction and access to otherwise 
unaffordable healthcare services – are identified that could potentially provide 
a welfare gain from taking out supplementary insurance: loss aversion, ambi-
guity aversion, liquidity constraints and debt aversion. This paper poses that 
in the presence of either of these aspects or a combination, the welfare gain 
from taking out supplementary health insurance would be higher than in the 
absence of (one of) these aspects. Secondly, three behavioural economic aspects 
are identified that could potentially explain why insured make suboptimal 
choices regarding their supplementary health insurance. Firstly, due to limited 
knowledge concerning supplementary insurance, insured might be unaware 
what they exactly insure and what the costs for healthcare services are. Sec-
ondly, as a result of social comparison, insured might take out supplementary 
insurance just because their friends and family do so. Thirdly, decision avoid-
ance might make insured automatically renew their current supplementary 
health insurance without critically reviewing whether they indeed want (and 
need) this insurance. Additionally, this paper provides several directions for 
further research and discusses policy implications regarding the design of 
health insurance and the support of the insured’s decision-making process.
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5.1 InTROduCTIOn
A vast amount of traditional economic literature describes the advantages 
and disadvantages of taking out health insurance (e.g., Arrow, 1976, Manning 
and Marquis, 1996; Zeckhauser, 1970). On the one hand, the advantages of 
health insurance are the reduction of uncertainty regarding financial losses 
and the provision of access to healthcare services that would otherwise be 
unaffordable. The disadvantages of insurance, on the other hand, are moral 
hazard29, the loading fee and the transaction costs related to purchasing the 
insurance and handling the claims. Regarding the design of health insurance, 
the literature shows that full insurance is far from optimal and that a mix of 
coverage and cost-sharing is preferred. Optimal designs of health insurance 
a) protect individuals against unpredictable high financial risks, b) provide 
access to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services, c) include first-dollar 
cost-sharing, and d) incorporate individual caps on out-of-pocket expenses. The 
Dutch supplementary health insurance, however, does not comply with these 
principles. This paper aims at explaining why insured take out this non-optimal 
supplementary health insurance.
Dutch individuals became obliged to buy basic health insurance for commu-
nity-rated premiums from a private health insurer with the introduction of the 
Health Insurance Act in 2006 (Schut and Van de Ven, 2011). For healthcare 
service not (or partially) covered by basic insurance, insured can take out 
supplementary health insurance. Healthcare services covered by supplemen-
tary insurance include, among others, dental care, physiotherapy, durable 
medical equipment, alternative medicines, pharmaceuticals, care consumed in 
a foreign country, orthodontics and maternity care, as far as these benefits are 
not covered by basic health insurance. Contrary to the market for basic health 
insurance, the Dutch supplementary insurance market is a free market, which 
means that insurers are free to determine the premiums, coverage and cost-
sharing arrangements. The Dutch supplementary health insurance deviates 
from the optimal insurance design as described by the traditional economic 
literature for several reasons. Firstly, the Dutch supplementary health insur-
ance covers healthcare services that do not involve large losses and applies 
coverage limits. The latter implies that, after the limit is reached, all expenses 
have to be paid out-of-pocket by the insured, which – in case of care consumed 
in a foreign country or dental care after an accident, for example – could lead 
to substantial out-of-pocket expenses. As a result, the risk reduction resulting 
from the supplementary health insurance seems limited. Secondly, next to the 
29 Moral hazard refers to the change in health behaviour and healthcare consumption caused 
by the fact that the insurer reimburses (part of) the costs.
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limited risk reduction, the Dutch supplementary insurance mostly provides 
access to already affordable healthcare services such as dental check-ups and 
regular consultations with the physiotherapist. These characteristics suggest 
that the consumers’ welfare gain from the Dutch supplementary health insur-
ance may be limited. Thirdly, the loading fee (about 17 per cent of the premium 
(Vektis, 2015c)), moral hazard and the transaction costs of the supplementary 
insurance are substantial. Substantial moral hazard can be expected, because 
most healthcare services are subject to first-dollar coverage, while substantial 
transaction costs could arise since many insurers offer many different supple-
mentary insurance policies (i.e., more than 150 policies in 2015 (Duijmelinck 
and Van de Ven, 2015)), making the choice of supplementary health insurance 
time consuming. Consequently, the consumers’ welfare loss from the Dutch 
supplementary health insurance may be substantial. Table 5.1 shows an over-
view in which the characteristics of the Dutch supplementary health insurance 
are compared to the characteristics of optimal insurance design as posed by the 
traditional economic literature.
Given the non-optimal design of the Dutch supplementary insurance, it is sur-
prising to observe the popularity of the scheme: 84 per cent of the Dutch popu-
lation took out supplementary insurance in 2015 (Vektis, 2015c). This paper 
therefore aims to indicate potential explanations of why so many Dutch insured 
take out this non-optimal supplementary health insurance. In order to do so, 
we will systematically study 1) the traditional economic literature on optimal 
Table 5.1. Characteristics of health insurance design: “optimal” versus the Dutch supplemen-
tary health insurance.
Characteristic
Optimal insurance 
design
dutch supplementary insurance
1.
What does the 
insurance provide 
protection against 
and what does it 
provide access to?
Unpredictable high 
financial risks and 
otherwise unaffordable 
healthcare services.
Mostly predictable low financial risks (e.g., 
dental check-ups and consultations at the 
physiotherapist). Some supplementary 
insurances provide protection against large 
expenses, but these are mostly maximised 
(e.g., dental expenses after an accident (up to 
about €10,000), care consumed in a foreign 
country)
2.
Is cost-sharing 
applied and if so, 
how?
Yes, in the form of first-
dollar cost-sharing.
In general no; only dental insurances apply 
coinsurance of 20-25 %.
3.
Are caps on out-
of-pocket expenses 
applied and if so, 
how?
Yes, in the form of an 
individual cap.
No, after the coverage limits (e.g., nine 
treatments at a physiotherapist) are 
reached, insured pay the full expenses for 
healthcare services out-of-pocket.
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insurance design to see what optimal designs should look like (Section 5.2), 2) 
the behavioural economic literature to see whether other aspects – compared 
to those mentioned in the traditional economic literature – could provide a 
welfare gain to insured when taking out supplementary health insurance (Sec-
tion 5.3.1), and 3) the behavioural economic literature to see whether certain 
aspects could indicate why insured make suboptimal choices (Section 5.3.2). 
Section 5.4 provides the conclusion, while some directions for further research 
and the policy implications are discussed in sections 5.5 and 5.6 respectively.
5.2 TRadITIOnaL ECOnOMIC ThEORy On OPTIMaL 
InSuRanCE dESIgn
The essence of insurance can be found in the transfer of risk. Insurance implies 
that the insured pays a premium and in return receives some monetary amount 
from the insurer should an uncertain loss occur (Getzen, 2007). The welfare 
gain from this uncertainty reduction depends on the individual’s degree of risk 
aversion (Pratt, 1964), which is affected by the presence of background risks 
(i.e., risks that cannot be avoided or insured against, such as labour income 
risks). Several studies show that background risks to wealth makes risk averse 
individuals behave in a more risk averse way with respect to any other inde-
pendent risk (e.g., Eeckhoudt et al., 1996). This concept is called risk vulner-
ability (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) and causes insured to reduce their exposure 
to avoidable risks, for instance by increasing their insurance demand (Guiso 
and Paiella, 2008). Additionally, Nyman (1999) states that the benefits from 
health insurance cannot only be found in the transfer of risk, but also in the 
fact that insurance provides access to healthcare services that would otherwise 
not be affordable. On the other side, taking out health insurance may also have 
several disadvantages, namely moral hazard, the loading fee and transaction 
costs. Ultimately, health insurance design involves a trade-off between the 
gains from risk pooling and access to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services 
and the losses from moral hazard, the loading fee and transaction costs. Many 
researchers have studied the classical problem30 of the trade-off between the 
gains from additional insurance and the efficiency losses from overconsumption 
of healthcare services (e.g., Arrow, 1976; Besley, 1988; Feldstein and Friedman, 
1977; Pauly, 1974; Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Zeckhauser, 1970). All these 
studies show that full insurance is far from optimal and that a mix of coverage 
and cost-sharing is preferred. However, the results regarding this mix differ 
30 Note that in most studies regarding optimal insurance design, focus is put on the classical 
trade-off between risk reduction and moral hazard.
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somewhat per study. We briefly mention the results of four studies regarding 
optimal insurance design.
Firstly, Arrow (1971) suggests that optimal insurance plans should have 
a stop-loss, which is a cap on total out-of-pocket expenses per individual or 
family. The empirical results of Manning and Marquis (1996) indicate that 
the optimal stop-loss would be rather large (i.e., larger than US$25,00031). 
Secondly, Manning and Marquis (1996) additionally show that plans with 
first dollar cost-sharing and a stop-loss appear to perform considerably better 
than pure stop-loss plans. For example, a plan with 25 per cent coinsurance 
and a stop-loss of €1,000 (i.e., the stop-loss is reached at healthcare expenses 
of €4,000) performs better than a plan with 100 per cent coinsurance and a 
stop-loss of €1,000 (i.e., similar to a deductible of €1,000, where the stop-loss 
is reached at healthcare expenses of €1,000). This is due to the fact that with 
pure stop-loss plans (i.e., the latter in the example) more insured exceed the 
limit and thereafter consume healthcare for free. Thirdly, Blomqvist (1997) 
indicates that relatively low co-payment percentages (i.e., up to a maximum of 
7 per cent), even for individuals with only moderate healthcare expenses (i.e., 
up to $3,99032), are efficient. He additionally suggests that an optimal deduct-
ible, in his simulation, should be smaller than $32033. Fourthly, Buchanan 
et al. (1991) analyse different insurance plans and provide three conclusions 
relevant for our discussion. Firstly, they show that even fairly small deduct-
ible levels (even of US$10034) in combination with a 25 per cent coinsurance 
rate would be highly effective in curbing demand (i.e., defined as producing 
the smallest waste (which is the difference between total cost and the value 
of the purchased medical services)). This seems in accordance with Blomqvist 
(1997) who also states that relatively low cost-sharing arrangement could be 
effective. Secondly, they state that caps on out-of-pocket expenses of US$1,000–
2,00035 per person make good economic sense. Beyond this level the financial 
risk is greatly increased while demand is hardly reduced. Thirdly, they state 
that individual caps seem generally better than family caps. After all, with a 
31 Dollars of 1995 that correspond to €32,400 in 2015. US dollars from 1995 are firstly con-
verted to US dollars in 2015 using a rate of 1.56855. Secondly, those US dollars are converted 
to Euros using an (non-healthcare specific) exchange rate of 0.82623 (1 January 2015).
32 Dollars of 1997 that correspond to €4,881 in 2015. US dollars from 1997 are firstly con-
verted to US dollars in 2015 using a rate of 1.48053. Secondly, those US dollars are converted 
to Euros using an (non-healthcare specific) exchange rate of 0.82623 (1 January 2015).
33 Corresponding to €391 in 2015.
34 Dollars of 1983 that correspond to €199 in 2015. US dollars from 1983 are firstly converted 
to US dollars in 2015 using a rate of 2.40586. Secondly, those US dollars are converted to 
Euros using an (non-healthcare specific) exchange rate of 0.82623 (1 January 2015).
35 Corresponding to respectively €1,988 and €3,976 in 2015.
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family cap, hospitalisation of one of the family members could take the whole 
family into a period of free care, while with an individual cap, the lower priced 
care (after the cap) is targeted at the sick individual only. Buchanan et al. 
(1991) overall state that, according to their analyses, the best policy has a 
small initial deductible (between US$100–30036) and a 25 per cent coinsurance 
rate up to an individual cap on out-of-pocket expenses of US$1,00037. In sum, 
although specifics sometimes differ, all studies point towards optimal designs 
of health insurance that a) protect individuals against unpredictable high 
financial risks, b) provide access to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services, 
c) include first-dollar cost-sharing either in the form of deductibles, coinsurance 
or a combination, and d) incorporate individual caps on out-of-pocket expenses.
An explanation of the high uptake of the Dutch supplementary insurance, 
related to optimal insurance design as proposed by traditional economics, could 
be that Dutch insured are extremely risk averse (Gorter and Schilp, 2012). 
This would imply that the consumer welfare gain from risk reduction would 
outweigh the substantial welfare loss from moral hazard, the loading fee and 
transaction costs. If this were true, however, one would expect (much) higher 
coverage limits than applied in the Dutch supplementary health insurance, 
since the gains from financial risk reduction would then be even larger than 
under the current design. Furthermore, an increase in risk aversion due to 
background risk could potentially explain the high uptake of the supplementary 
insurance. However, we consider it highly unlikely that there is substantial 
background risk that could have affected the demand for supplementary insur-
ance in the last decade for over 84 per cent of the Dutch individuals. After 
all, the Dutch have significant social security such as child allowances, social 
welfare payments, comprehensive social health insurance, disability insurance 
and state pensions.
5.3 bEhavIOuRaL ECOnOMICS
In addition to the traditional economic literature, key insights from behavioural 
economics may help explain the demand for health insurance. We provide two 
potential explanations for why so many Dutch insured take out non-optimal 
supplementary health insurance: 1) key aspects stemming from behavioural 
economics other than risk reduction and access to otherwise unaffordable 
healthcare services provide a welfare gain to individuals when taking out 
supplementary insurance, and/or 2) insured make suboptimal choices.
36 Corresponding to respectively €199 and €596 in 2015.
37 Corresponding to €1,988 in 2015.
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5.3.1 Potential aspects that provide a welfare gain from taking out 
supplementary health insurance
Loss aversion
A first potential aspect that may provide a welfare gain to insured when taking 
out supplementary insurance is loss aversion, which is a key insight from the 
cumulative prospect theory developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Loss 
aversion regards the phenomenon that ‘losses loom larger than gains’ and that 
‘the aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be 
greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount’ (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979). Wakker (2010) emphasises that loss aversion only 
plays a role in mixed prospects (i.e., where the outcome of a prospect is either 
a gain or a loss) and no role in pure gain and pure loss prospects. Loss aversion 
is denoted by λ and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated λ to be 2.25, 
meaning that the pain of losses is felt 2.25 times as much as the joy of gains. 
In the health domain, Attema et al. (2013) estimated λ to be 1.18. The presence 
of loss aversion depends on the perception of the reference point and prospects 
coded as losses from this reference point are affected by loss aversion. The 
current state of wealth is often assumed to be the reference point in any deci-
sion, although the expected state could be the relevant reference point in some 
situations (Wilkinson, 2008). Additionally, Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) 
and Bleichrodt et al. (2001) found that one of the offered options is often taken 
as the reference point. Furthermore, Camerer (2004) states that by making one 
option in a decision the default option, this option serves as a reference point 
that individuals move away from only reluctantly. Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
(1988) add that loss aversion could cause individuals to be biased in favour of 
the status quo.
This means that the taken reference point concerning the decision to take 
out supplementary insurance (i.e., either supplementary insurance or no 
supplementary insurance) is essential to the effect of loss aversion. When tak-
ing out supplementary health insurance (especially via the internet), Dutch 
insurers guide individuals through the different choices they have to make: 
which basic health insurance, which deductible level and which supplementary 
insurance to apply for. With respect to the choice of the supplementary insur-
ance, some insurers attach virtual labels to one of the offered policies stating 
‘most commonly chosen (in your situation)’, nudging insured to take out supple-
mentary insurance by carefully setting the default option. Next to the fact that 
most insured already had supplementary insurance in the previous year (i.e., 
their current state of wealth), this might additionally provide individuals with 
a reference point equal to having a supplementary insurance. From this refer-
ence point, the decision to take out supplementary insurance concerns a mixed 
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prospect, meaning that the insured could either lose the premium paid or gain 
the healthcare services reimbursed (i.e., when taking out supplementary insur-
ance). As a result of this loss aversion, an aversion to potential out-of-pocket 
expenses for healthcare services not covered by supplementary insurance (i.e., 
in case of not taking out supplementary insurance) could be created and a 
preference for the status quo (i.e., having supplementary insurance)38 could 
arise. This would imply that in the presence of loss aversion, the welfare gain 
from taking out supplementary health insurance would be higher than in the 
absence of loss aversion.
Ambiguity aversion
A second potential aspect that may provide a welfare gain from taking out 
supplementary insurance is ambiguity aversion (sometimes also referred to as 
uncertainty aversion). Ambiguity aversion captures individuals’ preference for 
prospects with known probabilities over prospects with unknown probabilities 
and was first presented by Ellsberg (1961). In a hypothetical experiment indi-
viduals were confronted with two urns. The first urn contained 100 red and black 
balls in an unknown ratio and the second urn contained exactly 50 red and 50 
black balls. The majority of respondents preferred to bet on either red or black 
in urn two rather than in urn one, although the expected outcome for both urns 
was the same, indicating ambiguity aversion. Frisch and Baron (1988) add that 
missing information that is relevant and could be known creates uncertainty 
about probabilities. Ritov and Baron (1990) show the presence of ambiguity 
aversion in healthcare in a study on children’s vaccination, where the vaccina-
tion reduces the risk of dying from a specific disease, but simultaneously might 
have adverse health effects. When ambiguity about the risk of adverse health 
effects was caused by missing information (i.e., a child had a high or no risk 
of adverse effects, but it was impossible to find out which) individuals were 
more reluctant to vaccinate, indicating ambiguity aversion. From ambiguity 
aversion it then follows that individuals will value provision of any information 
that reduces their ambiguity, even if it will not change their decision, while 
standard economic theory predicts that the demand for information depends 
on its value in making decisions. Ellsberg (1961) adds that individuals often 
perceive the status quo as the situation with low variation and that ambiguities 
of the new situation are more salient than those of the current situation.
When deciding to take out supplementary health insurance, ambiguity 
aversion might create a preference for taking out supplementary insurance. 
38 Note that this could also imply that for insured whose perceived reference point includes 
no supplementary insurance, a preference for this status quo could arise meaning that they do 
not take out supplementary insurance in the next year.
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This is caused by the fact that uncertainty (or ambiguity) is present regarding 
the choice option of not taking out supplementary insurance. After all, insured 
do not know (and are bad at estimating) their probability that healthcare ex-
penses occur that could have been covered by supplementary insurance. With 
supplementary insurance this type of ambiguity is absent and could therefore 
provide a welfare gain.
Liquidity constraints
Liquidity constraints are a third potential aspect that may provide a welfare 
gain from taking out supplementary insurance to insured. Liquidity con-
straints imply that individuals do not have the financial possibilities to free 
up an (substantial) amount of money at some point in time. For instance, if 
individuals do not take out supplementary insurance, but unexpectedly need 
several treatments from a healthcare provider that are not covered by basic 
health insurance, they might not be able to pay the bill they receive. This might 
be due to the fact that they are financially illiquid. Since this situation could be 
prevented, at least for healthcare services that are covered by supplementary 
insurance, individuals might be more inclined to take out supplementary health 
insurance. Of course, individuals then have to pay a (additional) monthly pre-
mium but they prevent the unpleasant situation where they cannot pay a large 
bill (or even forego care) due to liquidity constraints. This would imply that in 
the presence of liquidity constraints, the welfare gain from taking out supple-
mentary insurance would be higher than in the absence of liquidity constraints.
Debt aversion
A fourth potential aspect that may provide a welfare gain from taking out 
supplementary insurance is debt aversion. Debt aversion stems from mental 
accounting theory (Thaler, 1985; Thaler, 1999) and is shown by individuals’ 
preference to prepay for consumption and to get paid for work after completion. 
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) predict strong debt aversion because individu-
als tend to create linkages between consumption of goods or services and the 
payment for these goods or services. Essentially, individuals dislike the feeling 
of ‘having the meter running’. A phenomenon called the flat rate bias indicates 
that individuals prefer flat-rate pricing schemes even if they pay more for the 
same usage (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998; Thaler, 1999). This is for instance 
shown by a preference for unlimited internet access at a fixed monthly price over 
paying per megabyte. Debt aversion is explained by two motives: a) individuals 
hope to enjoy the product or service untroubled from payment concerns and b) 
individuals want to avoid the unpleasant experience of paying for consumption 
that has been enjoyed already.
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So, debt aversion predicts that insured prefer flat-rate pricing schemes (e.g., 
basic health insurance or supplementary health insurance) and dislike paying 
for healthcare after consumption. After all, with supplementary insurance, 
healthcare services (up to a maximum) do not have to be paid after usage, but 
are prepaid through a monthly flat rate. Without supplementary insurance, the 
individual receives the bill after usage of the healthcare service, which is not 
preferred as a result of debt aversion. This would imply that in the presence 
of debt aversion, the welfare gain from taking out supplementary insurance 
would be higher than in the absence of debt aversion.
5.3.2 Making a suboptimal choice
The fact that many Dutch insured take out non-optimal supplementary health 
insurance might be explained by an increase in welfare as a result of the above-
mentioned behavioural economic aspects. However, another explanation might 
be found in the fact that insured make suboptimal choices. Following the theory 
of rational consumer behaviour, an individual would take out supplementary 
health insurance if his expected healthcare expenses (under the supplementary 
insurance) are larger than the premium for supplementary health insurance. 
Some insured might indeed take out supplementary insurance because they 
know they will financially profit from it. For instance, if an insured knows for 
certain that he will need nine treatments at the physiotherapist, it is financially 
more profitable for him to buy a (cheap) supplementary insurance policy than 
it is to pay for the nine treatments out-of-pocket. Research shows, however, 
that in 2013 only 70 per cent of the Dutch insured with a supplementary insur-
ance, indeed filed bills to their insurer for reimbursement (Vektis, 2015b). This 
means that still another 30 per cent of the insured pays a monthly premium 
for supplementary insurance, but never submits any claims. Therefore, next 
to a potential welfare gain, an alternative explanation for the high uptake of 
supplementary health insurance in the Netherlands might be that a large num-
ber of insured make suboptimal choices due to several behavioural economic 
aspects, meaning that individuals take out supplementary insurance, while 
theoretically not taking out supplementary insurance would be ‘optimal’.
Limited knowledge
A first potential aspect that could indicate why insured make a suboptimal 
choice when taking out supplementary insurance may be individuals’ limited 
knowledge regarding supplementary health insurance policies. After all, in-
sured are known to have limited knowledge about their health insurance (Hsu 
et al., 2004; Reed et al., 2009) and to misunderstand complex price schedules 
including premiums and cost-sharing arrangements (Baicker et al., 2012; Lieb-
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man and Zeckhauser, 2004; Marquis, 1981). Dutch individuals, for instance, do 
not know what type of health policy they have and are ignorant with respect 
to aspects such as deductibles, coverage and healthcare providers covered 
(Pricewise, 2014). Especially insured with lower education, young insured 
and elderly insured have limited knowledge about these concepts. As a result, 
the Dutch minister of Health, Welfare and Sports has announced to improve 
the information to individuals concerning quality and expenses of healthcare 
(Skipr, 2015).
Because of two reasons it could be expected that limited knowledge indeed af-
fects the insured’s decision regarding supplementary health insurance. Firstly, 
it could be expected that insured do not (exactly) know what they insure against 
by taking out supplementary insurance. Insured could for instance not know 
which benefits are covered and which coverage limits and cost-sharing arrange-
ments apply. They might feel like they insure unpredictable and large potential 
losses, but might be unaware that they are (also) insuring regular dental 
check-ups. Secondly, it could be expected that insured do not know the costs of 
healthcare services that are (not) covered by insurance. This makes it hard for 
insured to make their own trade-off between the premium for supplementary 
insurance and the healthcare services covered by supplementary insurance, 
potentially causing them to make a suboptimal choice. Additionally, making 
this trade-off might be complex and might impose a high cognitive burden. This 
could especially be the case for individuals with low levels of numeracy and/or 
health literacy.
Social comparison
A second potential aspect that could explain why insured take out supplemen-
tary insurance regards social comparison. Friedl et al. (2014) propose that so-
cial comparison might be a factor affecting individuals’ willingness to purchase 
insurance. This social comparison is modelled via preferences where utility 
depends both on one’s own payoff as well as the payoff of relevant peers (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999). In their study on peer effects in risk taking, Lahno and 
Serra-Garcia (2015) state that imitation is the most frequent form of peer effect 
and that a norm to conform to the peer may explain why peer choices indeed 
matter. Richter et al. (2014) therefore state that individuals reflect upon what 
their peers (e.g., family and friends) decide and might think ‘if my peers are 
purchasing insurance, I should purchase insurance for myself as well’. The be-
haviour of peers might potentially affect the decision to take out supplementary 
insurance as well: “if many of my friends and family take out supplementary 
insurance, I will do too, but if almost nobody takes out insurance, I am also not 
going to take out supplementary insurance”. We additionally wonder what the 
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effect of the media could be on the decision to take out supplementary health 
insurance. After all, the last few years, the Dutch media paid much attention 
to the decision to take out supplementary insurance. They advised individu-
als to critically review their supplementary insurance and decide whether a 
supplementary health insurance would be necessary. The Dutch Association for 
Consumers (i.e., “De Consumentenbond”) even advised insured to potentially 
not take out supplementary insurance and to save the premium, which could 
be used in case any healthcare services are needed. A relevant question in this 
case would be whether individuals view the media as relevant peers. As long 
as many insured take out supplementary insurance, social comparison could 
potentially explain why many insured take out supplementary insurance.
Decision avoidance
Decision avoidance is a third potential aspect that could indicate why insured 
make a suboptimal choice concerning their supplementary insurance. Decision 
avoidance manifests itself, according to Anderson (2003), as a tendency to avoid 
making a choice by postponing it or by seeking an easy way out that involves 
no action or no change. Several underlying factors could contribute to decision 
avoidance.
Firstly, omission bias could result in decision avoidance. Ritov and Baron 
(1992) explain status quo bias (i.e., individuals’ tendency of doing nothing or 
maintaining one’s current or previous decision (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988)) by the fact that changing the status quo requires an act, while maintain-
ing the status quo only requires an omission. They define omission bias as a 
reluctance to take action to change the current state. Due to this omission bias, 
insured may automatically renew their current health insurance policy, which 
mostly includes a supplementary insurance.
A second underlying factor contributing to decision avoidance regards 
choice and information overload. Research in both economics and psychology 
questions whether more choice is always in the consumer’s interest. Consumers 
could be overwhelmed by too much choice (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000). Frank 
and Lamiraud (2009) additionally state that the relationship between the indi-
vidual’s satisfaction with a decision and the size of the choice set is an inverted 
U-shape. In first instance, individuals are more satisfied with their decision be-
cause more options (up to a certain point) imply a decision that is more closely 
related to their preferences, while after a certain point more options cause dis-
satisfaction because the decision-making process was difficult and frustrating 
and individuals are unsure whether they made the “right” decision (Iyengar 
and Lepper, 2000). Particularly when choice involves health and money – both 
part of the decision to take out supplementary health insurance – consumers 
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facing many choices may revert to the status quo even if superior options are 
available (Kunreuther et al., 2002). With respect to the Dutch supplementary 
insurance, many different insurers offer many different types of insurances, 
with different benefit packages, for different premiums, with different cost-
sharing arrangements and reimbursement maximums. This could cause the 
individual to be overwhelmed by too much choice and subsequently make the 
insured defer the choice and eventually not make any decision at all (Frank and 
Lamiraud, 2009).
A third underlying factor of decision avoidance regards search and transac-
tion costs. Consumer search is costly and a rational consumer will search until 
the cost of additional searching outweighs its expected benefits (Frank and 
Lamiraud, 2009). Also, the information or cognitive overload theory argues 
that, as the choice set grows, the cost of one’s information processing increases 
(Eppler and Mengis, 2003). Even if consumers use shortcuts, information-
processing costs grow with the choice set. Transaction and search costs, with 
respect to the supplementary insurance, regard the time and effort it takes for 
an individual to determine whether or not to take out supplementary health 
insurance and, if so, which supplementary insurance to take out (Strombom et 
al., 2002). Search and transaction costs might be very high since insured have 
many decisions and trade-offs to make regarding their supplementary insur-
ance. This could, again, cause insured to automatically renew their current 
health insurance policy.
A fourth underlying factor of decision avoidance regards regret avoidance, 
which implies that whenever choice can induce regret, individuals have a ten-
dency to eliminate the choice (Thaler, 1980). Regret avoidance helps explain 
individuals’ preference for first-dollar coverage, since many individuals find 
decisions that involve a trade-off between healthcare and money unpleasant 
(Thaler, 1980). Consequently, insured (again) might take out supplementary 
insurance, because they may regret not taking out supplementary insurance 
if healthcare expenses do occur and have to be paid for out-of-pocket while it 
would, in retrospect, have been financially profitable to take out supplementary 
insurance. In sum, decision avoidance could cause insured to make suboptimal 
choices regarding their supplementary insurance.
5.4 COnCLuSIOn
Traditional economic theory suggests that optimal insurance design a) protects 
individuals against unpredictable high financial risks, b) provides access 
to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services, c) includes first-dollar cost-
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sharing, and d) incorporates individual caps on out-of-pocket expenses. The 
Dutch supplementary health insurance is far from this optimal design, since it 
does not meet any of these requirements. Nevertheless, many Dutch insured 
take out this supplementary health insurance. This intriguing paradox sug-
gests that additional aspects – compared to those mentioned in the traditional 
economic literature – may play a role in the demand for health insurance. We 
have identified seven key aspects from behavioural economics to potentially 
explain the high uptake of non-optimal insurance in the Dutch supplementary 
health insurance market.
Firstly, we mention four potential aspects – other than risk reduction and 
access to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services – that could provide a 
welfare gain from taking out supplementary insurance: loss aversion, ambigu-
ity aversion, liquidity constraints and debt aversion. This paper poses that in 
the presence of either loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, liquidity constraints, 
debt aversion or a combination of these aspects, the welfare gain from taking 
out supplementary insurance would be higher than in the absence of (one of) 
these aspects. Next to an increase in welfare, an alternative explanation for 
the high uptake of the Dutch supplementary insurance might be that insured 
make suboptimal choices. We mention three behavioural economic aspects that 
could potentially explain why insured make suboptimal choices regarding their 
supplementary insurance: limited knowledge, social comparison and decision 
avoidance. Firstly, due to limited knowledge about the supplementary insur-
ance, insured might be unaware what they exactly insure against and what the 
costs for healthcare services are. Secondly, as a result of social comparison (i.e., 
peer effects), insured might take out supplementary insurance just because 
their friends and family do so. Thirdly, due to decision avoidance insured might 
automatically renew their current supplementary insurance without critically 
reviewing whether they indeed want (and need) this insurance. The final sec-
tions of this paper provide several directions for further research and some 
policy implications.
5.5 fuRThER RESEaRCh
It should be emphasised that the behavioural economic aspects presented 
in this paper are potential explanations for the observed behaviour. Further 
(empirical) research is needed to determine whether, and to what extent, the 
potential extensions to the theory on optimal insurance design and the ideas on 
consumer choice hold true in practice. We see at least five directions for further 
research. Firstly, research could be performed regarding the question whether 
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insured with an insurance policy in the current year indeed are more inclined 
to take out insurance in the next year (correcting for health status and other 
background characteristics such as gender, age and social economic status). 
In this way, the potential effect of loss aversion and decision avoidance on the 
demand for insurance could be tested. Secondly, research could study the effect 
of providing insight into the probability of using healthcare services covered by 
health insurance on the decision to take out insurance, such as is done by Wak-
ker et al. (2007). Such a study could look into the aspects of ambiguity aversion, 
limited knowledge and social comparison. Thirdly, it could be interesting to 
perform a discrete choice experiment with respect to design aspects of health 
insurance, to see which aspects insured value most and what an optimal insur-
ance design would look like to them. Fourthly, research could study the effect 
of providing information about health insurance (i.e., what does it cover, what 
cost-sharing arrangements apply, etc.) on the decision to take out insurance. 
This could provide insights regarding the direct effect of information on the 
demand for insurance. Fifthly, it would be important to study how the different 
research areas presented in this paper (i.e., traditional economics versus behav-
ioural economics) relate to each other. For instance, Gollier and Pratt (1996) 
show that adding a background risk to an individual’s initial wealth makes 
him desire a certain lottery which he disliked before the background risk was 
added. This seems quite similar to what Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present 
in their paper when they add 1,000 ILS39 to an individual’s initial wealth and 
show that the answer to the same lottery reverses. Both these results may 
relate to an individual’s reference point when making (insurance) decisions 
and could provide a better understanding of insurance demand. The mentioned 
directions for further research could contribute to better insurance designs and 
could help facilitate the insured’s decision-making process.
5.6 POLICy IMPLICaTIOnS
5.6.1 alternative design
Although further research is necessary, we wonder what the design of the 
supplementary insurance would look like in case these aspects indeed affect the 
demand for health insurance. In that case, a potential design of optimal supple-
mentary health insurance may be such that it 1) provides protection against 
unpredictable and large losses (e.g., dental care after an accident), 2) has 
first-euro cost-sharing with an individual cap on out-of-pocket expenses, and 3) 
provides the option to save for predictable small losses. Due to the first aspect 
39 ILS = New Israeli Shekel
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of this policy, insured are covered for unexpected large potential losses that are 
not already covered by basic insurance instead of covered for healthcare ex-
penses that might be predictable and relatively small (e.g., consultations at the 
dentist). This type of coverage could mean a welfare increase to insured since 
the risk reduction resulting from this insurance is larger than with the current 
design of the supplementary insurance. It could also affect ambiguity aversion 
since with such a policy, insured do know what they are insured against and 
know that all unexpected large losses are reimbursed. Due to the second aspect 
of this policy, which is based upon the results from the study by Buchanan et 
al. (1991), individuals might be more incentivised to contain their healthcare 
spending. This could potentially counteract moral hazard. The individual cap 
on out-of-pocket expenses protects insured from bills they cannot pay and 
makes sure that not too high expenses need to be paid in order to receive care. 
With the third aspect of this policy, insured are provided with the possibility 
to save for expenses that are predictable and small (e.g., dental consultations 
or regular treatments at the physiotherapist) instead of insuring against these 
expenses, as in currently the case. Note that with saving, the individual does 
not pay for the (high) moral hazard and high loading fee that characterises 
supplementary insurance policies. This third aspect could affect debt aversion 
since the savings account could serve as a prepayment vehicle that diminishes 
the attenuation of the payment on the pleasure of consumption. It might also 
affect liquidity constraints since an earmarked savings account could serve as a 
consumption commitment especially for predictable small losses not covered by 
insurance or cost-sharing. It could also affect loss aversion since with a savings 
account loss aversion is no longer present since insured only lose the savings in 
return for consumed healthcare services while they otherwise keep the savings 
and could potentially transfer it to next year’s expenses.
5.6.2 facilitating the insured’s decision-making process
Next to an alternative design of supplementary insurance, the results of this 
paper may lead to potential strategies to facilitate the individual’s decision-
making process. Again, note that further research regarding the effects of the 
mentioned behavioural economic aspects on insurance demand is necessary. 
However, in case insured indeed make suboptimal choices due to several be-
havioural economic aspects, facilitating their decision-making process might 
help them make more optimal choices. Firstly, information could be provided 
to insured concerning the design and coverage of the current supplementary 
insurance. This strategy provides insights into the reimbursement and the type 
of healthcare services actually covered. As a result, insured might potentially 
be more equipped to determine whether they actually want and need to take 
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out this type of insurance. Ignorance could be affected with this strategy since 
it provides insured with transparent information on the actual insurance policy 
they take out and empowers them to make a decision regarding the supplemen-
tary insurance that best fits their needs.
A second potential strategy to facilitate the insured’s decision-making pro-
cess is to provide insured with information on group and individual usages of 
healthcare services covered by supplementary insurance. Information could be 
provided on how often insured (i.e., on the individual or group level) consume 
certain healthcare services not covered by basic insurance. This also provides 
insured with information on the (average) costs of these healthcare services. 
Such a strategy could affect ambiguity aversion since it provides insured with 
information on the probability that they will consume healthcare expenses that 
could be covered by supplementary insurance. It could additionally affect social 
comparison since insured could be provided with information on the average 
healthcare usage of their relevant peers (i.e., individuals with for instance the 
same age and gender).
A third potential strategy to facilitate well informed decision-making is 
standardisation of the health insurance policies. This strategy could be similar 
to the standardisation of the set of benefits in Medigap in the United States 
of America in 1992, where insurers may only offer one out of ten standardised 
policies. Rice et al. (1997) show that as a result of this standardisation insured 
are better able to make informed choices. A step in this direction is already 
made by ‘Health Insurers the Netherlands’ (all Dutch insurers are member of 
this association), in their plan of action where they state to intend to provide 
clear policies to insured (ZN, 2015).


Chapter 6
Can premium differentiation counteract adverse 
selection in the Dutch supplementary health 
insurance? A simulation study
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abSTRaCT
Many Dutch insurers do still apply community-rating and open enrolment 
for supplementary health insurance, although it is offered at a free market. 
Theoretically, this should result in adverse selection. Historically, almost all 
Dutch insured purchased supplementary insurance. There are, however, four 
indications that adverse selection has started to occur on the Dutch supplemen-
tary insurance market. This paper studies 1) the effect of adverse selection on 
the premium for supplementary insurance over time and 2) whether premium 
differentiation would be able to counteract adverse selection. We do this by 
simulating the uptake and premium development of supplementary insurance 
over 25 years using data on healthcare expenses and background characteris-
tics from 110,261 insured. For the operationalisation of adverse selection, it 
is assumed that only insured for whom supplementary insurance is expected 
not to be beneficial will consider opting out of the insurance. Therefore, we 
calculate for each insured the financial profitability and make plausible as-
sumptions about the premium set by the insurer, the individual’s risk attitude 
and the probability to opt out or opt in. The simulation results show that ad-
verse selection might result in a substantial increase in premium and a decline 
in insurance uptake. They additionally show that if insurers were to increase 
the premium in anticipation of adverse selection, both the decline in insurance 
uptake and the increase in premium become steeper than when insurers do not 
do this. Finally, this paper shows that if insurers would apply highly refined 
risk-rating adverse selection could be counteracted.
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6.1 InTROduCTIOn
By the Health Insurance Act (2006) Dutch inhabitants are obliged to take out 
basic health insurance from a private health insurer of their choice, which 
covers a basic benefit package determined by the government. For healthcare 
services not covered by basic insurance, insured can voluntarily purchase sup-
plementary health insurance. Healthcare services covered by supplementary 
insurance include, among others, dental care for adults, physiotherapy, durable 
medical equipment, alternative medicines, pharmaceuticals, care consumed in 
a foreign country, orthodontics and maternity care, as far as these benefits are 
not covered by basic health insurance. Contrary to basic insurance, supple-
mentary insurance in the Netherlands is offered at a free market. Instead of 
the requirements of community-rating and open enrolment that hold for the 
basic health insurance, insurers on the supplementary insurance market are 
free to apply risk-rating and selective underwriting. Nevertheless, as a result 
of societal pressure, many insurers do still apply community-rating and open 
enrolment. Theory predicts that these circumstances lead to adverse selection 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). This paper focuses on adverse selection on the 
Dutch supplementary health insurance market.
Adverse selection refers to the tendency that, within each premium risk 
group, high-risk individuals have a larger incentive to buy supplementary in-
surance or to extend their coverage compared to low-risk individuals. It arises 
as a result of asymmetric information40 between the insured and the insurer 
(Chiappori and Salanié, 2013; Dionne et al., 2013). More specifically, the (ap-
plicant) insured has information regarding his risk that the insurer does not 
have, is not willing to use or is not allowed to use for risk rating or selective 
underwriting (Akerlof, 1970; Pauly, 1986; Neudeck and Podczeck, 1996). Two 
conditions are necessary for adverse selection to arise (e.g., Bakker, 1997; Cave, 
1985; Marquis, 1992; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977). Firstly, in-
sured need to be able to better forecast their expected healthcare expenses than 
the insurer is able to reflect into the premium. Secondly, this forecast needs 
to affect the demand for insurance. As a result of adverse selection, insurer’s 
profit is less than anticipated and the premium of supplementary insurance has 
to be increased. In the next year, this premium increase provides an incentive 
for low-risk individuals (within their premium risk group) to leave the supple-
mentary insurance policy or to reduce their coverage. This continuing process 
40 Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1995) emphasise that, in case of adverse selection, asymmetric 
information is often used as a more general term for consumer information surplus. Consumer 
information surplus implies that individuals know their individual risk deviates from the 
average risk within their risk group (i.e., the risk group used by the insurer to differentiate 
the premium).
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may lead to a so-called adverse selection or death spiral41. Adverse selection 
may have considerable consequences, since it might cause a competitive health 
insurance market to become unstable (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1979). In stable 
markets, both low-risk and high-risk individuals purchase the insurance policy 
especially designed for them. In unstable markets, due to adverse selection, 
individuals might select the wrong health policy (i.e., the policy that is not 
optimal given their expected healthcare expenses and preferences) (Cutler and 
Zeckhauser, 1998). Additionally, insurers could, in an attempt to counteract 
adverse selection, manipulate their offerings to deter the sick and attract the 
healthy insured (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998). These manipulations might 
impose welfare losses since they deny both low-risk and high-risk individuals 
the coverage they would like most.
Historically, almost all Dutch individuals purchased supplementary health 
insurance (Vektis, 2016). There are, however, four indications that adverse 
selection has started to occur in the Dutch supplementary health insurance. 
Firstly, the percentage of individuals with supplementary insurance decreased 
from 93 per cent in 2006 to 84 per cent in 2016 (Vektis, 2016). Additional re-
search shows that the majority of individuals without supplementary insurance 
(i.e., 72 per cent in 2014) did not purchase supplementary insurance because 
they expected not to need the healthcare services covered (Reitsma-van Rooijen 
and De Jong, 2014). Secondly, individuals with a supplementary insurance take 
out insurance policies with less comprehensive coverage than before (Vektis, 
2015c; Gezondheidsnet, 2012). In 2011, for instance, 75 per cent of the insured 
took out coverage for dental care, while in 2012 this reduced to 65 per cent. 
Additionally, 66 per cent of the insured took out coverage for physiotherapy in 
2011, while this reduced to 49 per cent in 2012 (Gezondheidsnet, 2012). Thirdly, 
insurers’ total technical result on supplementary insurance policies reduced 
substantially, from 321 million in 2008 to 33 million in 2014 (Vektis, 2015a). 
Fourthly, more and more insurers stop offering supplementary insurance 
policies providing coverage for healthcare services mostly used by high-risk 
individuals (e.g., unlimited coverage for physiotherapy), while premiums for 
policies that do offer this coverage increased considerably (Zorgwijzer, 2015). 
There are several potential explanations for the increase of adverse selection, 
such as changes in an individual’s financial conditions, changes in the basic 
benefit package and changes in the entitlement to reimbursement. Addition-
ally, two developments may lead to a further increase of adverse selection in 
the upcoming years. Firstly, media attention that urges insured to critically 
41 For empirical evidence on adverse selection see for instance: Ellis, 1985; Geurts and Rut-
ten, 1987; Godfried et al., 2001; Marquis, 1992; Marquis and Phelps, 1987; Short and Taylor, 
1989; Wolfe and Goddeeris, 1991.
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review their need of purchasing supplementary health insurance, to reduce un-
necessary coverage and to search for the lowest premiums increases (e.g., Con-
sumentenbond, 2014b; Independer, 2015b and 2015c and 2015d; Kassa, 2012 
and 2015; Radar, 2013a and 2013b). This may potentially encourage healthy 
individuals to opt out of the supplementary insurance, causing an increase in 
adverse selection. Secondly, it might be expected that insurers over the last 
few years have tried to limit the increase in premium for supplementary health 
insurance by reducing their profit. However, insurers may no longer be able 
to do this, since the technical result on supplementary health insurances has 
reduced significantly. This might imply that (substantial) premium increases 
could be expected for supplementary health insurance in the upcoming years 
causing an increase in adverse selection. To counteract adverse selection, in-
surers are allowed to apply premium differentiation42, although currently only 
very few Dutch insurers do this.
Against this background, this paper studies 1) the effect of adverse selec-
tion on the premium for supplementary insurance over time and 2) whether 
premium differentiation would be able to counteract adverse selection. This is 
studied by simulating the uptake and premium development of supplementary 
health insurance over time using data on healthcare expenses and background 
characteristics from 110,261 insured. The next two sections, respectively, 
discuss the data and methods used for the empirical simulations. The results 
are presented in section 6.4. Sections 6.5 and 6.6, respectively, present the 
conclusion and provide points for discussion, directions for further research 
and policy implications.
6.2 daTa
For the simulations of adverse selection over time and the potential of premium 
differentiation to counteract adverse selection, we use individual-level infor-
mation on healthcare expenditure and risk characteristics from the Achmea 
Health Database. The dataset contains 110,261 individuals who had the same 
supplementary health insurance policy during the entire period 2006–2011. 
Their supplementary insurance covers dental expenses and healthcare services 
not covered by basic health insurance (e.g., physiotherapy, alternative medi-
42 With premium differentiation, the premium for each insurance policy is adjusted to the 
individual’s risk (Van de Ven and Schut, 2011). As the differentiation is more refined, risk 
pools are less heterogeneous, implying less asymmetric information. Van de Ven and Van 
Vliet (1995) for instance show that the use of risk factors like age, gender, health indicators, 
prior healthcare expenditures, supplementary insurance and region, reduces the consumer 
information surplus by about 80 per cent in case of deductible choice.
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cine, care consumed in a foreign country, etc.). In 2011, the annual premium 
for this policy was almost €500, while the average premium for supplementary 
insurance in the Netherlands in that year was little over €300 (Vektis, 2015c). 
In the Netherlands, children can be insured on the supplementary health insur-
ance policy of one of the parents without any additional costs. This means that 
children do not actually have a direct demand for supplementary insurance. 
Therefore, we only included adult insured (i.e., 18 years or older on January 1, 
2006) into our analyses.
The Achmea Health Database contains administrative data from a large 
Dutch health insurer who operates particularly in the western and eastern 
parts of the Netherlands. The data contains individual-level information on 
insurance claims43, both for basic insurance and supplementary insurance, 
aggregated at and categorized into the following thirteen types of healthcare 
services: GP-care, pharmacy, inpatient care, hospital admissions, outpatient 
care, dental care, maternity care, durable medical equipment, physiotherapy, 
mental care, care consumed in a foreign country, alternative medicines and 
glasses. Furthermore, the database includes an encrypted ID-number and (per 
year) information on the year of birth, sex, ethnicity, degree of urbanisation 
in the residential area and in which Pharmacy-based Cost Group (PCG) and/
or Diagnoses-based Cost Group (DCG)44 the insured is classified for the risk 
equalisation scheme.
Appendix 6 provides an overview of some background characteristics of the 
Dutch population and compares these to the characteristics of our sample. It 
shows that more insured in the data are classified into a PCG or DCG and that 
the data includes a smaller share of insured up to the age of 40 and a larger 
share of insured over the age of 40 compared to the entire Dutch population. 
This will however not affect our results since the simulations only take into 
account who is relatively healthy or unhealthy compared to the entire sample; 
i.e., is the individual a low-risk or high-risk within the relevant premium risk 
group (see section 6.3).
6.3 METhOdS
6.3.1 Simulation process
Using the above-mentioned data, we will simulate the uptake and premium 
development of supplementary health insurance over time and study the po-
43 The insurance claims are corrected for inflation.
44 PCGs and DCGs are risk adjusters used as a proxy for health status based upon prior use 
of pharmaceuticals and prior hospital inpatient diagnoses respectively (Van Kleef et al., 2013).
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tential of premium differentiation to counteract adverse selection. In general, 
we will simulate per year who takes out a supplementary insurance and who 
does not45 (see Fig. 6.1). We use year t-1 (i.e., 2007) as our base year in which 
100 per cent of the insured still have their supplementary health insurance 
policy. From that year, we start the simulation process and study the effect of 
adverse selection on the premium. In year t, two flows of insured are simulated. 
Firstly, a share of the insured for whom purchasing supplementary insurance 
is expected not to be financially beneficial will opt out due to adverse selection 
(i.e., line #1 in Fig. 6.1). Secondly, the remainder of this group will not opt out of 
the policy and a share of insured is expected to benefit from purchasing supple-
mentary insurance and will therefore keep the policy (i.e., line #2 in Fig. 6.1). 
This process leaves us with a group of insured with and without supplementary 
health insurance in year t, from which the premium for year t+1 is based upon 
the average claims of the group of insured with supplementary insurance in 
year t. As a result, four flows of insured are simulated in year t+1. Firstly, for 
a share of insured who have supplementary insurance in year t, purchasing 
supplementary insurance is expected not to be financially beneficial in year t+1 
and a share of this group will opt out of the policy due to adverse selection (i.e., 
line #3 in Fig. 6.1). Secondly, the remainder of this group will not opt out of the 
policy and a share of insured who have supplementary insurance in year t is 
expected to benefit from purchasing supplementary health insurance in year 
t+1 and will therefore keep the policy (i.e., line #4 in Fig. 6.1). Thirdly, for a 
share of insured who do not have supplementary insurance in year t, purchas-
ing supplementary health insurance is expected to be financially beneficial in 
year t+1. Meaning that they will opt back into the insurance policy (i.e., line 
#5 in Fig. 6.1). Fourthly, for a share of insured who do not have supplementary 
insurance in year t, purchasing supplementary insurance is expected not to be 
financially beneficial in year t+1. Therefore, they will remain out of the insur-
ance policy (i.e., line #6 in Fig. 6.1). The simulation process from year t+1 will 
be continued up to year t+25 to provide insights over an extensive period of 
time. This is done by continuously ‘looping’ the available years in our data, 
meaning that we use the same five years (i.e., 2007 to 2011) over and over 
45 Note that we select insured who have had the same supplementary insurance policy in 
the period 2006–2011 and that we use exactly these insured to simulate adverse selection. 
This might seem paradoxical since these insured did not opt out of the policy in the period 
2006–2011 and we simulate that a share of them will opt out of the policy. We consider this 
group of insured, however, as a pool of insured in which at a certain point in time the trend of 
adverse selection as observed in the Dutch supplementary health insurance occurs.
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again to create a simulation of 25 years46. Since the healthcare expenses in our 
data are corrected for inflation, this looping process gives no shocks in total 
healthcare expenses over the years47.
As mentioned already, we are interested in the effect of adverse selection 
on the premium development and the potential of premium differentiation to 
counteract adverse selection. The operationalisation of adverse selection can be 
done in many different ways, such as by creating an outflow of insured based 
upon background characteristics (e.g., insured without any illness will opt 
out of the policy), based upon the lowest predicted healthcare expenses and 
based upon a number of years no claims have been filed for supplementary 
health insurance. In this paper, we simulate that insured for whom purchasing 
supplementary health insurance is not expected to be financially beneficial are 
subject to adverse selection and potentially opt out. Lines #1 and #3 in figure 
6.1 represent this. In the Netherlands, the percentage of insured with supple-
mentary health insurance decreased with about one per cent each year over 
the last decade (Vektis, 2016). In order to simulate a continuation of this trend 
and study the effect on the premium, we have to make a decision regarding 
the probability that an insured for whom purchasing supplementary health 
insurance is expected not to be beneficial will opt out of the policy. Our analyses 
have shown that in order to simulate the continuation of adverse selection this 
probability must be set at 0.05. Subsequently, we simulate that from the group 
of insured for whom purchasing supplementary health insurance is expected 
not to be financially beneficial randomly five per cent opts out. Note that since 
we select insured who opt out randomly (from the group for whom purchasing 
supplementary health insurance is expected not to be beneficial), we provide 
a lower bound of adverse selection, compared to selecting, for instance, the 
five per cent of insured with the lowest predicted expenses. The simulation 
of this continuation might provide an underestimation of adverse selection in 
the Dutch supplementary health insurance. After all, adverse selection does 
not only imply that insured opt out of the policy, but it could also imply that 
insured reduce their coverage. This reduction of coverage is one of the indica-
tions that adverse selection has started to occur in the Dutch supplementary 
health insurance. Therefore, we also simulate stronger adverse selection by 
increasing the probability to opt out to 0.1.
46 I.e., 2006 in the data is year t-2 in the simulations, 2007 is year t-1, 2008 is year t, 2009 
is year t+1, 2010 is year t+2, 2011 is year t+3, 2007 is year t+4, 2008 is year t+5, 2009 is year 
t+6, 2010 is year t+7, 2011 is year t+8, 2007 is year t+9, etc.
47 Additionally, this looping process does not result in any problems concerning the back-
ground characteristics of insured when going from the year 2011 to 2007, because insured 
have the appropriate risk factors and corresponding predicted claims for each year, also when 
the looping process continues.
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6.3.2 financial profitability
A crucial parameter in our simulations concerns the financial profitability of 
purchasing supplementary health insurance, which is determined by the indi-
viduals’ predicted claims, the premium set by the insurer and the insured’s risk 
attitude. These aspects and the corresponding assumptions are discussed below.
Predicted claims
The amount of claims that the insured expects to have for supplementary 
health insurance will for a large part determine whether purchasing supple-
mentary health insurance might be beneficial. If an insured expects no claims 
for supplementary insurance, he might be less inclined to purchase insurance 
compared to a situation in which he expects many claims for supplementary 
health insurance. To determine these predicted claims for each insured, several 
models were tested (see appendix 7). Since all models seem to perform equally 
well, we use the most commonly applied GLM with a log-link and a gamma 
distribution (Beeuwkes-Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004). The dependent variable 
is the total healthcare expenses under supplementary insurance in year t. The 
independent variables indicate several background characteristics that are 
included in the database: an age and gender interaction, classification into a 
PCG and / or DCG in year t (based upon information from year t-1), degree of 
urbanisation in the residential area, ethnicity, in which vigintile the insured 
was classified based upon healthcare expenses for basic insurance in year t-1 
and in which percentile the insured was classified based upon healthcare ex-
penses for supplementary insurance in year t-1. For the years 2007 to 2011 we 
use this model to determine the predicted claims for each specific year.
Premium
Next to the predicted claims, the premium determines the financial profitabil-
ity of purchasing supplementary insurance. Theoretically, the premium set by 
the insurer is determined as the predicted claims (as predicted by the insurer) 
plus a loading fee (for each premium risk group). In our data, we only have 
information on the premium in 2011. However, we want to simulate insurance 
uptake over 25 years and therefore, we determine the premium as the average 
reimbursed claims plus a loading fee. The loading fee for each year is based 
upon the average loading fee48 in the Netherlands in the period 2008–2011 and 
is 23 per cent. This implies that the premium in year t+1 is determined as the 
average claims (in the relevant risk group) in year t plus a 23 per cent loading 
48 The average loading fee concerns the difference between the average annual reimbursed 
expenses under supplementary insurance and the average annual premium for supplemen-
tary insurance for the years 2008 to 2011 (Vektis, 2014).
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fee. Note that we apply a constant percentage for the loading fee over the years 
and over the premium risk groups, while insurers are free to (and will most 
likely apply) different loading fees each year and for each premium risk group 
depending upon their own business model.
Insurers could anticipate upon adverse selection by increasing their pre-
mium (and still apply community-rating). After all, low-risk individuals within 
their premium risk group tend to leave the supplementary health insurance or 
reduce their coverage, while high-risk individuals within the same premium 
risk group tend to keep the supplementary health insurance. Therefore, we will 
also perform a simulation in which we simulate that insurers anticipate upon 
adverse selection by increasing their premium in advance.
Although many insurers do still apply community-rating, Dutch insurers 
are allowed to apply premium differentiation to counteract adverse selection. 
In order to study the potential of premium differentiation to counteract adverse 
selection, three types of premium differentiation are distinguished: gender49, 
age and individual predicted claims. For age, we differentiate between two 
premium risk groups: one for insured between the ages of 18 and 32 and one 
for insured older than 32. These groups were chosen since the data showed the 
largest difference in claims for this classification. With the differentiation to 
individual predicted claims, which is similar to fully risk-rating the premium, 
insured are faced with an individual premium based upon their individual 
predicted claims (as mentioned above) plus a loading fee. Note that this differ-
entiation is based upon the maximum information (at least in our data) insured 
themselves have to predict claims. Table 6.1 shows the number of insured in 
each premium risk group and the average claims in 2011.
Table 6.1 Average claims for different premium risk groups.
n average claims 2011
Community-rating 110,261 € 221
gender
Male 49,814 € 179
female 60,447 € 256
age
18-32 9,975 € 190
32+ 100,286 € 224
Risk attitude
Next to the insured’s predicted claims and the premium set by the insurer, 
the insured’s risk attitude determines whether purchasing supplementary 
49 Note that, in practice, the law prohibits insurers to apply premium differentiation to 
gender due to non-discrimination issues.
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health insurance is expected to be beneficial (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981; 
Manning and Marquis, 1996). A rational risk neutral insured would purchase 
supplementary health insurance if his predicted claims equal or exceed the 
premium. So, if the premium for supplementary health insurance is, for in-
stance, €500, a risk neutral insured would only purchase this insurance if his 
predicted claims are at least €500. Insured are, however, not risk neutral re-
garding uncertain choices in health insurance (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
In these situations, most insured are known to be risk averse, implying that 
the insured prefers a certain prospect (x) to any risky prospect with expected 
value x. So, a risk averse insured is willing to pay an additional risk premium 
to insure himself for healthcare services covered by (supplementary) insurance. 
In the previous example, if the insured is for instance willing to pay a risk 
premium of €100, he would purchase supplementary insurance if his predicted 
claims plus the risk premium of €100 are at least €500. The insured’s degree 
of risk aversion determines the risk premium the insured is willing to pay. As 
risk aversion becomes larger, the risk premium the insured is willing to pay 
becomes larger.
We use the measure of risk aversion (r) as developed by Pratt (1964) to 
determine the risk premium for our simulations. Several researchers have 
estimated this measure. Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) found an average 
r-value of 0.0067 among high-income people in the Netherlands. Marquis and 
Holmer (1986) report r-values of 0.00094 and 0.00113. Finally, Van Kleef et al. 
(2006) use r-values of 0.003 and 0.005 to determine the insured’s demanded 
compensation for opting for a voluntary deductible. Based upon the formula by 
Pratt (1964), we use the following formula to determine the risk premium the 
average insured is willing to pay:
RP = 0,5 × S2 (E(HCE(SHI))) × r (1),
where the risk premium (RP) is determined as 0.5 times the variance of the 
average expected claims (HCE (healthcare expenses)) under supplementary 
health insurance (SHI) times the risk aversion measure (r). Since, in our data, 
we have information on the variance of the supplementary insurance claims 
for the period 2006–2011, we determined the demanded risk premium for the 
highest variance level (i.e., 28,703 in 2010) and the smallest variance level (i.e., 
24,596 in 2011) using both the largest (i.e., 0.0067 (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 
1981)) and the smallest mentioned r-value (i.e., 0.00094 (Marquis and Holmer, 
1986)). This results in, respectively, a lower bound and upper bound of the risk 
premium of €12 and €96. Note that the upper bound is based upon the average 
r-value as found by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) for high-income people. 
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They, however, show that the r-value differs substantially between low-income 
and high-income people (i.e., varying from 0.0049 for high-income people to 
0.0079 for low-income people). To compensate for the variation in these results, 
we simulate risk aversion using a risk premium of €100. Using this risk pre-
mium, we simulate that insured with predicted claims plus a risk premium of 
€100 smaller than the premium (in their premium risk group) are subject to 
adverse selection and might potentially opt out of the supplementary health 
insurance. The results of the simulations are presented in the next section.
6.4 RESuLTS
6.4.1 adverse selection
Graph 6.1 shows the results of the simulation of the effect of adverse selection 
on the uptake and the premium development of supplementary health insur-
ance. The black lines indicate a continuation of adverse selection following the 
current trend in the Dutch supplementary health insurance, where on average 
the uptake of supplementary health insurance decreases with one per cent each 
year. It additionally shows that if adverse selection would be larger (i.e., the 
grey lines), potentially because the one per cent decrease over the last decade 
represents a lower bound of adverse selection since insured might have reduced 
their coverage (instead of opting out), the decline in insurance uptake is much 
steeper than with a continuation of the trend. Furthermore, the continuation 
of the current trend of adverse selection results in an increase in premium over 
25 years of 21 per cent (i.e., the black dotted line), while larger adverse selec-
tion results in a premium increase of 50 per cent over 25 years (i.e., the grey 
dotted line). The fact that the lines, representing the insurance uptake and 
the premium development, increasingly diverge is caused by the fact that, as 
expected with adverse selection, the group that still purchases supplementary 
insurance becomes less and less healthy compared to the years before. This 
implies that the reimbursed healthcare expenses increase and consequently, 
that the premium increases.
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Premium development - probability to opt out 0.1*
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graph 6.1 Effect of adverse selection on the premium for supplementary health insurance (SHI)50.
* Within the group of insured for whom purchasing supplementary insurance is not expected to 
be beneficial, the probability to opt out (resulting from adverse selection) is, respectively, 0.05 
(black) and 0.1 (grey).
50 The ‘bumps’ in the lines are caused by the fact that in the year 2011 (i.e., years t+3, t+8, 
t+13, t+18, t+23 in the simulation) the distribution of healthcare expenses differs from the 
other years in that fewer insured have very high claims and insured within the group of 
insured with few claims on average have somewhat higher claims. Additionally, this might 
partially be due to the fact that in 2010 the average reimbursed claims for care consumed in a 
foreign country where substantially higher than for the other years, implying that the average 
reimbursed claims in 2011 are smaller compared to 2010. This cost pattern is however very 
specific for the year 2011, and is not a result of the looping process we apply.
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6.4.2 anticipation upon adverse selection
Graph 6.2 shows the simulation results in case insurers would anticipate upon 
adverse selection by increasing the premium and still apply community-rating, 
where the darker lines are equal to the lines in graph 6.1. Note that we apply 
different percentages for the premium increase matching about the average 
increase in premium as shown in graph 6.151. Graph 6.2 shows that the insur-
ance uptake is lower in case the insurer increases its premium in anticipation of 
adverse selection compared to the situation where the insurer does not increase 
its premium, although the difference is not large. This is due to the fact that as 
the premium increase is larger, purchasing supplementary insurance is expected 
not to be financially beneficial for a larger share of insured, implying that more 
insured will opt out of the policy as a result of adverse selection. This means 
that by anticipating upon adverse selection by increasing the premiums, ad-
verse selection might increase. Additionally, graph 6.2 shows that the premium 
increase is larger in case insurers anticipate upon adverse selection compared 
to the situation where they do not do this. This is caused by the fact that due 
to the premium increase, a larger share of insured opts out since purchasing 
supplementary insurance is no longer expected to be beneficial to them. This 
causes higher premiums because the risk pool on average becomes less healthy 
compared to the situation where the insurer did not increase its premium.
6.4.3 Premium differentiation
Graphs 6.3A and 6.3B show the results of the simulations of the potential of 
premium differentiation to counteract adverse selection, where the darker lines 
are equal to those in graph 6.1 (and graph 6.2). The graphs show that premium 
differentiation to either gender or age has almost no effect on the uptake of 
supplementary health insurance. This results from two effects that more or less 
cancel one another out. Firstly, in case of age differentiation for example, pur-
chasing supplementary insurance becomes more beneficial to younger insured 
compared to community-rating. Secondly, at the same time, within the group 
of older insured, the relatively healthy insured leave the supplementary health 
insurance. Only in graph 6.3B, the differentiation to gender seems to be able 
to modestly slow down the decline in insurance uptake. Additionally, in graphs 
51 Graph 6.1 shows that a continuation of the current trend results in an increase in premium 
of 21 per cent over 25 years, which is about a one per cent premium increase each year. So, 
for the continuation of adverse selection where insurers anticipate upon adverse selection by 
increasing the premium in advance, we apply a premium increase of one per cent each year. 
Additionally, for the simulation in which adverse selection is larger, the increase in premium 
is about 50 per cent over 25 years. Therefore, for the simulation of larger adverse selection 
where insurers anticipate upon adverse selection by increasing the premium in advance, we 
apply a premium increase of two per cent each year.
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6.3A and 6.3B a fully risk-rated premium completely stabilises the insurance 
uptake at about 98 per cent52. Since individuals are then confronted with an 
individual premium, purchasing supplementary health insurance is expected 
to be benefi cial to a larger share of insured, and therefore adverse selection 
does not seem to occur, compared to the situation with community-rating.
52 Note that the uptake is not 100 per cent, as might be expected, since, in our simulations, 
the risk premium insured are willing to pay (i.e., €100 as the default option) is independent of 
the insured’s predicted claims while the loading fee (i.e., 23 per cent of the average claims in 
a specifi c year) is dependent upon the average claims.
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graph 6.2 Effect of adverse selection on the premium for supplementary health insurance 
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6.5 COnCLuSIOn
The Dutch supplementary health insurance is offered at a free market. Nev-
ertheless, many insurers do still apply community-rating and open enrolment. 
Theoretically, this should result in adverse selection. Historically, almost all 
Dutch insured purchased supplementary health insurance. There are, however, 
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B. 
graphs 6.3a and 6.3b Effect of premium differentiation on the uptake of supplementary 
health insurance (SHI) if within the group of insured for whom purchasing supplementary in-
surance is not expected to be benefi cial, the probability to opt out (resulting from adverse selec-
tion) is, respectively, 0.05 (graph 6.3A) and 0.1 (graph 6.3B). See table 6.1 for details on the 
premium risk groups.
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several indications that adverse selection has started to occur on the Dutch 
supplementary insurance market. This paper studies how adverse selection 
could affect the premium of supplementary insurance over time and whether 
premium differentiation would be able to counteract adverse selection. In order 
to do so, the uptake and premium development of supplementary insurance 
over time is simulated using data on healthcare expenses and background 
characteristics from 110,261 insured. For the operationalisation of adverse 
selection, it is assumed that only insured for whom purchasing supplementary 
health insurance is expected not to be beneficial will consider to opt out of the 
supplementary insurance. Firstly, the simulation results show that as adverse 
selection continues in the same trend, the premium would increase 21 per cent 
in 25 years, while if adverse selection would be larger, the premium would 
increase 50 per cent in 25 years. Secondly, the simulations show that if insurers 
were to increase the premium in anticipation of adverse selection, both the 
decline in insurance uptake and the increase in premium would become steeper 
compared to the situation where insurers do not increase their premium. 
Finally, the simulations show that if insurers were to apply full risk-rating 
instead of community-rating, the uptake of insurance would stabilise at about 
98 per cent. This implies that with highly refined risk-rating of the premium, 
insurers could potentially be able to counteract adverse selection.
6.6 dISCuSSIOn
This section discusses the assumptions made for the empirical simulations and 
it presents some directions for further research related to these assumptions. 
Furthermore, it provides some policy implications of the results presented in 
this paper.
6.6.1 assumptions and further research
Regarding the empirical assumptions, we provide four points for discussion. 
Firstly, in this paper the insured’s decision to purchase supplementary insur-
ance is based upon the predicted financial profitability of supplementary insur-
ance for one year only. However, one could imagine that insured have more 
information than is reflected in our calculated predicted claims, for instance for 
planned medical care like maternity care, orthodontics and physiotherapy. In 
such cases, the information asymmetry between the insured and the insurer is 
larger compared to the simulations in this paper, and consequently the decline 
in insurance uptake and the increase in premium might be steeper.
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Secondly, the increase in the premium resulting from adverse selection only 
affects the size of the group for whom purchasing supplementary health insurance 
is expected not to be beneficial. It does not affect the probability that an insured 
for whom purchasing supplementary insurance is expected not to be beneficial will 
opt out. Our simulations therefore provide an underestimation of adverse selec-
tion. After all, one could imagine that the further away the premium is from the 
predicted claims (and the risk premium), the larger the probability that an insured 
would opt out since the potential financial profit of opting out becomes larger.
Thirdly, in the simulations in this paper insurers do not apply selective 
underwriting. This paper simulates insurance uptake and the premium in 
this way since in the Netherlands all insurers have incorporated a guaranteed 
renewability in each supplementary health insurance (Roos and Schut, 2012). 
This implies a guaranteed renewal of the supplementary health insurance with 
an equal adjustment of the premium and insurance conditions for all current 
insured with that specific supplementary insurance (Van de Ven and Schut, 
2011). However, next to premium increases and premium differentiation, 
another way for insurers to anticipate upon adverse selection concerns selec-
tive underwriting. In that case, insurers adjust the accepted risk to the stated 
premium of a certain insurance policy (Van de Ven and Schut, 2011). This 
could for instance be done by refusing applicants or by excluding pre-existing 
medical conditions from coverage for new contracts, but also for their current 
enrolees. However, if insurers were to apply selective underwriting, they would 
probably refuse high-risk individuals from purchasing their insurance policy, 
which decreases adverse selection, implying that only low-risk individuals 
can purchase supplementary health insurance. As a result, there might be a 
large decline in insurance uptake due to refused applicants, but thereafter the 
decline in insurance uptake might be less steep than simulated in this paper 
due to less adverse selection. Further research concerning the effect of selective 
underwriting on adverse selection might provide important insights.
Fourthly, we assume that the insured is willing to pay a risk premium of 
€100 to purchase supplementary health insurance. Although this risk premium 
is based upon prior research concerning risk aversion in health insurance, we 
are unable to state with certainty whether this risk premium captures the 
(Dutch) insured’s real level of risk aversion. If insured would for instance be 
more risk averse – thus willing to pay a larger risk premium – than simulated 
within this paper, the outflow of insured would, ceteris paribus, be smaller 
resulting in a slower increase of the premium since there is less adverse selec-
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tion53. The opposite holds true in case insured would be less risk averse than 
simulated within this paper. Further research into the degree of risk aversion 
and its effect on (supplementary) insurance uptake, premium development and 
subsequently on the emergence of adverse selection is necessary.
6.6.2 Policy implications
Our main conclusion is that adverse selection could result in a substantial 
increase in premium for supplementary health insurance over time. If insur-
ers would want to anticipate upon this emergence of adverse selection or even 
counteract adverse selection, they need to move towards equivalence. To do 
so, they have three options. Firstly, they could start applying premium dif-
ferentiation instead of community-rating. The results in this paper have shown 
that a differentiation to gender or age (which is modestly done by a few Dutch 
insurers) might barely have an effect on the uptake of supplementary insur-
ance. This implies that insurers would have to use (more) refined risk-rating of 
the premium to be able to counteract adverse selection. In that case, however, 
supplementary health insurance might become unaffordable for some insured. 
Secondly, insurers could apply (strong) selective underwriting with which 
the accepted risk would be much better adjusted to the stated premium than 
without selective underwriting. As a result, less adverse selection could oc-
cur. This however implies that some insured will no longer be accepted for the 
supplementary health insurance policy they might want to purchase. Thirdly, 
insurers could change the design of the supplementary health insurance alto-
gether in an attempt to counteract adverse selection. Previous research has 
shown that the design of the Dutch supplementary health insurance is far from 
optimal, since it only provides a limited reduction of financial uncertainty and 
provides access to already affordable healthcare services (Van Winssen et al., 
2016). In an attempt to provide a larger welfare gain to insured from purchasing 
supplementary health insurance, the design of supplementary insurance could 
be adjusted in a way that it does a) provide protection against unpredictable 
and large financial losses (e.g., dental care after an accident), b) has first-euro 
cost-sharing with an individual cap on out-of-pocket expenses (i.e., in order 
to reduce moral hazard and protect insured from out-of-pocket expenses they 
cannot afford), and c) provides the option to save for predictable small losses 
such as dental check-ups (i.e., in order to make sure that insured have enough 
53 Note that if we would want to simulate the effect of risk attitude on the premium develop-
ment in case of a continuation of adverse selection as observed in the Dutch supplementary 
health insurance (i.e., on average a one per cent decrease in insurance uptake each year), we 
would not only need to adjust the risk premium the insured is willing to pay but also need to 
adjust the probability to opt out of the supplementary health insurance since the probability 
to opt out depends upon the assumptions regarding the insured’s risk attitude.
135
6
money available for these healthcare services and are not limited by liquidity 
constraints). Such a change in the design of the supplementary health insur-
ance would also imply that decisions regarding the basic benefit package might 
become more important.
The mentioned options insurers have to counteract adverse selection are 
currently only very limitedly applied by insurers due to a fear of reputation 
loss. This shows an interesting tension on the Dutch supplementary health 
insurance market. On the one hand, if insurers would continue offering 
supplementary health insurance in the way they have done the last decade, 
supplementary health insurance may eventually no longer be offered due to 
adverse selection. On the other hand, if insurers would want to anticipate upon 
adverse selection, they might be compelled to apply highly refined risk-rating 
and selective underwriting, which might imply that supplementary insurance 
is no longer available for everyone. The latter strategy is not in conflict with 
the view of the Dutch government that solidarity in the supplementary health 
insurance is no goal of the government, despite the fact that the Dutch society 
does expect solidarity for supplementary insurance (e.g., Consumentenbond, 
2014a and 2015; Independer, 2015a; Radar, 2013c and 2015). It is therefore 
important to realise that, in the long run, solidarity cannot be achieved on a 
free competitive health insurance market.

Chapter 7
Conclusions and discussion
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This chapter summarises the main conclusions of the preceding chapters by 
answering the research questions as formulated in the introduction including 
the central research question of this dissertation: “What are potential explana-
tions for the low demand for voluntary deductibles in basic health insurance 
and the high demand for supplementary health insurance?”. It additionally 
provides some policy implications of this dissertation and some directions for 
further research.
7.1 ThE vOLunTaRy dEduCTIbLE
Q1. How profitable is a voluntary deductible in health insurance for the 
consumer?
The results in chapter 2 showed that given the average premium rebate, a 
voluntary deductible of €500 on top of the mandatory deductible would have 
been profitable for 48 per cent of the insured in 2014. In practice, only 11 per 
cent of the insured indeed opted for a voluntary deductible in that year. If the 
whole population would have opted for a voluntary deductible in 2014, 44 per 
cent would have ended up with the maximum loss and 41 per cent with the 
maximum gain. This implies that any positive premium rebate would make a 
voluntary deductible profitable for the latter group of insured. The bivariate 
group analyses showed that a) a voluntary deductible is more profitable for 
males than for women, b) profitability of the voluntary deductible decreases 
with age, c) a voluntary deductible is more profitable for insured who are not 
classified in a PCG or DCG than for insured who are and d) a voluntary deduct-
ible is more profitable for insured with low past healthcare expenses than for 
insured with high past healthcare expenses. The multivariate binary logistic 
regression analysis showed that 26 per cent of the insured has a predicted 
probability that a voluntary deductible would be profitable between 0.0 and 
0.1 with an average financial result of €-239. At the same time, another 26 per 
cent has a predicted probability larger than 0.8 with an average financial result 
of €158. Given the result that a voluntary deductible would in retrospect have 
been profitable for almost one in two insured while only about one in ten per 
cent of the insured indeed opted for a voluntary deductible, apparently other 
reasons than financial profitability might play an important role in the decision 
to opt for a voluntary deductible.
140
Q2. What would the premium look like when differentiated to either the duration 
of the contract for which the voluntary deductible holds or the number of 
previous years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible?
Two strategies could be introduced to reduce adverse selection. Firstly, insur-
ers could differentiate the premium according to the duration of the contract 
for which the voluntary deductible holds (i.e., the ex-ante approach). Secondly, 
insurers could differentiate the premium according to the number of previous 
years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible (i.e., the ex-post approach). 
It is hypothesised that the longer the period for which the voluntary deduct-
ible holds or the more previous years an insured has opted for a voluntary 
deductible, the lower the premium will be. This would incentivise insured to 
opt for a voluntary deductible for a longer period or for another consecutive 
year, resulting in a larger reduction of moral hazard (ceteris paribus). The 
results in chapter 3 showed that only without risk equalisation insurers would 
be able to offer a decreasing premium with the duration of the contract or with 
the number of previous consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary 
deductible. With moderate, sophisticated or perfect risk equalisation, the pre-
miums are expected to increase for both the ex-ante and ex-post differentiation. 
These results are due to the fact that as either the duration of the contract or 
the number of years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible increases, 
the insurance claims decrease but the risk equalisation payments increase, 
which overall increases the premium. Given these results, the feasibility of 
these strategies to counteract adverse selection in the Dutch health insurance 
market remains questionable.
Q3. Which determinants could affect deductible uptake in health insurance and 
which strategies could increase deductible uptake?
Chapter 4 identified six determinants of the decision to opt for a voluntary de-
ductible, next to the financial profitability: loss aversion, risk attitude, ambiguity 
aversion, debt aversion, omission bias and liquidity constraints. Loss aversion 
is only expected to make insured forego the voluntary deductible if they evalu-
ate the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible in a one-stage process while 
excluding the premium. In that case, the pattern of risk attitudes predicts risk 
averse behaviour. Irrespective of the insured’s perspective, ambiguity aversion 
may arise since the probability distribution of healthcare expenses is largely 
unknown, which may explain why insured forego deductibles. Debt aversion 
may explain why insured do not opt for voluntary deductibles, since in case of 
a deductible healthcare is consumed first and paid after. Omission bias might 
play a role since individuals are reluctant to take action to change their current 
plan, which is necessary for the uptake of deductibles. Finally, liquidity con-
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straints are expected to influence the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible 
and increase both loss aversion and risk aversion. From these determinants, 
five potential strategies to increase the number of insured opting for a volun-
tary deductible and consequently reduce moral hazard are proposed: 1) present 
the voluntary deductible as the default option, 2) provide insured with informa-
tion regarding the voluntary deductible, 3) provide insured with information 
regarding their healthcare expenses, 4) present the voluntary deductible in 
the form of a no-claim rebate, and 5) combine the voluntary deductible with a 
savings account. Chapter 4 proposed implementing the voluntary deductible 
as the default option and providing insured with information regarding the 
functioning of the voluntary deductible as the two most promising strategies to 
increase uptake of voluntary deductibles and to reduce moral hazard.
7.2 ThE SuPPLEMEnTaRy hEaLTh InSuRanCE
Q4. Why do so many Dutch insured take out non-optimal supplementary health 
insurance?
Traditional economic theory suggests that optimal insurance design a) protects 
individuals against unpredictable high financial risks, b) provides access to 
otherwise unaffordable healthcare services, c) includes first-dollar cost-shar-
ing, and d) incorporates individual caps on out-of-pocket expenses. The Dutch 
supplementary health insurance seems to be far from this optimal design, since 
it does not meet any of these requirements (see table 1.1). Nevertheless, many 
Dutch insured take out this supplementary health insurance. Subsequently, 
chapter 5 identified seven key aspects from behavioural economics that might 
potentially explain the high uptake of non-optimal insurance in the Dutch 
supplementary health insurance market. The chapter poses that in the pres-
ence of either loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, liquidity constraints, debt 
aversion or a combination of these aspects, the welfare gain from purchasing 
supplementary health insurance would be higher than in the absence of (one 
of) these aspects. Next to an increase in welfare, an alternative explanation 
for the high uptake of the Dutch supplementary health insurance presented in 
chapter 5 might be that insured make suboptimal choices. This could be due 
to limited knowledge, social comparison and decision avoidance. Firstly, due 
to limited knowledge about the supplementary insurance, insured might be 
unaware what they exactly insure against and what the costs for healthcare 
services are. Secondly, as a result of social comparison, insured might take out 
supplementary insurance just because their friends and family do so. Thirdly, 
due to decision avoidance insured might automatically renew their current 
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supplementary health insurance without critically reviewing whether they 
indeed want and need this insurance.
Q5. How could adverse selection affect the premium for supplementary 
insurance over time and would premium differentiation be able to counteract 
adverse selection?
Although the Dutch supplementary health insurance is offered at a free 
market, many insurers do still apply community-rating and open enrolment. 
Theoretically, such circumstances should result in adverse selection. There are 
several indications that adverse selection has started to occur on the Dutch 
supplementary insurance market. To counteract adverse selection, insurers are 
allowed to apply premium differentiation, but due to societal pressure only few 
insurers modestly do this. Chapter 6 studied how adverse selection could af-
fect the premium of supplementary insurance over time and whether premium 
differentiation would be able to counteract adverse selection. The simulation 
results in chapter 6 firstly showed that adverse selection might result in a 
substantial increase in the premium between 21 and 50 per cent in 25 years. 
Additionally, chapter 6 showed that if insurers were to increase the premium in 
anticipation of adverse selection, both the decline in insurance uptake and the 
increase in premium become steeper than when insurers do not do this. Finally, 
the simulation results in chapter 6 showed that highly refined risk-rating could 
counteract adverse selection.
7.3 ExPLanaTIOnS fOR ThE dEMand fOR hIgh hEaLTh 
InSuRanCE COvERagE
Insurance demand in the Netherlands is among the highest of the world, which 
also holds for the demand for health insurance. Dutch insured are obliged to 
purchase basic health insurance but, nevertheless, also voluntarily demand 
high health insurance coverage. This is for instance shown by the fact that only 
12 per cent of the Dutch individuals opted for a reduction of health insurance 
coverage in the form of a voluntary deductible and at the same time 84 per cent 
of the Dutch individuals chose an extension of health insurance coverage in the 
form of supplementary health insurance in 2016. From traditional economics 
this might be explained by risk aversion. However, since the risk reduction 
resulting from not opting for a voluntary deductible and from purchasing 
supplementary health insurance seem to be limited, this dissertation wonders 
whether other aspects – than risk aversion – might explain the demand for 
high health insurance coverage. The central research question reads “What are 
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potential explanations for the low demand for voluntary deductibles in the basic 
health insurance and the high demand for supplementary health insurance?”.
To answer this question, the traditional economic literature and behav-
ioural economic literature have been studied and empirical analyses have been 
performed using real world data from a large Dutch health insurer containing 
individual-level information on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics 
for six years. This dissertation studied financial profitability and several be-
havioural economic aspects as potential explanations for the demand for high 
health insurance coverage.
Both chapter 2 and chapter 6 showed that financial profitability, of either the 
voluntary deductible or the supplementary health insurance, is important in 
explaining the low demand for voluntary deductibles and the high demand for 
supplementary health insurance but that it cannot alone explain the demand 
for high health insurance coverage. The empirical analyses from chapter 2 of 
this dissertation showed that opting for a voluntary deductible would have 
been financially beneficial for one in two insured in retrospect while only 12 
per cent of the insured indeed opted for a voluntary deductible. Furthermore, 
regarding the supplementary health insurance, research has shown that only 
70 per cent of the insured with supplementary insurance in 2013 actually filed 
bills to their insurer for reimbursement.
Next to the financial profitability, eight key aspects stemming from the be-
havioural economic literature, are identified that could explain the low demand 
for voluntary deductibles and the high demand for supplementary insurance: 
i.e., loss aversion, risk attitude, ambiguity aversion, debt aversion, decision 
avoidance, limited knowledge, liquidity constraints and social comparison 
(as shown in chapters 4 and 5). Firstly, loss aversion implies that individuals 
dislike incurring losses and experience that “losses loom larger than gains”. 
By purchasing high health insurance coverage, individuals could prevent the 
negative feelings associated with loss aversion. This makes loss aversion a 
potential explanation for the demand for high health insurance coverage.
Secondly, as stated in the cumulative prospect theory, individuals’ risk 
attitude could be represented in a fourfold pattern depending upon whether 
the prospect under question regards a loss or a gain and whether it regards 
an issue with a high or low probability. This pattern states that individuals 
are risk-averse for losses with small probabilities, such as the healthcare ex-
penses that occur as a result of consuming healthcare services for which health 
insurance provides protection. Risk aversion therefore might, as known from 
traditional economics as well, potentially explain why individuals demand high 
health insurance coverage.
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Thirdly, ambiguity aversion captures individuals’ preference for prospects 
with known probabilities over prospects with unknown probabilities. Health-
care consumption and the amount of healthcare expenses strongly vary among 
individuals and are to a large extent uncertain. Therefore, if individuals were 
not to insure (or demand little health insurance coverage), they are confronted 
with this uncertainty regarding (the amount of) healthcare expenses to be paid. 
On the other hand, if individuals purchase insurance, they know for certain 
they have to pay the premium and that healthcare expenses will be reimbursed. 
Therefore, ambiguity aversion might be another potential explanation for the 
demand for high health insurance coverage.
Fourthly, debt aversion implies that individuals have a preference to prepay 
for consumption and to get paid for work after completion. This implies that 
individuals dislike paying for healthcare after consumption and prefer flat-rate 
pricing schemes. Consequently, debt aversion could potentially explain why 
individuals demand high health insurance coverage. After all, with high health 
insurance coverage individuals do not have to pay for healthcare consumption 
afterwards and pay a flat-rate (i.e., the premium).
Fifthly, decision avoidance regards the tendency that individuals avoid 
making a choice by postponing it or by seeking an easy way out that involves no 
action or no change. Omission bias is one of the underlying factors of decision 
avoidance and implies that individuals are reluctant to take action to change 
their current state. For the demand for health insurance coverage, decision 
avoidance (and omission bias as an underlying factor) implies that as long as 
individuals have demanded high insurance coverage in the past, they will most 
probably do so in the future, simply because they do not want to make any 
new choices and therefore renew their current health insurance policy with the 
corresponding high insurance coverage.
Sixthly, as a result of limited knowledge regarding health insurance cover-
age, individuals might be unaware what they actually buy insurance for. They 
might for instance be unaware of the limited value of purchasing health insur-
ance in terms of risk reduction, since supplementary health insurance mostly 
provides access to already affordable healthcare services and since coverage 
limits are applied. Regarding the voluntary deductible, individuals might 
simply be unaware how the voluntary deductible works, how it relates to other 
cost-sharing arrangements and which healthcare services are excluded from 
the deductible. Consequently, individuals’ limited knowledge might potentially 
explain why they demand high health insurance coverage.
Seventhly, individuals might not have enough financial resources to free up 
a substantial amount of money to pay for healthcare services that fall below 
the voluntary deductible or that could be covered by supplementary health 
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insurance. This indicates that another potential explanation for the demand 
for high health insurance coverage might be found in liquidity constraints and 
that individuals prefer to not have a voluntary deductible and to purchase 
supplementary insurance to avoid the problem of not being able to pay the 
healthcare bill.
Finally, social comparison might potentially explain why individuals de-
mand high healthcare coverage. After all, if all their friends and family do not 
opt for a voluntary deductible and purchase supplementary insurance, then 
maybe so should they.
In sum, this dissertation showed that next to risk aversion, as stated by 
traditional economics, several other explanations, mostly stemming from 
behavioural economics, could potentially be found for the low demand for 
voluntary deductibles in the basic health insurance and the high demand for 
supplementary health insurance. If these other determinants indeed affect the 
demand for high health insurance coverage, two relevant subsequent questions 
might be: 1) How could these insights affect the design of health insurance and 
2) How to best facilitate the individual’s decision-making process regarding 
health insurance coverage? The next section, therefore, elaborates on the policy 
implications of this dissertation with respect to the design of the voluntary de-
ductible, the design of the supplementary health insurance and the individual’s 
decision-making process.
7.4 POLICy IMPLICaTIOnS
7.4.1 The design of the voluntary deductible
This dissertation has indicated several behavioural economic aspects that 
might, next to financial profitability, explain the low uptake of voluntary 
deductibles in the Dutch basic health insurance. Remember that voluntary 
deductibles are introduced to insured, not only in the Netherlands but also in 
Germany, Switzerland and the US, to reduce moral hazard. However, if few 
insured actually opt for a voluntary deductible, such as is the case in the Neth-
erlands, the moral hazard reduction might be limited. The results from this dis-
sertation regarding the determinants that potentially affect the decision to opt 
for a voluntary deductible lead to two promising strategies to change the design 
of the voluntary deductible. With these redesigns of the voluntary deductible 
the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible could potentially be 
increased which consequently could, ceteris paribus, lead to a larger reduction 
in moral hazard.
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Firstly, as presented in chapter 4, the voluntary deductible could be pre-
sented as the default option. This implies that, when individuals buy insur-
ance, the policy includes by default a voluntary deductible for the associated 
premium (i.e., with the premium rebate already deducted from the premium). 
Such a policy would not be mandatory because individuals would be able to 
commute the voluntary deductible for an increase in premium. This strategy 
intends to shift the individual’s reference point when deciding how much health 
insurance coverage to purchase from ‘not opting for a voluntary deductible’ to 
‘opting for a voluntary deductible’. According to the literature, this design could 
increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible (Johnson et 
al., 1993; Krieger and Felder, 2013; Moshinsky and Bar-Hillel, 2010; Thaler 
and Benartzi, 2004; Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), since it potentially diminishes 
the effect of loss aversion, it potentially encourages risk seeking behaviour and 
it uses omission bias to potentially make individuals retain the voluntary de-
ductible. Firstly, this redesign of the voluntary deductible might diminish the 
effect of loss aversion, since, seen from the new reference point, the decision to 
opt for a voluntary deductible could be considered a pure loss prospect (i.e., the 
deductible can be commuted for an increase in premium). In case of pure loss 
prospects, loss aversion is absent (Wakker, 2010) and therefore does not affect 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible if a voluntary deductible is the 
default option. Secondly, with such a redesign of the voluntary deductible that 
implies a shift in reference point, risk seeking behaviour might be expected 
since commuting the voluntary deductible implies a certain loss. Thirdly, this 
redesign might make more individuals inclined to retain the voluntary deduct-
ible due to omission bias. After all, if having a voluntary deductible is set as the 
default option, it might be expected that more insured would opt for a voluntary 
deductible than under an opt-in design. Redesigning the voluntary deductible 
to the default option could therefore be considered a strong nudge. Additionally, 
the nudging power of this default option could be reinforced if the option comes 
with some implicit or explicit suggestion that it represent the norm (related 
to norm-theory and social comparison) or the recommended course of action 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2009).
Secondly, the voluntary deductible could be presented in the form of a 
no-claim rebate. In that case, the individual pays a premium for the health 
insurance policy and receives a fixed amount of money at the end of the contract 
period if no healthcare expenses are claimed (i.e., the no-claim rebate). If health-
care expenses are, however, claimed, the individual receives no rebate. In other 
words, compared to a situation with a ‘normal’ deductible, individuals pay the 
full premium (i.e., the premium they would have paid if they had not opted for a 
voluntary deductible) and receive a no-claim rebate equal to the amount of the 
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original voluntary deductible if no healthcare expenses are claimed. Compared 
to the current design of the voluntary deductible, the potential loss (i.e., the 
premium increase) and gain (i.e., the no-claim rebate minus the premium in-
crease) are essentially unchanged, but explicitly integrated. With this redesign 
of the voluntary deductible, both the effect of loss aversion and debt aversion 
on the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible could be affected, which could 
result in more individuals opting for a voluntary deductible. The increased ef-
fect of loss aversion that results from the premium increase is expected to be 
small due to marginal sensitivity. The effect of debt aversion on the decision 
to opt for a voluntary deductible could be diminished in this redesign since the 
individual is not in debt with the insurer, but the insurer is potentially in debt 
with the individual. Additionally, the effect of debt aversion may be reduced in 
the redesign since the individual pays for healthcare expenses ex-ante instead 
of ex-post. Note, however, that the individual moral hazard reduction might be 
different between the current design of the voluntary deductible and a no-claim 
rebate and that further research in this respect would be necessary.
A final remark regarding the redesign of the voluntary deductible is that 
it would be important to keep in mind that the voluntary deductible amount 
should not become a barrier to seek healthcare. This is an important aspect 
to take into consideration, since we already observe many payment arrange-
ments for the mandatory deductible alone in the Netherlands (AD, 2016). When 
presenting strategies to increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary 
deductible (see chapter 4), this dissertation already provided a potential solu-
tion for this: the possibility to save for healthcare expenses that fall below the 
voluntary deductible. Such Health Savings Accounts are increasingly popular 
in the USA, Singapore, South Africa and China (Hurley and Guindon, 2008). In 
the USA, the savings accounts are combined with high deductible health plans, 
which is similar to what is proposed here. Individuals could for instance put the 
received premium rebate on this savings account in order to pay for healthcare 
services that fall below the deductible. The effect of liquidity constraints on 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible and as a problem for paying the 
deductible or seeking healthcare could be reduced since an earmarked savings 
account could serve as a consumption commitment specifically for the out-of-
pocket expenses due to the voluntary deductible.
7.4.2 The design of the supplementary health insurance
Next to explanations for why few individuals voluntarily choose to lower their 
health insurance coverage, this dissertation also provides explanations for 
why many individuals voluntarily choose to increase their health insurance 
coverage by purchasing supplementary health insurance. Traditionally, health 
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insurance design implies a trade-off between the gains from risk pooling and 
the losses from moral hazard. In this respect, the literature shows that full 
insurance is far from optimal and that a mix of coverage and cost-sharing is 
preferred. The design of the Dutch supplementary health insurance deviates 
from the optimal insurance design as proposed by traditional economics. 
Firstly, the Dutch supplementary insurance covers healthcare services that 
do not involve large losses and it applies coverage limits. Consequently, the 
risk reduction resulting from the supplementary health insurance seems to be 
very limited. Secondly, the Dutch supplementary insurance provides access to 
already affordable healthcare services such as dental check-ups, where, from 
a theoretical point of view, one would expect that insurance provides access to 
otherwise unaffordable healthcare services. This suggests that the individual’s 
welfare gain from purchasing supplementary insurance may be limited. Addi-
tionally, moral hazard, the loading fee and the transaction costs of the supple-
mentary insurance are substantial, suggesting that for many individuals the 
welfare loss from the Dutch supplementary health insurance might be large. If 
the current design of the Dutch supplementary health insurance is indeed not 
optimal, what should an optimal design of supplementary insurance look like?
Taken the results from chapter 5 into account, an alternative design of 
the supplementary health insurance would: 1) provide protection against un-
predictable and large financial losses (e.g., dental care after an accident), 2) 
have first-euro cost-sharing with an individual cap on out-of-pocket expenses, 
and 3) provide the option to save for predictable small losses. Such a design 
of the supplementary health insurance might provide a larger welfare gain 
to individuals when purchasing it than the current supplementary health 
insurance. After all, this design is much closer to the most important value 
of health insurance, namely that insurance should provide protection against 
events with low probabilities and high corresponding costs. With this design 
of the supplementary insurance, individuals are covered for unexpected large 
potential losses that are not already covered by basic insurance instead of 
covered for healthcare expenses that might be predictable and relatively small, 
such as dental check-ups. This could also affect the effect of ambiguity aversion 
since with this new design, individuals do know what they are insured against 
and know that all unexpected large losses are reimbursed. By additionally 
implementing first-euro cost-sharing, individuals might be more incentivised 
to contain their healthcare spending, which could potentially counteract moral 
hazard. The individual cap on out-of-pocket expenses moreover protects indi-
viduals from bills they cannot pay and makes sure that not too high expenses 
need to be paid in order to receive healthcare. Furthermore, implementing a 
savings option provides individuals with the possibility to save for expenses 
149
7
that are predictable and small instead of insuring against these expenses, as 
is the case with the current design. The savings option could affect the effect 
of debt aversion since the savings account could serve as a prepayment vehicle 
that diminishes the attenuation of the payment on the pleasure of consump-
tion. It might also affect the effect of liquidity constraints since an earmarked 
savings account could serve as a consumption commitment specifically for 
healthcare services that are predictable and have low healthcare costs that are 
not covered by insurance or subject to cost-sharing. The savings option could 
finally also affect the effect of loss aversion since in that case loss aversion 
might no longer be present because individuals only lose the savings in return 
for consumed healthcare services while they otherwise keep their savings or 
could transfer it to next year’s expenses.
7.4.3 facilitating the individual’s decision-making process
Next to the redesign of the voluntary deductible and the supplementary health 
insurance in order to affect the demand for health insurance coverage, this 
dissertation shows that the demand for health insurance coverage could also be 
affected by facilitating the individual’s decision-making process. If individuals 
indeed make suboptimal choices regarding health insurance coverage due to 
several behavioural economic aspects, facilitating their decision-making pro-
cess might help them to make more optimal choices. This dissertation leads to 
several recommendations regarding the facilitation of the individual’s decision-
making process.
Firstly, individuals could be provided with understandable and transpar-
ent information regarding the design of health insurance, or in the context 
of this dissertation, regarding the voluntary deductible and supplementary 
health insurance. With respect to the voluntary deductible, information could 
for instance explain the functioning of the voluntary deductible (i.e., that the 
possibility to opt for a voluntary deductible in return for a premium rebate ex-
ists and that some healthcare expenses, such as the GP and maternity care, are 
excluded from the deductible), and the relation between the voluntary deduct-
ible and other cost-sharing arrangements. With respect to the supplementary 
health insurance, information could for instance explain the functioning of the 
supplementary health insurance and the coverage – both in type of healthcare 
services covered and the amount of coverage – it provides. Providing such 
information to individuals might increase their knowledge regarding health 
insurance and might make them more equipped and more empowered to make 
decisions concerning the amount of health insurance coverage that best fits 
their needs.
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Secondly, individuals could be provided with information on group and 
individual usages of healthcare services covered by the voluntary deductible 
and the supplementary insurance. In that case, information could be provided 
on how often individuals consume certain healthcare services and the health-
care expenses associated with this consumption. This could be done on the 
individual-level based upon insurer information from prior years, but also on 
the group-level based upon background characteristics such as age, gender and 
chronic illness. With this strategy, individuals might get a better understand-
ing of their necessity of demanding high health insurance coverage than when 
this information is lacking.
Thirdly, health insurance policies could be standardised. This might be simi-
lar to the standardisation of the set of benefits in Medigap in the USA. Since 
1992, American insurers may only offer one out of ten standardised polices. 
This has shown to make individuals more equipped to make informed choices 
(Rice et al., 1997). Especially regarding the decision to purchase supplementary 
health insurance, which is currently characterised by many choice options by 
many different labels of health insurers, this could simplify the individual’s 
decision-making process.
7.5 dIRECTIOnS fOR fuRThER RESEaRCh
This dissertation has indicated several behavioural economic aspects that 
might, next to financial profitability, explain the low demand of voluntary 
deductibles in the Dutch basic health insurance and the high demand for 
supplementary health insurance. Further research is necessary to provide 
more insights into the effects of these determinants on the demand for health 
insurance coverage and the implications for health insurance design and the 
facilitation of the individual’s decision-making process. This section provides 
several directions for further research. Firstly, this dissertation has greatly 
benefited from combining traditional economics with behavioural economics. 
After all, not everything can be explained from a traditional economic point of 
view and not everything can be explained from a behavioural economic point 
of view. The value of this dissertation mostly lies in the combination of the two 
in studying potential explanations for the demand for high health insurance 
coverage. Therefore, this dissertation emphasises the importance of continuing 
combining the insights from both economic fields in further research concern-
ing the demand for health insurance coverage.
Secondly, an important direction for further research would be the quan-
tification of the effect of the indicated behavioural economics explanations for 
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the demand for high health insurance coverage. This dissertation has provided 
eight key aspects stemming from behavioural economics that could potentially 
explain why individuals demand high health insurance coverage. However, 
further research would be necessary to show whether, how and to what extent 
these aspects indeed affect the demand for health insurance coverage.
Thirdly, nudging is considered to be a powerful tool in influencing indi-
viduals’ behaviour in a predictable way. The idea behind nudging is to move 
individuals in directions that will make their lives better without forcing them 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). Any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
individuals’ behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives is considered a nudge. Nudges 
are not considered to be mandates and should be easy and cheap to avoid. 
Nudges (e.g., presenting the voluntary deductible as the default option) are also 
in this dissertation mentioned as tools to affect individuals’ choice behaviour 
when it comes to the demand for health insurance coverage. Further research 
regarding the potential of nudges in health insurance to affect behaviour and 
regarding its effect on choice in health insurance would be of great importance 
to further increase both the individual and societal welfare gain from health 
insurance.
Fourthly, from the behavioural economic aspects that have been indicated 
to potentially explain the demand for high health insurance coverage, a first 
recommendation presented within this dissertation regards the potential re-
design of the voluntary deductible and the supplementary health insurance. 
An important step within this redesign could be to perform a discrete choice 
experiment with respect to the design of health insurance in general. Such an 
experiment could study which design aspects of health insurance individuals 
find most important and could consequently lead to important insights with 
respect to an optimal design of health insurance.
Fifthly, related to the redesign of health insurance, it would be important 
to study the effects of a different design of health insurance on moral hazard. 
Especially when redesigning the voluntary deductible, which is implemented 
in order to reduce moral hazard, it would be important to first study in what 
way a different design (e.g., a default option or a no-claim rebate) affects moral 
hazard. In such studies, both the individual reduction in moral hazard (i.e., for 
the individual insured) and the total moral hazard reduction (i.e., the reduction 
of all individuals taken together) should be taken into account. After all, some 
strategies might lower the individual reduction of moral hazard, but could 
increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible, which may 
lead to a higher total reduction of moral hazard than before the redesign.
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Sixthly, a better facilitation of the individual’s decision-making process re-
garding health insurance coverage was presented as a second recommendation 
within this dissertation. Wakker et al. (2007), however, showed that provid-
ing individuals with information regarding healthcare consumption actually 
increased adverse selection. Therefore, additional research in this direction 
would be necessary to provide insights into the effect of providing information 
– both on the design and functioning of insurance as on healthcare consump-
tion – on the individual’s decision concerning health insurance coverage. This 
could for instance be done by a small experiment where individuals are first 
asked to state their preferred amount of health insurance coverage, after which 
they are provided with information concerning the design of health insurance, 
the functioning of health insurance or the consumption of healthcare. Subse-
quently, individuals might again be asked about their preferred amount of 
health insurance coverage.
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aPPEndIx 1. ChaRaCTERISTICS Of ThE aChMEa hEaLTh 
daTabaSE
Table a1 Characteristics of the Achmea Health Database
2011
n 808,189
% male 45.9
% non-nativea 18.6
% in a PCg 28.9
% in a dCg  4.7
% adults with a voluntary deductible  0.90
average total healthcare expenses under basic insurance (€) 2,890
average age 50.9
a Non-native indicates Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese descent.
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aPPEndIx 2. RESuLTS Of ThE MuLTIvaRIaTE bInaRy 
LOgISTIC REgRESSIOn anaLySIS.
Table a2 Results of the multivariate binary logistic regression on whether a voluntary deduct-
ible of €500 on top of a mandatory deductible of €360 would be profitable given the average 
premium rebate of €240 (0 = not profitable, 1 = profitable) in the Dutch basic health insurance 
in 2014. Presented are odds ratios and p-values in parentheses.
variable binary logistic regression
Intercept 0.180 (0.000)
gender – age classes
(reference is male 18-24)
Male
25-29 0.883 (0.000)
30-34 0.843 (0.000)
35-39 0.817 (0.000)
40-44 0.764 (0.000)
45-49 0.732 (0.000)
50-54 0.677 (0.000)
55-59 0.642 (0.000)
60-64 0.632 (0.000)
65-69 0.573 (0.000)
70-74 0.513 (0.000)
75-79 0.456 (0.000)
80-84 0.422 (0.000)
84+ 0.378 (0.000)
Female
18-24 0.599 (0.000)
25-29 0.494 (0.000)
30-34 0.528 (0.000)
35-39 0.591 (0.000)
40-44 0.633 (0.000)
45-49 0.585 (0.000)
50-54 0.556 (0.000)
55-59 0.577 (0.000)
60-64 0.560 (0.000)
65-69 0.528 (0.000)
70-74 0.481 (0.000)
75-79 0.442 (0.000)
80-84 0.433 (0.000)
84+ 0.443 (0.000)
PCg (reference is not classified in PCG) 0.347 (0.000)
dCg (reference is not classified in DCG) 0.000 (0.912)
Ethnicity (reference is non-native) 1.153 (0.000)
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Table a2 (continued)
variable binary logistic regression
urbanisation 
(reference is very poorly 
urbanised region)
Very highly urbanised region 0.862 (0.000)
Highly urbanised region 0.872 (0.000)
Moderately urbanised region 0.913 (0.000)
Poorly urbanised region 0.953 (0.003)
Profitability in 
previous years
Profitable in
2006 1.594 (0.000)
2007 1.651 (0.000)
2008 1.923 (0.000)
2009 2.282 (0.000)
2010 4.216 (0.000)
Profitable in x 
previous years
x = 1 2.055 (0.000)
x = 2 1.779 (0.000)
x = 3 1.430 (0.000)
x = 4 1.134 (0.000)
nagelkerke R2 0.533
n 807,366
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aPPEndIx 3. SEvERaL MOdELS TO ESTIMaTE ThE PREdICTEd 
hEaLThCaRE ExPEnSES and aCCORdIngLy RanK InSuREd
Several models are tested to determine the predicted healthcare expenses of 
individuals in year t based upon their background characteristics.
1. Ordinary least squares
2. Ordinary least squares with a log transformation of healthcare expenses
3. Generalised linear model with a gamma distribution and a log link
4. Generalised linear model with a gamma distribution and a power -1 link
5. Generalised linear model with a gamma distribution and a power 0.5 link
6. Generalised linear model with a normal distribution and a log link.
Table A3 shows the Spearman correlation coefficients of the predicted health-
care expenses with the actual healthcare expenses in year t for all models. 
Table A3 shows these correlation coefficients for both the entire dataset and a 
subset of the sample. This subset regards the half of insured with the lowest 
actual healthcare expenses in year t. We also determined the correlation coef-
ficient for this subset to see whether our preferred model would also perform 
well for the healthiest insured since these would be the insured we would select 
to opt for a voluntary deductible. Since the second model, the OLS with a log 
transformation of healthcare expenses, has the highest correlation coefficient 
on both the entire dataset and the subset of the sample, this model is used to 
determine the predicted healthcare expenses of all insured in year t and rank 
insured accordingly.
Table a3 Spearman correlation coefficient of the predicted healthcare expenses according to the 
different models with the actual healthcare expenses in year t for the entire dataset and for the 
half of insured with the lowest actual healthcare expenses.
Entire 
dataset
Subset of 
sample
0 Actual healthcare expenses in year t 1.0000 1.0000
1 OLS 0.6857 0.3814
2 OLS with log transformation of THCEa 0.7384 0.5192
3 GLM with gamma distribution and log link 0.7327 0.5021
4 GLM with gamma distribution and power -1 link 0.5928 0.4730
5 GLM with gamma distribution and power 0.5 link 0.7326 0.5010
6 GLM with normal distribution and log link 0.6947 0.4356
a THCE = total healthcare expenses under basic insurance
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aPPEndIx 4. IndEPEndEnT vaRIabLES InCLudEd In 
STaTISTICaL MOdEL
Table A4 provides a description of the independent variables that are included 
in the model. The six models mentioned in appendix 3 were also tested with the 
same independent variables as mentioned in Table A4 but with the past total 
healthcare expenses in year t-1 included as a continuous variable (instead of 
included as dummy variables for the vigintiles). However, with this operation-
alisation of the past total healthcare expenses, the correlation coefficients were 
much lower (e.g., the correlation coefficient for the second model was 0.6480).
Table a4 Description of the independent variables of the model to determine the expected 
healthcare expenses in year t.
Independent 
variables
description
number of 
variables in 
the model
age / gender
28 classes (i.e., 14 classes for males and 14 classes for 
females) with age in 5-year classes starting from 18-24 years 
up to an age of 84. Insured older than 84 years are also 
included in a separate risk class.
27a
PCg
1 class to indicate whether an insured is classified into a 
PCG in year t. Individuals are assigned to a PCG when they 
used at least 180 daily dosages of a specific drug in year t-1.
1
dCg
1 class to indicate whether an insured is classified into a 
DCG in year t. Individuals are assigned to a DCG when they 
had a hospital admission in year t-1 for a specific diagnosis.
1
urbanisation
5 classes to indicate the degree of urbanisation in the insured 
residential area based upon a four digit zip code
4a
Ethnicity
1 class to indicate whether the insured is native or non-
native. Non-native insured include insured with a Turkish, 
Moroccan and Surinamese descent.
1
Past healthcare 
expenses
20 classes that indicate the vigintile of total healthcare 
expenses under basic insurance the insured incurred in year 
t-1.
19a
a The number of variables included in the model is for some independent variables one less than 
the number of defined classes, because one variable for each independent variable is a reference 
group for all included dummy variables per independent variable.
161
a
aPPEndIx 5. SEnSITIvITy ChECK On ThE RanK Of InSuREd 
fOR ThE Ex-anTE dIffEREnTIaTIOn
See Tables A5 and A6.
Table a5 Composition of the premium according to the ex-ante differentiation for a voluntary 
deductible of €1,000 where the rank of insured is determined using only the information known 
at the beginning of year t without any risk equalisation.
% HCE ICa MHR OOP Pa
50 nvd
€1,894
€3,289 €3,289
50 vd €128 €113 €257 €128
10 vd 1-year contract €232 €187 €406 €232
10 vd 2-year contract €162 €139 €314 €162
10 vd 3-year contract €114 €103 €238 €114
10 vd 4-year contract €79 €77 €185 €79
10 vd 5-year contract €53 €57 €143 €53
a Note that since a situation without risk equalisation is shown, no risk equalisation payment is 
in place and the insurance claims equal the premium.
HCE = average healthcare expenses  P = premium
IC = average insurance claims  NVD = insured without a voluntary
MHR = average moral hazard reduction deductible
OOP = average out-of-pocket expenses  VD = insured with a voluntary deductible
Table a6 Composition of the premium according to the ex-ante differentiation for a voluntary 
deductible of €1,000 where the rank of insured is determined using only the information known 
at the beginning of year t with perfect risk equalisation.
% ICa REP Pa
50 nvd €3,289 €-1,395 €1,894
50 vd €128 €1,396 €1,524
10 vd 1-year contract €573 €1,069 €1,301
10 vd 2-year contract €35 €1,279 €1,441
10 vd 3-year contract €19 €1,439 €1,553
10 vd 4-year contract €12 €1,553 €1,632
10 vd 5-year contract €1 €1,641 €1,694
IC = average insurance claims
REP = risk equalisation payment, determined according to equation (2a) or (2b) given the MHR 
and OOP shown in table A5
P = premium
NVD = insured without a voluntary deductible
VD = insured with a voluntary deductible
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aPPEndIx 6. COMPaRIng ThE duTCh POPuLaTIOn and ThE 
SaMPLE In 2011.
Table a7 Comparing characteristics between the Dutch population and the insured within the 
data. For comparison reasons, children are included into this analysis.
2011
The netherlands data
PCg (yes) 21.4 % 26.5 %
dCg (yes) 8.7 % 4.8 %
0-18 yearsa 23.5 % 16.2 %
19-40 years 25.0 % 20.5 %
41-65 years 35.9 % 37.5 %
66 years and older 15.6 % 25.8 %
n 16,655,799 140,557
a The numbers regarding the Dutch population regard insured between the age of 0 and 20.
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aPPEndIx 7. dIffEREnT MOdELS TO ESTIMaTE hEaLThCaRE 
ExPEnSES undER SuPPLEMEnTaRy hEaLTh InSuRanCE.
Several models are tested to determine the predicted healthcare expenses 
for supplementary health insurance of individuals in year t based upon their 
background characteristics.
1. Ordinary Least Squares
2. Generalized Linear Model with a gamma distribution and a log link
3. Generalized Linear Model with a normal distribution and a log link.
4. Generalized Linear Model with a poisson distribution and a log link.
Table A8 shows different summary statistics of all models. Since the differ-
ences regarding these statistics among the different models are minimal, we 
apply the most commonly recommended and used Generalized Linear Model 
with a gamma distribution and a log link to determine the predicted claims for 
supplementary health insurance for each individual for each year.
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hIgh hEaLTh InSuRanCE COvERagE
The Netherlands belong to the countries with the highest insurance density 
in the world. This does not only hold for insurance in general, but also for 
health insurance specifically. This is shown by the fact that 84 per cent of the 
Dutch insured opted for an extension of health insurance coverage in the form 
of a supplementary insurance, while, at the same time, only 12 per cent of the 
Dutch insured opted for a reduction of health insurance coverage in the form 
of a voluntary deductible in 2016. From the traditional economic literature, 
this might be explained by risk aversion. Risk averse individuals will want to 
protect themselves from the possibility of having to need a substantial amount 
of money to purchase the necessary healthcare treatments. This dissertation 
questions whether risk aversion alone can explain the demand for high health 
insurance coverage as expressed by the low demand for voluntary deductibles 
and the high demand for supplementary health insurance. After all, the value 
in terms of reduction of uncertainty regarding financial losses is limited in 
those cases. For instance, Dutch individuals can opt for the highest voluntary 
deductible of €500 and get a premium rebate of €300 in return, which implies 
that little financial risk (i.e., €200) is left. This implies that Dutch insured are 
willing to pay €300 in order to commute a deductible of €500. Furthermore, 
Dutch insured are for instance willing to purchase supplementary health 
insurance covering dental expenses up to a maximum of €250 per individual 
per year for an annual premium of €180 per individual. Additionally, the 
Dutch supplementary insurance mostly provides access to already affordable 
healthcare services such as dental check-ups and regular consultations with 
the physiotherapist. These examples illustrate that other aspects than risk 
aversion are likely to affect the demand for health insurance coverage as well.
The goal of this dissertation, therefore, is to identify potential explanations 
for the low demand for voluntary deductibles in basic health insurance and the 
high demand for supplementary health insurance. In order to do so, the tradi-
tional economic literature and the behavioural economic literature are studied. 
Furthermore, several empirical analyses and simulations are performed using 
real world data from a large Dutch health insurer containing individual-level 
information on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics for six years. The 
insights provided within this dissertation regarding which aspects potentially 
drive the demand for health insurance coverage could be used to optimise the 
design of health insurance – and more specifically the design of voluntary 
deductibles and the supplementary health insurance – and to better facilitate 
the individual’s decision-making process concerning the demand for health 
insurance coverage.
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ThE vOLunTaRy dEduCTIbLE In ThE baSIC hEaLTh 
InSuRanCE
Chapter 2 studies the financial profitability of opting for a voluntary deductible 
as a potential explanation for the low uptake of voluntary deductibles. The 
results of the empirical analyses in chapter 2 showed that given the average 
premium rebate, a voluntary deductible of €500 on top of the mandatory deduct-
ible of €360 would have been profitable for 48 per cent of the insured in 2014 in 
retrospect. If the whole population would have opted for the highest voluntary 
deductible in 2014, 44 per cent would have ended up with the maximum loss 
(i.e., €-260) and 41 per cent with the maximum gain (i.e., €240). The bivariate 
group analyses showed that a voluntary deductible is more profitable for males 
than for females, more profitable for insured who are not chronically ill than 
for insured who are and more profitable for insured with low past healthcare 
expenses than for insured with high past healthcare expenses. Additionally, 
the analyses showed that profitability of the voluntary deductible decreases 
with age. Based upon these results, chapter 2 concludes that apparently other 
reasons than financial profitability might play an important role in the decision 
to opt for a voluntary deductible.
Voluntary deductibles are offered to insured in the Netherlands and 
several other countries, such as Germany, Switzerland and the US, to coun-
teract moral hazard. Moral hazard refers to the change in health behaviour 
and consumption caused by the fact that the health insurer reimburses the 
costs. Given the fact that only 12 per cent of the Dutch insured opted for a 
voluntary deductible, it is expected that the moral hazard reduction resulting 
from this deductible is quite limited. Economic theory predicts that rational 
consumer behaviour causes individuals to opt for a voluntary deductible only 
if their expected expenses under the deductible fall (far) below the premium 
rebate. This phenomenon is referred to as adverse selection and implies that 
low-risk individuals (such as young and healthy individuals) are more inclined 
to opt for a voluntary deductible than high-risk individuals (such as old and 
unhealthy individuals). This kind of behaviour would also imply that individu-
als do not opt for a voluntary deductible in a (incidental) year they expect (high) 
healthcare expenses. To reduce this adverse selection, insurers could apply 
premium differentiation to either the duration of the contract for which the 
voluntary deductible holds (i.e., the ex-ante differentiation) or the number of 
previous years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible (i.e., the ex-post 
differentiation). It is hypothesised that the longer the period for which the 
voluntary deductible holds or the more previous years insured have opted for 
a voluntary deductible, the lower the premium can be. This could incentivise 
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insured to opt for a voluntary deductible for a longer period or more consecu-
tive years. Consequently, this could imply a larger reduction in moral hazard 
since insured then also opt for a voluntary deductible in (incidental) years they 
expect (high) healthcare expenses. Chapter 3 studies what the premiums look 
like when differentiated to either the duration of the contract for which the 
voluntary deductible holds or the number of previous years insured have opted 
for a voluntary deductible. The results in chapter 3 show that only without 
risk equalisation54 insurers would be able to offer a decreasing premium with 
the duration of the contract or with the number of previous consecutive years 
insured have opted for a voluntary deductible. With moderate, sophisticated or 
perfect risk equalisation, the premiums are expected to increase for both the 
ex-ante and ex-post differentiation. These results are due to the fact that as 
either the duration of the contract or the number of years insured have opted 
for a voluntary deductible increases, the insurance claims decrease but the risk 
equalisation payments increase, which overall increases the premium. Given 
these results, the feasibility of these strategies to counteract adverse selection 
in the Dutch health insurance market remains questionable.
The results in chapter 2 already showed that, in retrospect, a voluntary 
deductible would have been financially profitable for about one in two insured, 
while only 12 per cent of the insured in 2016 actually opted for a voluntary 
deductible. Therefore, chapter 4 identifies six potential other determinants that 
affect the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible from the behavioural eco-
nomic field: 1) loss aversion, 2) risk attitude, 3) ambiguity aversion, 4) debt aver-
sion, 5) omission bias and 6) liquidity constraints. Firstly, loss aversion could 
make insured forego the voluntary deductible because they dislike the feeling 
of potentially losing the deductible amount. Secondly, insured are expected to 
behave risk averse with respect to the decision to opt for a voluntary deduct-
ible and might therefore not opt for a voluntary deductible. Thirdly, since the 
probability distribution of healthcare expenses is to a large extend unknown to 
individuals, ambiguity aversion55 might arise, which may explain why insured 
forego deductibles. Fourthly, debt aversion may explain why insured do not opt 
for voluntary deductibles, since in case of a deductible healthcare is consumed 
first and paid after. Fifthly, omission bias might play a role since individuals 
54 Risk equalisation prospectively compensates insurers for predictable differences in ex-
penses between insured.
55 Ambiguity aversion regards individuals’ preference for prospect with known probabilities 
over prospect with unknown probabilities. Ellsberg first showed this in a hypothetical ex-
periment in 1961, where individuals were confronted with two urns. The first urn contained 
exactly 100 red and black balls, but in an unknown ratio, while the second urn contained 
exactly 50 red and 50 black balls. The majority of the respondents preferred to bet on either 
red or black in urn two rather than in urn one, indicating ambiguity aversion.
186
are reluctant to take action to change their current plan, which is necessary for 
the uptake of deductibles. Finally, liquidity constraints are expected to make 
insured forego the voluntary deductible since potentially a substantial amount 
of money needs to be paid out-of-pocket. From these determinants, five potential 
strategies to increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible 
and consequently reduce moral hazard are proposed: 1) present the voluntary 
deductible as the default option, 2) provide insured with information regarding 
the voluntary deductible, 3) provide insured with information regarding their 
healthcare expenses, 4) present the voluntary deductible in the form of a no-
claim rebate, and 5) combine the voluntary deductible with a savings account.
ThE SuPPLEMEnTaRy hEaLTh InSuRanCE
The design of health insurance involves a trade-off between the gains from risk 
pooling and the losses from moral hazard, the loading fee and the transaction 
costs. Traditional economic theory suggests that optimal insurance design a) 
protects individuals against unpredictable high financial risks, b) provides 
access to otherwise unaffordable healthcare services, c) includes first-dollar 
cost-sharing, and d) incorporates individual caps on out-of-pocket expenses. 
The Dutch supplementary health insurance seems to be far from this optimal 
design. Firstly, this is due to the fact that the welfare gain from purchasing 
supplementary insurance seems to be limited since coverage limits are applied 
and since the healthcare services that are covered do not involve large losses, 
which implies that they are already affordable. Secondly, the welfare loss 
from the supplementary insurance might be significant, since moral hazard is 
expected to be large since no cost-sharing arrangements are introduced. Fur-
thermore, the loading fee is large and transaction costs are substantial since 
many different insurers offer many different supplementary insurance policies. 
Nevertheless, many Dutch insured take out this supplementary insurance. 
Chapter 5 identified seven key aspects from behavioural economics that might 
potentially explain the high uptake of this non-optimal insurance. This chapter 
poses that in the presence of either loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, liquid-
ity constrains, debt aversion or a combination of these aspects, the welfare 
gain from purchasing supplementary health insurance would be higher than 
in the absence of (one of) these aspects. Next to an increase in welfare, an 
alternative explanation for the high uptake of the Dutch supplementary health 
insurance might be that insured make suboptimal choices. This could be due 
to limited knowledge, social comparison and decision avoidance. Firstly, due 
to limited knowledge about the supplementary insurance, insured might be 
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unaware what they exactly insure against and what the costs for healthcare 
services are. Secondly, as a result of social comparison, insured might take out 
supplementary insurance just because their friends and family do so. Thirdly, 
due to decision avoidance insured might automatically renew their current 
supplementary health insurance without critically reviewing whether they 
indeed want and need this insurance.
Despite the fact that the supplementary health insurance is offered at a free 
market (in contrast to the basic health insurance), many Dutch insurers do 
still apply community-rating and open enrolment. Theoretically, such circum-
stances should result in adverse selection, where high-risk individuals (within 
each premium risk group) have a larger incentive to purchase supplementary 
health insurance or to extend their coverage compared to low-risk individuals. 
Historically, almost all Dutch individuals purchased supplementary insurance. 
There are, however, four indications that adverse selection has started to oc-
cur in the Dutch supplementary health insurance. Firstly, the percentage of 
individuals with supplementary insurance decreased from 93 per cent in 2006 
to 84 per cent in 2016. Secondly, individuals with supplementary health insur-
ance take out insurance policies with less comprehensive coverage than before. 
Thirdly, insurers’ total technical result on supplementary insurance policies 
reduced substantially since 2008. Fourthly, more and more insurers stop offer-
ing supplementary health insurance policies providing coverage for healthcare 
services mostly used by high-risk individuals, while the premium for policies 
that do offer this coverage increased considerably. To counteract this adverse 
selection, insurers are allowed to apply premium differentiation, but due to 
societal pressure only few insurers modestly do this. Chapter 6 studied how 
adverse selection could affect the premium of supplementary insurance over 
time and whether premium differentiation would be able to counteract adverse 
selection. The simulation results in chapter 6 firstly showed that adverse selec-
tion might result in a substantial increase in the premium between 21 and 
50 per cent in 25 years. Additionally, the results show that if insurers were 
to increase the premium in anticipation of adverse selection, both the decline 
in insurance uptake and the increase in premium become steeper than when 
insurers do not do this. Finally, the simulation results in chapter 6 showed that 
highly refined risk-rating could counteract adverse selection.
POLICy IMPLICaTIOnS
This dissertation shows that next to risk aversion, as proposed by the tradi-
tional economic literature, several other behavioural economic aspects could 
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be identified that might potentially explain why few Dutch insured opt for a 
voluntary deductible in the basic health insurance and why so many Dutch 
insured purchase supplementary health insurance. These aspects regard the 
financial benefit, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, decision avoidance, limited 
knowledge regarding the health insurance, liquidity constraints and social 
comparison. If these determinants indeed affect the demand for high health 
insurance coverage, two relevant subsequent question might be: a) How could 
these insights affect the design of the voluntary deductible and the supplemen-
tary health insurance, and b) How to best facilitate the individual’s decision-
making process regarding health insurance coverage.
With respect to the voluntary deductible, the design could be adjusted 
in such a way that the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible 
could potentially increase, which consequently could, ceteris paribus, lead to 
a larger reduction in moral hazard. Firstly, the voluntary deductible could be 
presented as the default option. This implies that, when individuals buy insur-
ance, the policy includes by default a voluntary deductible for the associated 
premium. Such a policy would not be mandatory since individuals would be 
able to commute the voluntary deductible for an increase in premium. This 
redesign could increase the number of insured opting for a voluntary deductible 
since the effect of loss aversion on the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible 
might potentially be diminished. Furthermore, with this redesign risk seeking 
behaviour might be expected since commuting the voluntary deductible implies 
a certain loss. Moreover, this redesign might make more individuals inclined to 
retain the voluntary deductible due to omission bias. Secondly, the voluntary 
deductible could be presented in the form of a no-claim rebate. In that case, 
the individual pays a premium for the health insurance policy and receives 
a fixed amount of money at the end of the contract period if no healthcare 
expenses are claimed (i.e., the no-claim rebate). If healthcare expenses are, 
however, claimed, the individual receives no rebate. Compared to the current 
design of the voluntary deductible, the insured pays the full premium (i.e., the 
premium he would have paid if he had not opted for a voluntary deductible) 
and receives a no-claim rebate equal to the original deductible amount if no 
healthcare expenses are claimed. With this redesign of the voluntary deduct-
ible it is expected that more insured would opt for a voluntary deductible than 
under the current design since the effect of loss aversion and debt aversion on 
the decision to opt for a voluntary deductible might be reduced. Note, however, 
that the individual reduction of moral hazard might be different between the 
current design of the voluntary deductible and a no-claim rebate.
With respect to the supplementary health insurance, this dissertation 
shows that the Dutch supplementary health insurance substantially deviates 
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from what an optimal insurance theoretically looks like. If the current design 
of the Dutch supplementary health insurance is indeed not optimal, what 
should an optimal design of supplementary insurance look like? An alternative 
design of the supplementary insurance would: 1) provide protection against 
unpredictable and large financial losses (e.g., dental care after an accident), 2) 
have first-euro cost-sharing with an individual cap on out-of-pocket expenses, 
and 3) provide the option to save for predictable small losses. Such a design 
of the supplementary health insurance might provide a larger welfare gain to 
individuals when purchasing it than the current supplementary health insur-
ance. After all, this design is much closer to the most important value of health 
insurance, namely that insurance should provide protection against events 
with low probabilities and high corresponding costs.
The insights from this dissertation could finally lead to facilitating the 
individual’s decision-making process regarding health insurance coverage in 
order for them to make more optimal choices. This could firstly be done by 
providing insured with understandable and transparent information regarding 
the voluntary deductible and the supplementary insurance. Such information 
could for instance explain the functioning of the voluntary deductible, the rela-
tion between the voluntary deductible and other cost-sharing arrangements 
and explain the coverage the supplementary health insurance provides both 
in terms of types of healthcare services covered and the amount of coverage. 
Secondly, the individual’s decision-making process could be facilitated by pro-
viding insured with information on group and individual usages of healthcare 
services covered by the voluntary deductible and the supplementary insurance. 
In that case, information could be provided on how often individuals consume 
certain healthcare services and the healthcare expenses associated with this 
consumption. With this strategy, individuals might get a better understanding 
of their necessity to opt for a voluntary deducible or to purchase supplemen-
tary insurance. In general, providing insured with information could increase 
individual’s knowledge regarding health insurance, which might make them 
able to make more optimal decisions regarding the amount of health insurance 
coverage that best fits their needs.
This dissertation has identified several determinants stemming from behav-
ioural economics that, next to the financial profit, might be able to explain why 
few insured opt for a voluntary deductible in the Dutch basic health insurance 
and many insured purchase supplementary insurance. Further research into 
the effect of these determinants on the demand for health insurance coverage 
and its implications for the design of health insurance and the facilitation of 
the individual’s decision-making process remains, however, necessary.

Samenvatting
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hOgE zORgvERzEKERIngSdEKKIng
Nederland behoort wereldwijd tot de landen met de hoogste verzekeringsdek-
king. Dit geldt niet alleen voor verzekeringen in het algemeen, maar ook voor 
zorgverzekeringen. Dit laatste is terug te zien in het feit dat in 2016 maar 
liefst 84 procent van de Nederlanders kiest voor een uitbreiding van de ba-
sisverzekeringsdekking in de vorm van een aanvullende zorgverzekering en 
tegelijkertijd slechts 12 procent van de Nederlanders kiest voor een beperking 
van de verzekeringsdekking in de vorm van een vrijwillig eigen risico. Vanuit 
de economische literatuur kan dit gedrag mogelijk verklaard worden door 
risico-aversie. Risico-averse individuen willen zich namelijk zo goed moge-
lijk verzekeren tegen de kans dat zij substantiële kosten moeten maken om 
(noodzakelijke) zorg te verkrijgen. In dit proefschrift wordt de vraag gesteld 
of risico-aversie de enige verklaring is voor de vraag naar hoge zorgverzeke-
ringsdekking (en dus de lage vraag naar het vrijwillig eigen risico en de hoge 
vraag naar de aanvullende verzekering). Immers, de risicovermindering van 
het niet kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico en van het kopen van een aanvul-
lende verzekering lijkt beperkt. Zo kunnen Nederlandse verzekerden voor het 
hoogste vrijwillig eigen risico bedrag van €500 bijvoorbeeld €300 premiekorting 
krijgen. Dit betekent dat feitelijk slechts een financieel risico van €200 resteert. 
Anders gezegd: de meeste Nederlanders zijn bereid om €300 te betalen om een 
eigen risico van €500 af te kopen. Daarnaast zijn Nederlanders bijvoorbeeld 
bereid een tandartsverzekering te kopen voor een jaarlijkse premie van €180 
per persoon met een maximale dekking van €250 per persoon per jaar. Daar 
komt bij dat de Nederlandse aanvullende verzekering vooral toegang ver-
schaft tot reeds betaalbare zorgvormen, zoals tandartscontroles en reguliere 
behandelingen van de fysiotherapeut. Deze voorbeelden laten zien dat andere 
determinanten dan risico-aversie mogelijk een rol spelen in de vraag naar een 
hoge zorgverzekeringsdekking.
Het doel van dit proefschrift is dan ook het identificeren van mogelijke 
verklaringen voor de beperkte vraag naar het vrijwillig eigen risico in de ba-
siszorgverzekering en de grote vraag naar aanvullende zorgverzekeringen. 
Dit gebeurt door het bestuderen van de traditionele economische literatuur 
en de gedragseconomische literatuur. Daarnaast worden empirische analyses 
en simulaties uitgevoerd op basis van een gegevensbestand van een grote Ne-
derlandse zorgverzekeraar met daarin informatie over zorgkosten en diverse 
achtergrondkenmerken op verzekerde-niveau over een periode van zes jaar. De 
inzichten van dit proefschrift over de mogelijke factoren die de vraag naar zorg-
verzekeringsdekking beïnvloeden, kunnen worden gebruikt om de vormgeving 
van zorgverzekeringen in het algemeen – en het vrijwillig eigen risico en de 
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aanvullende verzekering in het bijzonder – te optimaliseren en het keuzeproces 
van de verzekerde te ondersteunen.
hET vRIJWILLIg EIgEn RISICO In dE 
baSISzORgvERzEKERIng
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt gekeken naar het financiële profijt van het kiezen voor 
een vrijwillig eigen risico als mogelijke verklaring voor het lage percentage 
verzekerden dat kiest voor een vrijwillig eigen risico. De resultaten van de 
analyses in hoofdstuk 2 laten zien dat, gegeven de gemiddelde premiekorting 
in Nederland in 2014, een vrijwillig eigen risico van €500 bovenop het verplicht 
eigen risico van €360 achteraf bezien financieel profijtelijk zou zijn geweest 
voor 48 procent van de verzekerden. Wanneer iedere Nederlander voor een 
maximaal vrijwillig eigen risico zou hebben gekozen in 2014, dan zou achteraf 
bezien 44 procent het maximale verlies lijden (namelijk €-260) en 41 procent 
de maximale winst behalen (namelijk €240). Analyses op groepsniveau laten 
zien dat een vrijwillig eigen risico aantrekkelijker is voor mannen dan voor 
vrouwen, aantrekkelijker is voor mensen zonder chronische aandoening dan 
voor mensen met een chronische aandoening en aantrekkelijker is voor mensen 
met lage zorgkosten in het verleden dan voor mensen met hoge zorgkosten 
in het verleden. Ook laten deze analyses zien dat het financiële profijt van 
het vrijwillig eigen risico afneemt naarmate de leeftijd toeneemt. Gebaseerd 
op deze resultaten wordt in hoofdstuk 2 de conclusie getrokken dat andere 
factoren dan het financiële profijt mogelijk ook een rol spelen bij het wel of niet 
kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico.
Het vrijwillig eigen risico is in Nederland, maar ook in verschillende andere 
landen zoals Duitsland, Zwitserland en de VS, ingevoerd om moral hazard te-
gen te gaan. Moral hazard is het gebruikmaken van meer of duurdere medische 
diensten, veroorzaakt door het feit dat de verzekering (een gedeelte van) de 
kosten vergoedt. Aangezien slechts 12 procent van de Nederlanders kiest voor 
een vrijwillig eigen risico, kan worden verwacht dat de totale afname in moral 
hazard beperkt is. De economische literatuur laat zien dat rationeel consumen-
tengedrag ervoor zorgt dat individuen alleen kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen 
risico wanneer hun verwachte zorgkosten onder het eigen risico flink onder 
de premiekorting liggen. Dit wordt adverse selectie genoemd en houdt in dat 
laagrisicoverzekerden (zoals jongeren en gezonde mensen) eerder geneigd zijn 
te kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico dan hoogrisicoverzekerden (zoals oude-
ren en ongezonde mensen). Adverse selectie betekent ook dat verzekerden niet 
zullen kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico in een (incidenteel) jaar waarin 
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ze (hoge) zorgkosten verwachten. Om adverse selectie tegen te gaan kunnen 
verzekeraars de premiekorting differentiëren naar de duur van het contract 
waarvoor het vrijwillig eigen risico geldt (ex-ante differentiatie genoemd) of 
naar het aantal jaren dat iemand heeft gekozen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico 
(ex-post differentiatie genoemd). Het is hierbij de verwachting dat hoe langer 
de contractduur voor het vrijwillig eigen risico of hoe groter het aantal jaren 
dat een verzekerde heeft gekozen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico, hoe hoger de 
premiekorting en dus hoe lager de premie zal zijn. Dit zou verzekerden moe-
ten stimuleren om te kiezen voor een langere contractduur voor het vrijwillig 
eigen risico of om nog een jaar te kiezen voor het vrijwillig eigen risico. Als 
gevolg hiervan kan de moral hazard reductie groter worden omdat individuen 
ook voor een vrijwillig eigen risico kiezen in een (incidenteel) jaar waarin ze 
(hoge) zorgkosten verwachten. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt gekeken hoe de premies 
er in het geval van een ex-ante of ex-post differentiatie uit zouden komen te 
zien. De resultaten van de empirische analyses laten zien dat verzekeraars 
alleen zonder risicoverevening56 in staat zouden zijn om de premie te verlagen 
naarmate de contractduur voor het vrijwillig eigen risico langer is of het aantal 
jaren dat iemand heeft gekozen voor het vrijwillig eigen risico hoger is. De 
premies zullen naar verwachting toenemen voor zowel de ex-ante als de ex-
post differentiatie in het geval van matige, goede of perfecte risicoverevening. 
Dit komt doordat, wanneer de contractduur of het aantal jaren dat iemand 
voor een vrijwillig eigen risico kiest toeneemt, de claims weliswaar afnemen, 
maar de risicovereveningsbijdrage toeneemt, waardoor de premie uiteindelijk 
toeneemt. Deze resultaten trekken de mogelijkheid van deze strategieën om 
adverse selectie tegen te gaan in twijfel.
De resultaten in hoofdstuk 2 toonden reeds dat, achteraf bezien, een vrijwil-
lig eigen risico voor ongeveer een op de twee verzekerden financieel aantrek-
kelijk is, terwijl slechts 12 procent van de verzekerden in 2016 kiest voor een 
vrijwillig eigen risico. Op basis van de gedragseconomie identificeert hoofdstuk 
4 daarom zes andere mogelijke determinanten voor de keuze voor een vrijwil-
lig eigen risico: 1) verliesaversie, 2) risicohouding, 3) ambiguïteitaversie, 4) 
schuldaversie, 5) onwil om actie te ondernemen om te veranderen en 6) liquidi-
teitsbeperkingen. Allereerst kan verliesaversie ervoor zorgen dat verzekerden 
geen vrijwillig eigen risico kiezen, omdat ze het mogelijke financiële verlies van 
het eigen risico bedrag als onprettig ervaren. Ten tweede zullen verzekerden 
zich waarschijnlijk risico-avers gedragen met betrekking tot de keuze voor een 
vrijwillig eigen risico en daarom niet kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico. 
Ten derde kan, omdat de kansverdeling van zorgkosten voor verzekerden 
56 Risicoverevening compenseert verzekeraars vooraf voor voorspelbare kostenverschillen 
tussen verzekerden.
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grotendeels onbekend is, ambiguïteitaversie57 verklaren waarom verzekerden 
niet kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico. Ten vierde kan schuldaversie ervoor 
zorgen dat verzekerden niet kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico, omdat de 
gemaakte kosten onder het vrijwillig eigen risico pas worden betaald nadat de 
zorg genuttigd is. Ten vijfde kan een onwil om actie te ondernemen om zaken 
te veranderen ervoor zorgen dat verzekerden niet kiezen voor een vrijwillig 
eigen risico omdat het kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico een handeling van 
de verzekerde vraagt. Tenslotte kunnen liquiditeitsbeperkingen ervoor zorgen 
dat verzekerden niet kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico, omdat mogelijk 
een substantieel bedrag uit eigen zak betaald moet worden. Gebaseerd op deze 
gedragseconomische factoren, draagt hoofdstuk 4 vijf mogelijke strategieën aan 
om het aantal verzekerden dat kiest voor een vrijwillig eigen risico te verhogen 
en zodoende moral hazard te verminderen: 1) het vrijwillig eigen risico vorm-
geven als een systeem waarbij de elke verzekerde sowieso een vrijwillig eigen 
risico heeft, maar ook de mogelijkheid krijgt deze af te kopen, 2) verzekerden 
informatie geven over (de werking van) het vrijwillig eigen risico, 3) verzeker-
den informatie geven over hun (verwachte) zorgkosten, 4) het vrijwillig eigen 
risico vormgeven als een no-claim teruggaveregeling en 5) het vrijwillig eigen 
risico combineren met een spaarrekening.
dE aanvuLLEndE zORgvERzEKERIng
Bij de vormgeving van zorgverzekeringen moet een afweging worden gemaakt 
tussen de voordelen van verzekeren (i.e., het poolen van risico’s) en de nadelen 
van verzekeren (i.e., moral hazard, premieopslag en transactiekosten). De 
traditionele economische literatuur laat zien dat optimale verzekeringen a) 
bescherming bieden tegen onvoorspelbare hoge financiële risico’s, b) toegang 
verschaffen tot zorgvormen die anders onbetaalbaar zouden zijn, c) eigen be-
57 Ambiguïteitaversie betreft de voorkeur van mensen voor keuzesituaties met bekende 
kansen ten opzichte van keuzesituaties met onbekende kansen. Dit werd voor het eerst 
aangetoond in een hypothetische experiment van Ellsberg uit 1961, waarin mensen werden 
geconfronteerd met twee vazen. De eerste vaas bevatte precies 100 rode en zwarte ballen, 
maar de verhouding tussen de beide kleuren was onbekend, terwijl de tweede vaas precies 
50 rode en 50 zwarte ballen bevatte. De meerderheid van de mensen gaf de voorkeur aan het 
wedden op rood of zwart in de tweede vaas in plaats van wedden op rood of zwart in de eerste 
vaas, waaruit blijkt dat zij een aversie hebben voor ambiguïteit.
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talingen aan de voet hebben58, en d) een individueel maximum stellen aan de 
eigen betalingen. Vergeleken met de optimale vormgeving zoals gesteld in de li-
teratuur, lijkt de vormgeving van de Nederlandse aanvullende zorgverzekering 
verre van optimaal. Ten eerste lijken de voordelen van de aanvullende verzeke-
ring beperkt, omdat er vergoedingslimieten gelden en de meeste zorgvormen die 
gedekt worden door de aanvullende verzekering geen grote financiële gevolgen 
hebben en dus al toegankelijk zijn. Ten tweede zijn de nadelen relatief groot. 
Moral hazard is naar verwachting substantieel, omdat de meeste zorgvormen 
die gedekt worden door de aanvullende zorgverzekering geen eigen betaling 
kennen. Daarnaast is de opslag op de premie voor de aanvullende zorgverze-
kering groot en zijn de transactiekosten voor het kiezen van een aanvullende 
verzekering hoog, omdat verzekeraars veel verschillende polissen aanbieden. 
Ondanks deze suboptimale vormgeving kiezen veel Nederlanders voor een 
aanvullende zorgverzekering.
In hoofdstuk 5 worden zeven aspecten uit de gedragseconomie geïdentifi-
ceerd die mogelijk kunnen verklaren waarom zoveel Nederlanders kiezen voor 
deze suboptimale verzekering. Allereerst is het mogelijk dat als gevolg van 
verliesaversie, ambiguïteitaversie, liquiditeitsbeperkingen en/of schuldaversie 
de welvaartswinst van het hebben van een aanvullende zorgverzekering gro-
ter is dan wanneer (één van) deze factoren afwezig zouden zijn. Een andere 
mogelijke verklaring voor het grote aantal verzekerden dat een aanvullende 
zorgverzekering koopt is dat verzekerden suboptimale keuzes maken. Dit zou 
het gevolg kunnen zijn van beperkte kennis over de aanvullende zorgverze-
kering, sociale vergelijking en/of het vermijden van beslissingen. Allereerst 
zouden verzekerden door beperkte kennis over de aanvullende zorgverzeke-
ring mogelijk niet goed weten waar ze zich precies voor verzekeren en wat de 
kosten voor de verschillende zorgvormen zijn. Ten tweede is het mogelijk dat 
verzekerden, door sociale vergelijking, simpelweg een aanvullende verzekering 
nemen omdat vrienden en familie dat ook doen. Ten derde is het mogelijk dat 
verzekerden, doordat zij het nemen van (lastige) beslissingen vermijden, hun 
huidige zorgverzekering automatisch vernieuwen zonder kritisch te kijken of 
ze ook daadwerkelijk een aanvullende zorgverzekering willen en nodig hebben.
58 Een eigen betaling aan de voet houdt in dat de eigen betaling direct vanaf de eerste 
euro aan zorgkosten geldt. Een voorbeeld van een eigen betaling aan de voet betreft het 
verplicht eigen risico van €385 dat in Nederland in 2016 geldt. Hierbij betalen verzekerden 
de eerste €385 aan zorgkosten uit eigen zak (met uitzondering van kosten voor de huisarts en 
kraamzorg). Een ander voorbeeld betreft een procentuele bijbetaling aan de voet, waarbij de 
verzekerde van iedere euro aan zorgkosten een vaststaand percentage uit eigen zak betaalt 
tot een bepaald maximum. Ook deze procentuele bijbetaling geldt dan vanaf de eerste euro die 
aan zorgkosten wordt uitgegeven.
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Ondanks dat de aanvullende verzekering in Nederland wordt aangeboden 
op een vrije markt (in tegenstelling tot de basisverzekering), kiezen bijna alle 
zorgverzekeraars ervoor om nagenoeg iedereen te accepteren voor een aanvul-
lende verzekering en om weinig tot geen premiedifferentiatie toe te passen. 
Theoretisch gezien zou dit moeten leiden tot adverse selectie, waarbij binnen 
elke premierisicogroep hoogrisicoverzekerden een grotere prikkel hebben dan 
laagrisicoverzekerden om zich aanvullend te verzekeren of hun dekking uit te 
breiden. Hoewel in het verleden bijna iedere Nederlander voor een aanvullende 
zorgverzekering koos, zijn er momenteel vier indicaties dat dergelijke adverse 
selectie al aan het optreden is in de Nederlandse markt voor de aanvullende 
zorgverzekering. Ten eerste is het percentage mensen dat een aanvullende ver-
zekering afsluit gedaald van 93 procent in 2006 naar 84 procent in 2016. Ten 
tweede kiezen verzekerden met een aanvullende zorgverzekering voor steeds 
minder uitgebreide pakketten. Ten derde is het totale technische resultaat van 
verzekeraars op de aanvullende zorgverzekering substantieel afgenomen sinds 
2008. Ten vierde stoppen steeds meer verzekeraars met het aanbieden van 
polissen die dekking bieden voor zorgvormen die voornamelijk worden gebruikt 
door hoogrisicoverzekerden en stijgen de premies van de polissen die deze zorg 
nog wel aanbieden aanzienlijk. Om deze adverse selectie tegen te gaan mogen 
verzekeraars de premie differentiëren naar achtergrondkenmerken van ver-
zekerden, maar als gevolg van maatschappelijke druk kiest bijna geen enkele 
verzekeraar hiervoor. In hoofdstuk 6 zijn empirische simulaties uitgevoerd om 
na te gaan hoe adverse selectie de premie in de loop van de tijd kan beïnvloeden 
en of premiedifferentiatie in staat is om adverse selectie tegen te gaan. De 
resultaten in dit hoofdstuk laten zien dat adverse selectie kan resulteren in een 
substantiële stijging van de premie, namelijk met tussen 21 en 50 procent na 
25 jaar. Ook laten de resultaten zien dat wanneer verzekeraars zouden antici-
peren op adverse selectie door de premie vooraf te verhogen, zowel de afname in 
het aantal mensen dat een aanvullende zorgverzekering koopt als de toename 
in de premie nog sterker zouden zijn dan wanneer verzekeraars dit niet zouden 
doen. Tenslotte laten de resultaten in hoofdstuk 6 zien dat een zeer verfijnde 
premiedifferentiatie adverse selectie zou kunnen tegengaan.
bELEIdSaanbEvELIngEn
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat naast risico-aversie, zoals aangedragen in de 
traditionele economische literatuur, verschillende andere gedragseconomische 
factoren aangewezen kunnen worden als mogelijke verklaring waarom weinig 
mensen in Nederland kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico in de basiszorgver-
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zekering en veel mensen een aanvullende zorgverzekering aanschaffen. Deze 
factoren betreffen het financiële profijt, verliesaversie, ambiguïteitaversie, 
schuldaversie, het vermijden van beslissingen, beperkte kennis over zorg-
verzekeringen, liquiditeitsbeperkingen en sociale vergelijking. Wanneer deze 
factoren inderdaad de vraag naar zorgverzekeringsdekking beïnvloeden, is het 
interessant om te bekijken hoe 1) deze inzichten de vormgeving van het vrijwil-
lig eigen risico en de aanvullende verzekering kunnen beïnvloeden en 2) het 
keuzeproces van de verzekerde het best ondersteund kan worden.
Met betrekking tot het vrijwillig eigen risico zou de vormgeving zodanig ver-
anderd kunnen worden dat meer mensen zullen kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen 
risico zodat, ceteris paribus, een grotere afname van moral hazard bewerk-
stelligd wordt. Hiertoe zou allereerst het vrijwillig eigen risico gepresenteerd 
kunnen worden als de standaardoptie, waarbij verzekerden de mogelijkheid 
hebben om het vrijwillig eigen risico af te kopen door middel van een premiestij-
ging. Het aantal mensen dat kiest voor een vrijwillig eigen risico zou hierdoor 
mogelijk kunnen stijgen, omdat 1) het effect van verliesaversie op de keuze 
voor een vrijwillig eigen risico wordt weggenomen, 2) risicozoekend gedrag van 
de verzekerde met deze vormgeving wordt gestimuleerd (het afkopen van het 
vrijwillig eigen risico is immers een zeker verlies, terwijl het behouden van 
het vrijwillig eigen risico ook een kans op winst met zich meebrengt) en 3) het 
hebben van een vrijwillig eigen risico in dit geval geen actie van de verzekerde 
verlangt. Een tweede manier om meer mensen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico te 
laten kiezen is door het vrijwillig eigen risico vorm te geven als een no-claim te-
ruggave. In dat geval betaalt de verzekerde een premie voor de zorgverzekering 
en ontvangt aan het einde van de contractperiode een vaststaand bedrag – de 
no-claim teruggave – wanneer er geen zorgkosten worden geclaimd. Wanneer 
er wel zorgkosten worden geclaimd, ontvangt de verzekerde geen of een lagere 
no-claim teruggave. In vergelijking met het huidige systeem, betaalt de verze-
kerde in het geval van de no-claim teruggave de volledige premie (dat wil zeg-
gen: de premie die hij zou hebben moeten betalen wanneer hij niet had gekozen 
voor een vrijwillig eigen risico) en kan hij een bedrag zo groot als het vrijwillig 
eigen risico terugkrijgen wanneer geen zorgkosten worden geclaimd. Met deze 
alternatieve vormgeving van het vrijwillig eigen risico zullen naar verwachting 
meer mensen kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico, omdat verliesaversie en 
schuldaversie de keuze voor een vrijwillig eigen risico minder zullen beïnvloe-
den. Het is echter de vraag of het effect op de moral hazard reductie gelijk is 
voor de huidige vormgeving van het vrijwillig eigen risico en de vormgeving in 
het geval van een no-claim teruggave.
Met betrekking tot de aanvullende verzekering laat dit proefschrift zien 
dat de Nederlandse aanvullende verzekering substantieel afwijkt van hoe een 
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optimale verzekering er theoretisch gezien uitziet. Wanneer de Nederlandse 
aanvullende zorgverzekering inderdaad niet optimaal is, rijst de vraag hoe een 
optimale verzekering er uit zou kunnen zien. In dat geval zou een aanvullende 
zorgverzekering 1) verzekerden beschermen tegen onvoorspelbare en grote 
financiële uitgaven (zoals tandartskosten na een ongeluk), 2) eigen betalingen 
aan de voet introduceren met een individueel maximum aan eigen betalingen 
en 3) de mogelijkheid bieden om te sparen voor voorspelbare kleine verliezen 
(zoals tandartscontroles). Een dergelijke vormgeving van de aanvullende zorg-
verzekering kan leiden tot een grotere welvaartswinst voor verzekerden dan de 
huidige vormgeving, omdat het beter aansluit bij het grootste voordeel van het 
afsluiten van een verzekering, namelijk bescherming bieden tegen gebeurtenis-
sen met een kleine kans, maar met zeer hoge kosten tot gevolg.
Tenslotte kunnen de inzichten in dit proefschrift leiden tot ondersteuning 
van verzekerden bij het maken van keuzes (met betrekking tot te kopen verze-
keringsdekking) die beter aansluiten bij hun voorkeuren. Dit keuzeproces kan 
ondersteund worden door twee vormen van informatievoorziening. Allereerst 
zouden verzekerden duidelijke en transparante informatie moeten krijgen over 
het vrijwillig eigen risico en de aanvullende zorgverzekering. Dergelijke infor-
matievoorziening zou betrekking kunnen hebben op hoe het vrijwillig eigen 
risico werkt en hoe het zich verhoudt tot andere eigen betalingen in de zorg 
(zoals het verplicht eigen risico), maar ook op wat de aanvullende verzekering 
precies aan dekking biedt, zowel in termen van type zorgvormen als de hoeveel-
heid dekking. Ten tweede zou het keuzeproces ondersteund kunnen worden 
door verzekerden te informeren over zorggebruik op zowel individuniveau als 
op groepsniveau. Dergelijke informatie zou kunnen laten zien hoe vaak indi-
viduen bepaalde zorgvormen consumeren en welke kosten daarmee gepaard 
gaan. Hierdoor krijgen verzekerden beter inzicht in de eigen noodzaak tot het 
al dan niet kiezen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico en/of het aanschaffen van een 
aanvullende zorgverzekering.
Dit proefschrift heeft verschillende gedragseconomische determinanten geïden-
tificeerd die, naast het financiële profijt, mogelijk kunnen verklaren waarom 
relatief weinig mensen voor een vrijwillig eigen risico in de Nederlandse 
basiszorgverzekering kiezen en relatief veel mensen een aanvullende zorgver-
zekering afsluiten. Verder onderzoek naar het effect van deze determinanten 
op de vraag naar zorgverzekeringsdekking en de implicaties daarvan voor de 
vormgeving van zorgverzekeringen en het ondersteunen van het keuzeproces 
van verzekerden blijft echter noodzakelijk.
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Na vijf jaar hard werken is het nu tijd om het dankwoord – het waarschijnlijk 
meest gelezen onderdeel van dit proefschrift – te schrijven. Ik weet nog goed 
hoe ik negen jaar geleden aan de studie Gezondheidswetenschappen, BMG 
begon: leergierig en vol energie en ambitie. Maar niet met de ambitie om weten-
schapper te worden. Echter, na een geslaagde bachelor- en masterscriptie en 
een mooi aanbod om aan een promotietraject te beginnen werd ik dan toch 
echt fulltime onderzoeker: met veel plezier en dit proefschrift tot gevolg. Ook 
al behoort een proefschrift te laten zien dat de betreffende kandidaat in staat 
is zelfstandig wetenschappelijk onderzoek uit te voeren, had dit proefschrift er 
nooit zo uit gezien zonder de steun en hulp van verschillende mensen. Graag 
wil ik de aankomende pagina’s gebruiken om een aantal van deze mensen in 
het bijzonder te bedanken.
Allereerst heeft dit proefschrift veel baat gehad bij de hulp van Wynand. Be-
dankt voor de fijne samenwerking en de interessante discussies de afgelopen 
jaren. Jouw kennis over zorg(verzekerings)systemen overal ter wereld en in 
Nederland in het bijzonder is ongekend en ook voor mijn proefschrift van grote 
waarde gebleken. In nagenoeg elk gesprek dat we voerden daagde jij mij uit 
nog meer uit de papers en de analyses te halen. Hoewel dit vaak tot nieuwe 
inzichten, nieuwe analyses en veel werk leidde, hebben de verschillende hoofd-
stukken in dit proefschrift daar veel profijt van gehad. Dankjewel dat je me 
altijd hebt weten te motiveren het meeste uit de papers te halen! Richard, ook 
jou wil ik uiteraard bedanken voor de hele fijne samenwerking. Regelmatig 
bespraken wij een paper waarvan ik vond dat alle ingrediënten er wel inzaten, 
maar waarvan ik niet goed wist wat de juiste lijn van het paper was. Jij kwam 
dan met een heldere opzet op de achterkant van datzelfde paper, waarvan ik 
me altijd afvroeg waarom ik dat niet zelf had kunnen bedenken. Jouw vernieu-
wende ideeën omtrent onderwijs werken inspirerend en motiverend!
Ook wil ik de leden van de beoordelingscommissie (Prof. dr. H. Bleichrodt, 
Prof. dr. H.M. Prast en Prof. dr. F.T. Schut) en de promotiecommissie (Prof. 
dr. J. Boone en dr. R.C.J.A. van Vliet) bedanken voor het beoordelen van mijn 
proefschrift en voor het opponeren tijdens de verdediging.
Voor de empirische analyses in dit proefschrift is gebruik gemaakt van de 
Achmea Health Database. Voor het verkrijgen van deze omvangrijke dataset 
wil ik in het bijzonder Hugo Smeets en Henk Evers bedanken: het was geen 
gemakkelijke weg, maar het resultaat mag er zijn!
Corine, bedankt voor het ontwerpen van de prachtige kaft van mijn proef-
schrift. Complimenten voor hoe jij het idee dat slechts in mijn hoofd bestond 
werkelijkheid hebt kunnen maken! En bedankt voor het geduld dat je met mij 
had wanneer ik het toch nog net iets anders wilde.
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Verder wil ik ook graag mijn (oud)ZKV/HSI-collega’s bedanken: Anne-Fleur, 
Daniëlle C., Daniëlle D., Edith, Erik, Frank, Marco, Peter, René, Rudy, Stéph-
anie, Suzanne en Trea. Bedankt voor de fijne samenwerking en de gezellige 
tijd die we hebben gehad. Anne-Fleur, Frank en Suzanne, bedankt dat ik vele 
uren op jullie pc’s mijn empirische analyses mocht uitvoeren omdat jullie een 
aanzienlijk snellere pc hadden dan ik. Erik, bedankt dat je een fijne sectieleider 
was en de appelkanjers in stand hebt gehouden nadat Wynand sectieleider-af 
was. Suzanne, bedankt dat je een fijne en geïnteresseerde kamergenoot was. 
Mijn kennis over veldrijden en econometrie is door jou zeker toegenomen. Wat 
vond ik het fijn om mijn promotietraject met jou, Daniëlle D. (maar nu eigenlijk 
Daniëlle W.), te beginnen en wat was het mooi om naast je te staan tijdens je 
verdediging! Wat fijn dat ik bij jou mijn ‘promotiehart’ kon luchten en dat we al 
snel, naast collega’s, ook vriendinnen werden. Ook ik zal ons ‘Schipholavontuur’ 
niet snel vergeten: nogmaals dank dat jij mij heel Schiphol over hebt geduwd en 
m’n koffer hebt gedragen in Zürich. Daniëlle C., ik blij dat jij van student, een 
collega en uiteindelijk een goede vriendin bent geworden. Ik vond het heerlijk 
dat we onze liefde voor interieur, kookboeken en restaurants konden delen en 
hoop (maar ga er eigenlijk van uit) dat we dit in de toekomst nog vaak zullen 
doen! Bovenal vind ik het heel bijzonder en ontzettend fijn dat jij naast mij zult 
staan tijdens de verdediging van m’n proefschrift! Ik kan niet wachten om jouw 
proefschrift in m’n handen te hebben.
Uiteraard wil ik ook heel graag m’n collega’s bij Marketing & Communi-
catie: Ernst, Laurens, Marlot, Mylène, Stefan, Susan en Wouter bedanken. 
Jullie waren een heel fijn toevluchtsoord als ik even over iets anders dan 
zorgverzekeringen wilde praten. Stefan, ook al zei jij vanaf het begin af aan 
dat promoveren niet ‘mijn ding’ was, hier ligt het proefschrift dan toch echt! 
Wouter, ik ken niemand met zo’n omvangrijke en diverse voorraad snoep en 
zo’n figuur! Graag wil ik ook mijn iBMG-collega’s bedanken met wie ik met veel 
plezier onderwijs heb mogen geven. In het bijzonder wil ik noemen: Annemieke, 
Anushka, Barbara, Carien, Jeannet, Kirti, Hanna en Marleen. Tenslotte ook 
veel dank aan de activiteitencommissie (Hanna, Iris, Kirti, Lytske, Maarten, 
Martijn, Saskia, Tim en Wouter) met wie ik veel sportieve en geslaagde activ-
iteiten heb mogen organiseren!
Daarnaast wil ik mijn lieve vrienden en familie bedanken. M’n Tang Soo Do 
maatjes, in het bijzonder Cheyenne, Gert-Jan, Jori, Mischa, Remy, Ronald, 
Ruben, Theo, Sjef en Sjoerd, bedankt voor de sportieve avonden! Een dergelijke 
lichamelijke uitdaging is zeer welkom na een dag flink met m’n hoofd bezig te 
zijn geweest. Ineke en Dick, Eric en Jolanda, Ingmar en Eline, Davy en Gera, 
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Norina en Jeroen, Bodil en Rocco, Tiffani en Mike en Anouk en Bas: de smak-
elijke etentjes, gezellige avondjes en vele uitjes die we hebben gehad waren 
een welkome afleiding tijdens het promotietraject. Bodil, jou ken ik al mijn 
hele leven en wat hebben we veel meegemaakt. Bedankt dat je de Nederlandse 
samenvatting van dit proefschrift zo kritisch hebt gelezen. Ik geloof er heilig in 
dat er een hele mooie toekomst in het verschiet ligt voor jou, Rocco en Raii. Tif-
fani, zeker aan het begin van mijn promotietraject was jij, samen met Maaike, 
een belangrijk onderdeel van ‘mijn leven buiten de universiteit’. Van jou heb 
ik geleerd te relativeren, het beste uit mezelf te halen en wat teamwork echt 
is. Ik ben nog steeds heel trots op onze tweede plek tijdens het NK van 2013! 
Anouk, dit jaar vieren wij 20 jaar vriendschap. Wie had kunnen bedenken dat 
een ontmoeting op een berg klei in de nieuwbouwwijk waar wij beiden zouden 
komen te wonen tot zo’n bijzondere vriendschap zou kunnen leiden?! Wat ben 
ik gezegend met een vriendin zoals jij! Zelfs als jij in het verre buitenland 
(Friesland, Engeland, Zuid-Afrika of Tenerife) zit, weten we elkaar te vinden. 
Ik vind het heel bijzonder dat jij naast mij zult staan tijdens de verdediging van 
m’n proefschrift en kan me geen betere paranimf bedenken.
Lieve opa en oma, gelukkig spreken we elkaar regelmatig ook al wonen jullie 
in het mooie, maar verre, Maastricht. Wat lief dat jullie zo vaak vroegen hoe 
het met mijn studie was of hoe het op school ging! Vaak legde ik dan uit dat dit 
‘een echte baan’ op een universiteit was. Ik vind het heel bijzonder dat jullie bij 
mijn verdediging zullen zijn!
Lieve Shannon, ook jij bedankt voor de nodige afleiding de afgelopen jaren. 
Wat ben ik blij dat we zo goed contact hebben en gezellig bij elkaar over de 
vloer komen. Ik vind het heel mooi om te zien dat je helemaal je plek hebt 
gevonden als fysiotherapeut. Ik ben trots op je! Ik gun jou en Sjoerd een hele 
mooie toekomst (samen met jullie tijgers)!
Lieve pa en ma, bedankt voor jullie steun, opbeurende woorden en vertrou-
wen in de afronding van m’n proefschrift de afgelopen jaren. Pap, bedankt voor 
je oprechte interesse in m’n onderzoek en kritische vragen de afgelopen jaren. 
Daar heeft m’n proefschrift zeker profijt van gehad. Mam, bedankt voor de on-
telbare uren die ik bij jou aan de keukentafel heb mogen spenderen. Dit heeft 
het nakijken van verslagen, het schrijven van artikelen en het controleren van 
de referenties een stuk aangenamer gemaakt. Bedankt voor alle koppen thee 
waarvan je me hebt voorzien, het aantal keren dat ik mocht aanschuiven voor 
het eten en je betrokkenheid bij de status van mijn ingediende papers.
Tot slot wil ik het woord tot jou, Marten, richten. Bedankt voor je liefde, je 
onvoorwaardelijke steun en je vertrouwen in mij. Je was altijd geïnteresseerd 
in m’n onderzoek en onderwijstaken. Wanneer ik eens vast zat, zelfs als het 
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om empirische analyses ging, bood je een luisterend oor en nam je de tijd om 
mee te denken. Wat is het fijn om iemand te hebben die tegen het einde van 
het kalenderjaar de ‘zorgverzekeringsadviestaak’ voor vrienden en familie van 
mij overneemt! Bedankt dat je me af en toe tot rust dwingt, voor alle heerlijke 
(en steeds mooiere wordende) cappuccino’s en het fijne thuis dat je me biedt. Ik 
kan niet wachten op alle mooie dagen die we nog samen (met de tijgers) mogen 
doorbrengen!


PhD Portfolio

213
P
Name  K.P.M. (Kayleigh) van Winssen
Department institute of Health Policy and Management (iBMG)
PhD Period September 2011 – August 2016
Promotor Prof. dr. W.P.M.M. van de Ven
Copromotor dr. R.C. van Kleef
Phd training year
A successful doctoral track / “Klaar in 4 jaar” 2011
Training in Problem-based Learning (Dutch PGO) 2011
Studievaardigheden 2012
Gesprekstechnieken en coachingsvaardigheden 2012
Academic writing in English 2012
Begeleiden van schrijfopdrachten 2012
Geven van onderwijs I: kleine groepen 2012
Beoordelen van schrijfopdrachten 2012
Patient Preferences in the Delivery of Healthcare 2013
Toetsing I: beoordeling en feedback 2013
Mediatraining for PhDs (Eva Kuit) 2013
Geven van onderwijs II: plenaire bijeenkomsten 2014
Droomwerk coaching (Bureau Dolly) 2015
Employability 2015
Seminars and conferences year
Health Policy Workshop “Incentives in health insurance: the role of cost sharing”, Utrecht 
(Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa), the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) 
and the Tilburg Law and Economics Center of Tilburg University (TILEC))
2011
Meeting “Zorgsparen”, Soest (PGGM) 2011
European Conference on Health Economics, Zürich 2012
Meeting “Marktwerking: een mond vol tanden?”, Amsterdam (NVSST) 2012
Netwerkbijeenkomst “Slimme eigen betalingen en zorgsparen”, Rotterdam (iBMG) 2013
LOLA Health Economics Study Group, Nunspeet 2013
Symposium “Aanvullende verzekering”, Den Haag (Ministry of Finance) 2013
European Conference on Health Economics, Dublin 2014
214
Presentations year
iBMG, Rotterdam 2012
NVSST Meeting “Marktwerking: een mond vol tanden?”, Amsterdam 2012
Netwerkbijeenkomst “Slimme eigen betalingen en zorgsparen”, Rotterdam 2013
iBMG, Rotterdam 2013
iBMG, Rotterdam 2014
European Conference on Health Economics, Dublin 2014
iBMG, Rotterdam 2015
iBMG, Rotterdam 2016
Media performance year
Radio interview “Radio 1”: Verhogen eigen risico scheelt helft verzekerden geld 2014
Radio interview “RTV Rijnmond”: Helft verzekerden laat geld liggen door eigen risico 2014
Radio quote “3FM”: Veel mensen profijt van hoger eigen risico 2014
Several news websites (e.g., Nu.nl, Skipr, Vara Kassa, Radar, Financieel Dagblad) 2014
Article in “Reformatorisch Dagblad”: je kunt tientjes besparen op zorgpolis 2014
Article in “Erasmus magazine”: De kwestie: je kunt honderden euro’s besparen op je 
zorgverzekering
2014
Article in “Healthy”: Slim kiezen van je zorgverzekering 2015
Article in “Margriet”: Je geld of je gezondheid? 2016
Teaching activities Period
Multivariate Analyses (Bachelor 2), lecturer and tutor working groups 2011-2013 & 
2015
Zorgverzekeringen en Zorgstelsel (Bachelor 3 & Pre-master), tutor working groups  2011-2014
Schrijf- en onderzoeksvaardigheden (Pre-master), supervisor 2012-2014
Mentor first-year bachelor students (Bachelor 1) 2012-2016
Stage (Bachelor 1), tutor working groups and supervisor 2013-2016
Patient Preferences in the Delivery of Healthcare (Master), supervisor 2014
Kwantitatief leeronderzoek (Pre-master), supervisor 2016
dutch publications
Van Winssen, K.P.M., Van Kleef, R.C., Van de Ven, W.P.M.M.: Zorgsparen reduceert zorgkosten. 
ESB 97(4643), 548-551 (2012)
Van Winssen, K.P.M., Van Kleef, R.C., Van de Ven, W.P.M.M.: Naschrift bij: Zorgsparen reduceert 
zorgkosten. ESB 97(4646), 647 (2012)
Van Winssen, K.P.M., Van Kleef, R.C., Van de Ven, W.P.M.M.: Vrijwillig eigen risico profijtelijker 
dan gedacht. ESB 99(4696), 658-661 (2014)
215
P
non-peer reviewed English publications
Van Winssen, K.P.M., Van Kleef, R.C., Van de Ven, W.P.M.M.: Saving for healthcare: an 
interesting option to increase the attractiveness of voluntary deductibles. Health and Ageing 
Newsletter of the Geneva Association N°28 (2013)
Van Winssen, K.P.M., Van Kleef, R.C., Van de Ven, W.P.M.M.: Why do so many individuals choose 
suboptimal supplementary health insurance in the Netherlands? Working Paper iBMG 2015.02 
(2015)
additional activities Period
Member of the housing committee 2013-2015
Member of the activities committee 2013-2016
Reviewer for The European Journal of Health Economics 2016

About the author

219
a
Kayleigh van Winssen (1988) studied Health Sciences from 2007 to 2010 and 
obtained her master’s degree in Health Economics, Policy and Law with a 
specialisation in Health Economics in 2011 at the Erasmus University Rot-
terdam. From 2011 to 2016, she worked at the institute of Health Policy and 
Management (iBMG) on her PhD research on determinants of the demand for 
health insurance coverage. The results of this research are published in several 
(peer-reviewed scientific) journals, including the European Journal of Health 
Economics, Health Policy and Economische Statistische Berichten. In addition, 
she presented her work at (inter)national (scientific) conferences, including the 
European Conference on Health Economics in 2014 (Dublin, Ireland). During 
the first years of her PhD, Kayleigh practised acrobatics at the sub top level, 
culminating in a second place at the National Championships in 2013. After a 
compelled stop with acrobatics, Kayleigh found a new challenge in Tang Soo 
Do – a Korean martial art – in which she became National Champion orange 
belt (2014) and green belt (2015) for adult women.
As a teacher, Kayleigh was involved in different courses of the bachelor 
and pre-master program Health Sciences and master program Health Econom-
ics, Policy and Law at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. She was a tutor 
and lecturer for the course “Multivariate analyses” and a tutor for the course 
“Health Insurance and Healthcare System”. Furthermore, she supervised sev-
eral pre-master theses and master students with a DCE-study (course “Patient 
Preferences in the Delivery of Health Care”). Additionally, she was a mentor for 
first-year students (2012–2016) and supervised their internships.
Besides her research and teaching activities, Kayleigh was a member of the 
housing committee from 2013 to 2015, a member of the activities committee 
from 2013 to 2016 and a reviewer for the European Journal of Health Econom-
ics.
The health insurance density in the Neth-
erlands is among the highest in the world. 
This is shown by the fact that, in 2016, only 
12 per cent of the Dutch insured opted 
for a reduction of health insurance cover-
age in the form of a voluntary deductible, 
while, at the same time, 84 per cent of the 
Dutch insured opted for an extension of 
health insurance coverage in the form of 
a supplementary health insurance. On the 
cover of this dissertation, this is illustrated 
by two individuals in a grocery store with 
the same basket of goods. The young wom-
en, however, reduces her basket by putting 
a product back onto the shelf (illustrating 
the voluntary deductible), while the old man 
extends his basket by adding a product (il-
lustrating the supplementary insurance). This 
dissertation questions whether risk aver-
sion alone can explain the low uptake of 
voluntary deductibles and the high uptake 
of supplementary insurance, since the value 
in terms of reduction of financial uncer-
tainty regarding financial losses is limited in 
those cases. Therefore, this dissertation aims 
to identify potential explanations for the 
demand for high health insurance coverage. 
The insights provided within this disserta-
tion could be used to optimise the design 
of health insurance – and more specifically 
the design of voluntary deductibles and the 
supplementary insurance – and to better 
facilitate the individual’s decision-making 
process concerning the demand for health 
insurance coverage.
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